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Micro energy grid (MEG) is widely used to meet the combined electricity, heating, 
cooling and natural gas demands for numerous customers’ types. Design of MEGs were 
extensively introduced in numerous articles, however safety analysis methods for MEG 
design are not existing so far. This study develops a hazard and operability (HAZOP) 
matrix for MEGs by proposing a resilience matrix (RM). In addition, it proposes two 
advanced risk-modeling approaches, namely fault tree and layer of resilience analysis 
(LORA), for risk and resilience analysis of MEG. Selected independent resilience layers 
(IRLs) were proposed to achieve a resilient MEG by increasing safety integrity level (SIL).  
IRLs are applied using co-generation and thermal energy storage (TES) technologies to 
mitigate the hazards of system failure, increase efficiency, and minimize greenhouse gas 
emissions. The proposed risk assessment approach aims to design a resilient MEG that has 
the ability to deal with those potentials efficiently. In addition, an energy risk analysis has 
been applied to each MEG’s physical domains such as electrical, thermal, mechanical and 
chemical. These concurrent objectives lead to achieving higher resilience, fewer 
greenhouse gases emissions, and greater sustains economy. 
A multi-level hierarchical decision making (MLHDM) is one of the IRLs that are 
proposed in this study. It aims to boost the MEG’s self-healing features on risks uncertainty 
of the system operation. The structural design of MLHDM consists of three concurrent 
levels functioning together to achieve a resilient operation. The simulation results of the 
proposed resilient MEG infrastructure that combine a selected group of IRLs, shows the 
ability to work with high level of self-healing capability under various hazardous scenarios 
as well as meeting the on-demand energy requirement. 
On the other hand, intelligent reasoning algorithms using Bayesian belief network 
(BBN) are proposed to accurately and instantaneously estimate risks in MEG. The offered 
BBN based monitoring/alarm system is one of the IRLs that are proposed in this study for 
a resilient MEG design. This study introduces a hybrid-safety assessment approach for 




The approach enables measuring the MEG’s condition using fault diagnosis assessment 
by means of a hybrid BBN and ANFIS based model. The BBN is capable to form a 
consistent function of MEG’s uncertainty based on experts’ contribution more than the data 
from measurement instruments (I&Cs). The proposed method shows a capability to predict 
the source(s) of failure by using fault-assessment computation process for the observed 
symptoms.  
Finally, the methods and data that were proposed and used in this research are validated 
by using three main types of validation namely validation of MEG simulation, validation 
of LORA and validation of BBN. The validation results of the proposed safety analysis 
tools reveal promising solution for designing resilient MEG. 
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Symbol Definition Units 
Ai The ability for failure avoidance N/A 
Axs Tank cross-sectional area m
2 
   
Ci Class hazard event likelihood N/A 
COP Coefficient of Performance N/A 
Cp Storage fluid heat capacity J/K 
Ctp Specific heat of products of combustion Btu/lbm
oF 
e HRSG effectiveness N/A 
E[x] Quantifying Risk N/A 
𝒇 Fuel m3 
Fi Frequency  N/A 
F(t) The probability of failure on demand f/yr 
fn LOPA f/yr 
Hl Hazard level N/A 
hsaf Saturated liquid enthalpy in steam drum kJ/kg 
hsh Enthalpy of steam leaving superheater kJ/kg 
K A constant for calibration purpose N/A 
L A factor to account radiation and other losses= 
0.985 
N/A 
N Speed rpm 
P Pressure  Pa 
pi Probability density N/A 
p(v,w) Joint probability f/yr 
Pin Power input to MEG kW 
ρ Density  kgm-3 
P Tanks perimeter m 
p(v|w) Conditional probability  f/yr 
pow Power kW 
r A constant variable N/A 
R Reliability N/A 
Si The consequence severity of the hazard event N/A 
𝝉 Torque Nm 
T Time s 
Tm Temperature  K 
T1 Gas temperature afterburner 
oF 
T3 Saturation temperature in steam drum 
oF 
U Tank fluid to ambient overall heat transfer 
coefficient 
Btu/(ft2 h oF) 




W Random event N/A 
Wm Mass flow rate  kgs-1 
wi Weight of importance (0-1) N/A 
Ws Steam flow rate lb/hr 
Wg Exhaust flow rate to HRSG lb/hr 
xi Random variable for severity consequence N/A 
σ Pressure loss coefficient N/A 
η Efficiency  N/A 
ρ Storage fluid density kg/m3 
∆x Length of node m 
?̇? Mass flow rate Kg/s 






List of Abbreviations 
AC 
Alternating current, an electric current that reverses its direction 
many times a second at regular intervals 
Availability 
The likelihood that a system or equipment will operate satisfactorily 
and effectively at any given point in time. 
ANFIS Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System  
ANN 
Artificial Neural Network is an information processing paradigm that 
emulates the biological nervous systems 
BBN 
Bayesian Belief Network is a probabilistic graphical model that 
illustrates a set of random variables with their conditional dependencies 
using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). 
CC 
The combined-cycle power station, In electric power generation a 
combined cycle is an assembly of heat engines that work in tandem off 
the same source of heat, converting it into mechanical energy, which in 
turn usually drives electrical generators. The principle is that the 
exhaust of one heat engine is used as the heat source for another, thus 
extracting more useful energy from the heat, increasing the system's 
overall efficiency 
CG 
Co-generation is a power plant that produces electricity but does not 
waste the by-product of heat. The heat is used for district heating or 
other purposes, and thus the overall energy production efficiency is 
improved. 





Distributed energy resources are smaller energy sources that can be 
aggregated to provide the required energy to meet regular demand. 
DG 
Distributed generation, is generated or stored by a variety of 
small, grid-connected devices referred to as distributed energy 
resources (DER) 
DNS 
Demand not served, is the failure to provide a sufficient energy to 





A fault tolerant system where faults are explicitly detected and 
accommodated. 
FPGA 
A field-programmable gate array (FPGA) is an integrated circuit has 
the capability to be configured by a customer after manufacturing 
FTA 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a hierarchical failure analysis using 
Boolean logic to combine a series of basic fault events to define the 
probability of top even failure 
HRSG 
Heat recovery steam generator, an energy recovery heat exchanger 
that recaptures heat from a hot gas stream produced by the prime mover 
engine. 
IPL 
Independent protection layer, A device, system, or action that is 
capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to the undesired 
consequence without being adversely affected by the initiating event or 
the action of any other protection layer associated with the scenario. 
IRL 
independent resilience layer a modification of the IPL for enhancing 






Refers to the condition in which a distributed generator (DG) 
continues to power a location even though electrical grid power from 
the electric utility is no longer present. 
LOPA 
A layer of protection analysis is a method of analyzing the likelihood 
(frequency) of a harmful outcome event based on an initiating event 
frequency and on the probability of failure of a series of independent 
layers of protection capable of preventing the harmful outcome. 
LORA 
A layer of resilience analysis is a method of analyzing the likelihood 
(frequency) of a harmful outcome event based on an initiating event 
frequency and on the probability of failure of a series of independent 
layers of resilience able to prevent the harmful outcome. 
MEG 
Micro energy grid, a system that comprises intelligent energy sources 
and distribution systems, automated metering, and a specialized 
computing system. 
MG 
A microgrid is a district energy system comprising of distributed 
energy sources, energy storage and loads. It has the capability to 
operate with or independently from the utility grid. 
MLHDM 
A multi-level hierarchical decision making. It enhances the self-
healing characteristics of MEG against uncertainty hazards during the 
system operation. 
MTTF 
Mean time to failure, is the predicted elapsed time between inherent 
failures of a system during operation. 
PFD 
Probability Failure on Demand, the probability that a system will fail 






Phasor measurement unit (PMU) or synchro-phasor is a device which 
measures the electrical waves on an electricity grid, using a common 
time source for synchronization. Time synchronization allows 
synchronized real-time measurements of multiple remote measurement 




Power-system protection is a branch of electrical power engineering 
that deals with the protection of electrical power systems from faults 
through the isolation of faulted parts from the rest of the electrical 
network. The objective of a protection scheme is to keep the power 
system stable by isolating only the components that are under fault, 
whilst leaving as much of the network as possible still in operation. 
Thus, protection schemes must apply with very pragmatic and 
pessimistic approach to clearing system faults. The devices that are 




The devices that are used to protect the power systems from faults 
PV 
Photovoltaic, solar power technology that turns sunlight directly into 
electricity. 
PVC 
A photovoltaic cell, often used interchangeably with 
PV module (especially in one-module systems), but more accurately 
used to refer to a physically connected collection of modules (i.e., a 
laminate string of modules used to achieve a 
required voltage and current). 
PVs 
Process variables, the measurements variables for monitoring and 





The probability of a system to perform a required function under 





Renewable energy sources are naturally replenishable but flow-
limited. They are virtually inexhaustible in duration but limited in the 
amount of energy that is available per unit of time. Such as biomass, 
hydro, geothermal, solar and the wind. In the future, they could also 
include the use of ocean thermal, wave, and tidal action technologies. 
Risk 
assessment 
Risk assessment A systematic process of evaluating the potential 
risks that may be involved in a projected activity or undertaking. 
Risk 
Management 
Risk Management, The systematic application of management 
policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of establishing the 
context, identifying, analyzing, assessing, treating, monitoring and 
communicating. 
RM 
Resilience Matrix is a proposed matrix that is used for risk and 
resilience assessment to define the level of risk by considering the 
category of probability or likelihood against the category of 
consequence severity and the ecological risk index. 
ROI 
Return on investment, the amount of profit, before tax and after 
depreciation, from an investment made, usually expressed as a 
percentage of the original total cost invested. 
Safety 
The safe state is a freedom from the risk of injury, danger, or loss. It 
is the condition of being protected from harm or other non-desirable 
consequences. Safety can also refer to the control of recognized hazards 






Safety design is the concept of minimizing hazards and eliminating 
danger level through applying detailed planning of the necessary 
safeguards plus the selection of appropriate technologies. It is essential 
to integrate a detailed safety design before the concrete implementation, 
in order to avoid subsequent costs, increase the system's availability and 
reduce downtime. 
SAIFI 
System average interruption frequency index, An index of average 
power interruption frequency within electricity distribution. Measured 
in terms of the number of power interruptions per customer and year. 
Severity 
A measure of the seriousness of fault effects using verbal 
characterization. Severity considers the worst case damage to 
equipment, damage to the environment, or degradation of a system’s 
operation. 
SIF 
Safety Instrumented Functions are the specific control functions 
performed by a SIS. They are implemented as part of an overall risk 
reduction strategy which is intended to eliminate the likelihood of a 
previously identified failure event that could range from minor 
equipment damage up to an event involving an uncontrolled 
catastrophic release of energy and/or materials. 
SIL 
Safety integrity level is a measurement of performance required for 
a safety instrumented function (SIF). 
SIS 
Safety instrumented system, an instrumented system used to 
implement one or more safety instrumented functions. It is a 
combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s). IEC 






Safety performance indicators, is a high-level measure of system's 
safety output, traffic or another usage, simplified for gathering and 
review on a weekly, monthly or quarterly basis. 
TES 
Thermal energy storage refers to the technology that allows the 
transfer and storage of heat energy or, alternatively, energy from ice or 
cold air or water. The storage of thermal energy (heat or cool) during 
power provider off-peak times at night, for use during the next day 
without incurring daytime peak electric rates. 
WT 
Wind turbine, A device that captures the force of the wind to provide 







The beginning of micro-grids (MGs) were started as early as the beginning of using 
distributed generations (DGs) to supply small towns with electric power in the late 19th 
century. MG is an expression for small-scale, i.e. low and medium voltage distribution 
grids consists of DGs and loads. The last two decades show a significant increase of using 
interconnected DGs into the distribution grids due to the rapid development of the 
renewable energy technologies namely fuel cell (FC), solar energy (PV) and wind energy 
(WT). The main advantages of using renewable energy sources (RES) can be summarized 
as follows: the capability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the natural alternative energy 
source for fossil fuel that is dramatically depleted and a solution for the rapid increase on 
power demand and transmission losses [1].  
Many benefits were alleged for using MGs in the 21st-century grids such as MGs are 
cheaper, more reliable and cleaner than legacy-grids [2]. Nevertheless, these are not true 
for every MG as several factors are influencing each entity. Eventually, most of the existing 
MGs are unable to concurrently achieve all the above mentioned benefits. Using MG has 
proven that it cannot be a cheaper option as two-thirds of all fuel used to produce power 
electricity is mostly wasted by emitting unused thermal energy from power generation 
system into the air or into water streams (e.g. sea and river). The average efficiency of 
power generation has remained around 33 percent since 1960. Therefore, with the 
increasing concerns regarding energy reliability and emissions, the claim on a combination 
of distributed energy resources (DERs), district cooling/heating units, energy storage 
devices, and renewable energy sources (RES) are increasing accordingly. The combination 
is widely deployed to meet the energy demands of electricity, cooling and heating for 
numerous types of buildings [3]. This combination is commonly named micro energy grids 
(MEGs). 
MEGs defined as a system comprises intelligent energy sources, distribution systems, 




overall energy efficiency of the energy system, as well as to provide environmental benefits 
by reducing primary energy consumption and related greenhouse gas emissions [5]. 
The MEG has become a key point in the energy system for several reasons. Firstly, these 
systems can upsurge the energy efficiency up to 90 percent by utilizing thermal energy by-
product of power generation for cooling, heating, and humidity control systems [6]. 
Secondly, with the rapid development of MEG technologies, the renewable energy industry 
has become one of the fastest growing industries in the last two decades [7]. The integration 
of renewable energy systems (RES), such as photovoltaic (PV), wind turbine (WT), small 
hydro, geothermal, waste-to-energy, and combined heat and power systems (CHPs), into 
the conventional energy grids improves the energy efficiency, increases the system’s 
reliability and reduces the greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, the MEG is considered an 
integrated energy system, which contributes a high dynamic distribution system for 
different types of energy such as electricity, cooling, heating and natural gas [8].  
1.2 Problem Definition 
Till date, the studies on risk analysis of MEGs are rare and incomplete, despite it is 
paramount for designing resilient MEG. Failure in any components such as DERs may 
increase the hazard(s) of demand not served (DNS) and/or general blackout/brownout. In 
addition, utilizes of on-site renewable sources (RES) that have accompanying 
unpredictability and variability may affect the integrity of MEGs. Thus, MEGs require a 
high adaptive performance from the distributed energy systems [9]. 
Boosting the MEGs’ resiliency improves the grids’ reliability, increases fuel source 
variety and enhances national security [10]. The reliability idiom defines the capability of 
the energy system to offer the energy service to all customers at an affordable price [11]. 
However, the utility’s grid reliability is decreased dramatically as much as the number of 
customers (i.e. residential, commercial and industrial) increases [12]. 
Basically, MEG reduces energy squandering and increases self-healing capability [13]. 
Whilst the conventional energy system generates these different types of energy 
independently, which causes low energy efficiency and high operational costs [14]. MEG 




energy management controller to reduce electricity costs and emissions, as well as to 
improve energy reliability and efficiency [8]. 
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) definition of the power 
reliability can be extended to define the energy grid reliability as an integration of grid 
sufficiency (energy production meets demand) and grid security (capability to adapt 
disturbances). However, the 21st-century energy systems require grids that have the ability 
to continuously operate during various topologies conditions and to withstand in abnormal 
events by eliminating hazardous consequences that influence life quality, economic 
activity, and environmental sustainability. Therefore, the reliability, as a definition, is not 
enough for MEG’s sustainability that needs to be enhanced by resilient method(s). 
MEG analysis should have a wider perspective of the energy grids, not only as energy 
flow but also as grids that serve and influence people and societies. Hence, it requires 
studying the consequences of each component failure within MEG infrastructure. 
Several advantages can be gained by utilizing resilient MEGs, as listed below [15]: 
1. Enhance the reliability of system’s performance, 
2. Enhance customers’ awareness and choices, 
3. Encourage efficient decisions to be taken by the utility provider, 
4. Provide a closer proximity between energy generation and energy use. Thus, lower 
costs and losses. 
When resilient MEG technology is applied to a city, the city is called a “Smart Green 
City”, such as Canada's Dockside or the UAE’s Masdar. 
From a systems perspective, the MEG as one controllable unit that combines energy 
sources, loads, and storage units, has the ability to supply electricity, cooling, heating and 
natural gas energy to the end users independently [16]. Thus, during the peak demand 
period, or at energy failure occurrence, the MEG can operate independently out of the 
utility grids by isolating its energy nodes (generation and load) from disturbance without 
affecting the larger grid's integrity. On the other hand, integrating multi-DERs, particularly 




due to the intermittent and varied characteristics of the environment. further to the 
uncertainty of dealing with indefinite system’s behavior, which means constructing such a 
large complex system, MEG, with the uncertainty of dealing with various unknown 
parameters, which increase the hazardous condition [17]. Thus, there is an increased 
demand to design MEGs with higher safety fault tolerance of numerous types of risks 
compared with classical discrete systems [18]. Therefore, quantitative and qualitative terms 
of risks that threaten the MEG are mandatory for design of resilient MEG with high fault-
tolerant capability. Hereby, the risk analysis becomes a fundamental part of practical 
MEGs. 
Faults in MEGs, if not controlled properly, might propagate and cause blackouts and/or 
energy outages. However, faults detection and toleration action in MEGs are still open 
research areas. The existing studies about hazard estimation are on a case-by-case basis 
[19]. Estimating the fault propagation and analyzing the consequences are major challenges 
for safety design verification. To implement a precise safety verification approach, it is 
vital to analyze and diagnose all hazard and fault events of the MEG and to study fault 
propagation scenarios. 
Faults in MEG causes abnormal operating occurrence that leads to degradation in 
performance. Therefore, fault analysis of the MEG is important at design and operation 
stages. Fault prognosis and diagnosis respectively, have direct benefits on energy 
optimization and operating cost savings. Different fault prognosis and diagnosis 
approaches have been developed for several types of complex systems. Nowadays, the fault 
detection, diagnosis and prognosis methodologies has become engaged in various system 
analysis, from univariate statistical process control to multivariate control systems [20]. In 
general, control charts are created based on critical quality attributes of the process, e.g. 
CUSUM chart. The control chart helps to identify the cause of the failure once indicated 
by operator [21]. However, it is difficult to identify the failure root without expert’s 
contribution as there are many factors that may cause a certain failure mode [22]. 
Moreover, different control charts are necessary for identifying different problem types. 




simultaneously. Several fault diagnosis and prognosis methods were presented in many 
articles toward providing practical solutions as discussed in Section 2.11.  
Although, Bayesian belief networks (BBN) have been extensively developed for fault 
prognosis and diagnosis in several fields, as shown in Section 2.12. It can be concluded 
that BBN has not been applied yet to MEG diagnosis and prognosis. Therefore, this study 
offers the application of BBN for fault diagnosis and prognosis in MEG by implementing 
the BBN model for a concerned MEG, the uncertainty between control parameters and 
their impact on energy performance can be qualitatively interpreted to a unique BBN 
structure and quantitatively presented by determining the conditional probability table 
(CPT) for each node in the BBN structure. 
The performance of the proposed resilient MEG, that guarded by selected independent 
resilience layers (IRLs) can be validated by implementing a model for the MEG case study 
in Matlab-Simulink platform. The mathematical equations of the model performance can 
be converted into a more tangible model by using interactive graphical shapes in the 
Simulink environment. 
1.3 Objectives  
The work addresses one of the most challenging problems on our society as it focuses 
on the transition from a centralized energy production to a distributed ones. The thesis 
outlines the advantages of this process and deals with its most critical issue namely the 
resiliency of the new energy paradigm. MEGs are efficiently exploited the primary fuels 
but due to its innovative structure and limited hardware capabilities, many critical points 
to be studied in its response to fault conditions. In order to assess MEG’s resiliency, many 
aspects must be considered namely society, economy and environment.  
The main objective of this study is to propose a practical methodology using safety 
design/analysis tools to attain resilient MEGs. This can be achieved by developing the 
hazard analysis and the risk assessment methods for MEGs, this can be implemented by 
Study hazards and estimate risks of MEG such as hazards in electricity, heating, cooling, 
transportation and natural gas sectors. In addition to the hazards of natural phenomena. The 




and prioritize the risks according to its associated risk rank. Therefore this research should 
focus on defining and developing numerous independent resilience layers (IRLs) for MEG 
safety design in order to increase SIL and reduce the risk. The MEG’s risk level can be 
evaluated by using two advanced approaches, i.e. developed fault tree analysis (FTA) and 
advanced layer of resilience analysis (LORA) to estimate changes in safety integrity level 
(SIL) due to integrating selected independent resilience layers (IRLs) to the MEG entity. 
The development of risk analysis tools for resiliency is leading to define a new performance 
indicators named resilience risk performance indicator (RRPIs).  
In addition, this research is focusing on proposing a non SIF IRL and a SIF IRL 
successively a hierarchical decision making structure for MEG and a MEG alarm system. 
A smart fault prognosis system able to predict risk-roots is proposed using Bayesian 
belief network (BBN) and Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy interference system (ANFIS). The 
strategy is to develop advanced and more robust predictive techniques to improve the 
resiliency of MEG condition monitoring systems. 
The specific objectives of the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
1- Study hazard scenarios for MEG by proposing a resilience matrix and developing a 
resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI) to measure the MEG resiliency 
2- Define, develop and propose independent resilience layers (IRLs) for resilient MEG 
3- Propose layer of resilience analysis (LORA) for safety analysis tools for resilient MEG 
design and utilize the fault tree analysis (FTA) for resiliency assessment 
4- Study and implement an intelligent reasoning algorithm by using BBN and ANFIS 
techniques for resilience design and verification of MEG. 
1.4 Methodology Framework 
This research concerns in proposing a methodology of safety design and evaluation to 
achieve resilient micro energy grid (MEG). This method pursues to offer a tool to achieve 
an accurate design of resilient MEG, by proposing safety design tools namely developed 




required independent resilience layers (IRLs), consist of SIF and non-SIF components, to 
achieve an acceptable safety tolerance margin.  
Specialised intelligent reasoning algorithm like Bayesian inference, Neural Networks 
and Fuzzy Logic are employed in forecasting the behavior of the MEG under different 
working scenarios. The proposed algorithm offers a tool for MEGs safety design analysis 
(prognosis) and for MEGs fault identification (diagnosis) as well. Several hazards 
scenarios were studied in order to examine the MEG self-healing and resilience 
performance. Fig. 1.1 shows the steps followed to achieve the objective of the research 
study. 
The framework shown below begins with the study of a theoretical model of a MEG 
design case study that is presented in CHAPTER 3 and implements a static and dynamic 
simulation models by using the Simulink platform in order to study and validate the 
proposed safety design techniques for a resilient MEG structure. Different levels of the 
simulation are used from the models of the components to one of their interactions as 





Fig. 1.1: Methodology framework for this thesis 
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The next step is the hazard analysis by studying risks that threaten the MEGs’ resiliency. 
The resilience matrix (RM) is proposed in Section 4.2. The RM consists information about 
quantitative and qualitative risk estimation. In addition, it shows forecasted risk 
consequences and offers the available mitigation and prevention actions. The resilience 
risk performance indicator (RRPI) is used as KPI to evaluate the MEG’s performance. 
The third step is the risk assessment that illustrated in CHAPTER 4. Where the safety 
integrity level (SIL) for a MEG was determined and two risk assessment tools were 
proposed namely a developed fault tree analysis (FTA) and an advanced layer of resilience 
analysis (LORA) to evaluate/improve the resilience of MEG. The probability failure on 
demand (PFD) and the safety integrity level (SIL). 
A study of the safety performance for selected IRLs was attained in order to be utilized 
in a MEG to improve the RRPI value and the resilience of a MEG. Different types of safety 
instrumented systems (SIF) such as MEG alarm system, load shading system and 
emergency shutdown system (ESD) were utilized for additional improve the resiliency. 
A non-SIF IRL is proposed in CHAPTER 5 by implementing a multi-level hierarchical 
decision making structure and validate the new resilient MEG through numerous hazard 
scenarios were simulated for design validation of the proposed resilient MEG. 
A SIF IRL MEG’s alarm system was proposed in CHAPTER 6 by using a BBN-ANFIS 
based intelligent fault reasoning for MEG. The proposed fault reasoning tool has the ability 
to predict risks and diagnose faults to improve the MEG condition monitoring systems that 
have a direct positive impact on the MEGs’ resiliency. 
Finally, three validation process were proposed to verify the data and methods that 
offered in this study, i.e. the MEG simulation model, LORA and BBN. 
Hence, the risk analysis techniques that proposed in this study can be projected on 
different MEG entities by minor tune-ups to fit the new MEG configuration. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 




The next chapter, CHAPTER 2, presents a review of ultimate literature associated with 
this study. Fundamental of the micro energy grid, the definition of risk concepts of fault 
detection and diagnosis are briefly explained. In addition, a review of hazard and risk 
analysis, safety and protection were presented.  
CHAPTER 3 is devoted to describe a selected case study of MEG’s infrastructure and 
extensively discuss the mathematical formula of its components. In addition, modeling and 
simulation of a selected MEG are presented in this chapter. Additionally, three baseline 
operational scenarios are studied to evaluate the MEG’s performance. 
CHAPTER 4 defines the hazard and risk in MEGs, proposes resilience matrix and 
defines/propose resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI). Then demonstrates problems 
associated with the MEG design and operation process. In addition, it determines the 
definition of MEGs’ resilience design. It proposes methodologies for MEG fault analysis 
namely fault tree analysis and layer of resilience analysis (LORA) and finally, discusses 
the self-healing mechanism for MEGs. 
CHAPTER 5 three control types of MEG’s are presented in brief. Then a hierarchical 
decision making structure is proposed by using a neuro-fuzzy decision-making method. 
Finally, a selected operational scenarios are studied to evaluate the MEG’s performance. 
CHAPTER 6 devotes for discussing and developing MEG’s fault detection and 
diagnosis approaches by proposing Bayesian belief network (BBN) and Adaptive Neuro-
Fuzzy interference system (ANFIS) technologies. 
CHAPTER 7 validates the data and methods used/proposed in this research. Three main 
items will be validated namely the simulation of MEG operation, LORA and BBN. 










 Literature Review 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of existing literature related to the 
research study. The flow of the chapter will start by introducing ultimate references in the 
basic concepts of micro energy grids (MEGs) and its main distributed energy resources 
(DERs). The recent citation in fault detection techniques and fault tolerant control 
methodologies for MEG are studied in order to have sufficient knowledge before going 
through the hazards and risk analysis discussion, which is the key point for safety and self-
healing methods. Also, references in protection and energy management are justified for 
system reliability and energy optimization. Numerous techniques for MEGs management 
and optimization are discussed to illustrate benefits on economic, sustainability and 
environment. Different fault diagnosis and prognosis methods for several applications are 
illustrated then Bayesian belief networks methods and implementation for online fault 
detection and diagnosis of different application are discussed. 
2.1 Micro Energy Grid 
Micro energy grid is an entity consists energy sources and loads that are in a capacity of 
50MW and less [23], which typically operates in connection with traditional utility grid 
nevertheless it can be disconnected to island mode. In [24] a coupled microgrids were 
proposed by utilizing the waste heat that is co-produced by the combined heat and power 
(CHP), and gas generators in the MG. the new configuration enhance the reliability, self-
healing and increase the generation efficiency. The articles in [15] and [17] illustrate a 
physical case-study for distributed energy plant at University of California - Irvine campus, 
to provide effective control methodology to cover the energy demand of electricity, cooling 
and hot water, eliminate gases emission and reduce cost. To achieve the simultaneous 
goals, the following techniques were used: load-following generators, energy storage 
devices, and predictive energy management. Promising results were found where the 
annual utility bill costs reduced by 12.0%, net energy costs by 3.61%, and improve energy 
efficiency by 1.56%. A hybrid poly-generation management methodology was proposed 
in [25] to achieve an optimal operation cost, energy usage and gases emission. The model 




battery energy storage (BES) was proposed in [26] to improve the reliability of power 
system in the MG. An enhanced control methodology was used to mitigate the impact of 
the intermittency on MG and a genetic algorithm (GA) was used to define the optimal size 
of the BES. The validation was done using PSCAD/EMTDC software platform. In [27] a 
MG combing a gas and renewable energy generation were proposed to improve the 
reliability and resiliency of the system performance. Distinct key performance indicators 
(KPI) were proposed to evaluate and optimize the system performance. The MEG model 
was validated in Matlab platform. In [28], an experimental study for utilizing a CHP in a 
commercial building was conducted. Validation for both operating modes of the CHP, 
namely following thermal and electrical loads (FTL and FEL), were realized. The results 
show the advantages and disadvantages of each mode. 
This thesis study proposes risk modeling techniques to design a resilient MEG that 
consists electricity, cooling and heating energy. The MEG analysis should have a wider 
perspective of the energy grids, not only as energy flow but also as grid that serve and 
influence people and societies. Hence, it requires studying the consequences of each 
component failure within MEG infrastructure. The socio-econo-ecological method is 
proposed to design resilient MEG by improving MEG’s stability characteristics.  
2.2 Risk Management Approaches 
Risk is an essential factor in any system’s safety design, where risk can be defined by 
the potential harm or loss correlated with an activity performed in an uncertain 
circumstance. The first use of “Risk” was in 1667, by Arnauld and Nicole, who assumed it 
consists of at least two components. “Fear of some harm ought to be proportional not only 
to the magnitude of the harm but also to the probability of the event” [29]. Knight defines 
risk as a situation of being exposed to danger where the uncertainty of injury or loss is high 
[30]. Thus, Knight’s definition associated the risk with the uncertainty which can be 
reduced to a single probability [31]. Therefore, risk management can be defined based on 
knight’s standpoint as an expert knowledge analysis of the uncertainties. Ellsberg 
distinguished between the uncertainty and the risk, where the uncertainty has impacts on 




portion of the ambiguity [32]. Adams describes risk as an interactive event that has a 
significant level of uncertainty tied to varying reactions of different risk judgment [33]. 
Resilient model of a health care system was presented in [34] to mitigate risks 
consequences by monitoring the system’s states parameters, analyzing its safety 
measurements and predicting the risk level before the consequences such as failure and 
harm take place, this model can be utilized for any complex systems. 
The risk modeling techniques are extended in this thesis to be utilized for MEG design 
and to measure the resilience parameters of the MEG. Whereas the existing studies about 
hazard estimation are on a case-by-case basis. Estimating the fault propagation and 
analyzing the consequences are major challenges for safety design verification. To 
implement a precise safety verification approach, it is vital to analyze and diagnose all 
hazard and fault events of the MEG and to study fault propagation scenarios. 
2.3 Risk Matrix 
It has different names as a “risk assessment matrix”, “risk management matrix,” “risk 
rating matrix,” or “risk analysis matrix”. Risk matrix consists of two main features that will 
be discussed in detail in Section 2.4: 
 Severity: The impact of a risk and the negative consequences that would result 
 Likelihood: The probability of the risk occurring 
A historical review of risk matrices types was presented in [35] by discussing the 
probability consequence diagrams and the factors that may affect the risk analysis. The 
article [36] presents methods for risk ranking and risk analysis that takes in consideration 
various risks factors due to different stakeholders perspectives. Three Main perspectives 
are formulating the proposed method namely the expected value, uncertainty and moral 
perspective. A logarithmical scale risk assessment matrix was proposed in [37] to mitigate 
the inherent limitations of using linear scale risk matrices. The linear scale risk matrices 
have a deficiency in dealing with assessment and management analysis. In article [38] 
develops the multiple criteria decision analysis for implementing risk matrix structures for 
health and safety risks assessment at the occupational health and safety unit (OHSU) of the 




on the risk control level to reduce the importance of the risk assessment level in the hazard 
management process to achieve higher uses of resources and improves the decision making 
process time. 
The risk matrix is developed in this thesis to produce a resilience matrix. The resilience 
matrix presents important information of socio-econo-ecological parameters in a form of 
resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI). The RRPI is an indicator for the system 
performance that evaluate the society, economy and environment risk levels for every 
hazard event to assist the engineers in both design and operation process. 
2.4 Risk Assessment Techniques 
There are different methods to identify and quantify risks. Here below are illustrated 
discussions of the existing quantifying risk methods: 
1- Haimes in [39] uses accumulate summation of the probability density function of the 
severity of consequences and a random variable of the severity of consequences, as 
illustrated by the following equation: 
𝐸[𝑥] = ∑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖                   (2-1) 
where p is the probability density function of x and x is a random variable 
representing the severity of consequences; thus, the frequency of occurrence of the 
hazard is latent. 
2- Bahill in [40], uses a different method for quantifying the risk by combining the 
frequency of occurrence with the severity of failure consequences., the function can 
be presented as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 (𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
                                                           𝑋 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 
 (2-2) 
Bahill’s method is commonly used in North America industries. 




a. Linear combining function that accumulates the summation of the combined 
products of the weight of importance with the score variable. The weight of 
importance is a random variable between 0 and 1.0: 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖. 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                    (2-3) 
where w is weight of importance (0-1) and x is the score 
b. Product combining function that accumulates the products of the score variable to 
the power of the weight of importance: 
𝐸 = ∏ 𝑥𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1                  (2-4) 
4- Exponential combining function [42], that utilizes an exponent of the summation of 
a linear combining function between the weight of importance and score variable. 
Hence, a constant variable can be used for calibration purpose: 
𝐸 = 1 − 𝑒−∑ 𝑘𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1               (2-5) 
 where k is a constant for calibration purpose 
5- Summation minus product combining function [43], which derived from the 
probability of unions between independent variables. However, this function is 
lacking when used to qualify the risk, where if severity or likelihood is 0 then the 
risk should be 0, which is not the case by using this equation 
𝐸 = 𝑤1𝑥 + 𝑤2𝑦 − 𝑤1𝑥𝑦              2-6) 
Which derived from the probability of unions between independent variables. 
However, this function has obstacle when used to qualifying the risk, where if 
severity or likelihood is 0 then the risk should be 0, which is not the case by using 
this equation 
6- Compromise combining function [44]: 




𝑟⁄               (2-7) 
where r is constant factor 




 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 (𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) ×
                                                                                  (𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠)2  
       (2-8) 
8- In [46] the failure modes and effects analysis (FEMA) comprises the difficulty of 
detection 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 (𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
× 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 × 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
                (2-9) 
9- The hazard level can be calculated by the following formula [47] [48]: 
Hazard Level (HL)=Si*Ci  (2-10) 
where, 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝐴𝑖) and Si is the consequence severity of the hazard event, Ci is 
the class hazard event likelihood, Pi is the probability, Fi is the frequency, and Ai the 
ability for failure avoidance. 
In this thesis Bahill’s risk assessment equation (2-2), was used as a base for developing 
resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI) to assess the socio-econo-ecological 
parameters of the MEG. The RRPI is capable to assess the resilience of MEG, which is a 
paramount tool in risk analysis and decision-making process. 
2.5 Micro Grid Fault Detection 
The resiliency of Micro energy grids is under threat of imperceptible faults. Therefore, 
development of efficient fault detection methodologies are highly important to improve the 
systems’ operation security. Numerous researches and articles were presented, in the last 
two decades, to solve this dilemma. In [49] a fault detection approach was proposed to 
secure the microgrid (MG) against faults risks. The approach focuses on the faults that can 
be defined by changes in the state space matrices model. The numerical results show that 
this approach is efficient mainly with the small changes. In [50] numerous heterogeneous 
features were utilized to modeled localized faults in the smart grid. The proposed classifier 
model is mainly depending on two features, the interaction between the clusters and the 




optimization. Paper [51] study fault detection and localization methods in both 
transmission and distribution system within smart grids. Then it proposed a methodology 
to enhance the accuracy of fault location. Wavelet multiresolution analysis (MRA) was 
utilized with GPS and intelligent computation technologies in the article [52] to provide an 
efficient algorithm able to detect the fault in the transmission line of smart grid and define 
its location. The adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) and artificial neural 
network (ANN) were used to improve the fault location accuracy. Monte-Carlo simulation 
was used to validate the proposed algorithm. An active fault detection and isolation scheme 
for islanded faults in the MG was presented in [53]. Utilizing a set-membership filter and 
Kalman filter gave the ability to achieve the proposed approach. The article in [54] presents 
a fault detection, isolation, and service restoration (FDIR) for an outage event in an 
electrical distribution grid. 
Many studies were done in fault detection of MG however up to date, there are none of 
the studies conducted on fault detection of MEG. In this study an alarm/monitoring system 
is proposed for a MEG by using SIF-IRL based BBN-ANFIS techniques for fault detection 
and diagnosis. 
2.6 Protection Systems 
The general purpose of utilizing protection systems is to isolate rapidly and narrowly 
disturbance area(s) in order to protect the system’s assets and to maintain operational status 
of the rest of the system entity. Therefore, protection systems detect and eliminate faults to 
prevent dragging the system to undesired consequence conditions due to faults 
propagation.  
2.6.1 Micro Grid Protection Systems 
Microgrid (MG) has various unique structures and combining of numerous components 
that make protection strategies more complicated and challenging. The dynamic non-radial 
topology accompanying with different types of DERs in addition to the altering connection 
mode between utility grid connected and islanded modes have originated new problems 
that does not exist in the legacy distribution systems. Those new problems are preventing 




problems and proposing different methodologies for fault detecting, preventing and 
mitigating processes. 
Line ratings are the main limiting factor for MGs in grid-connected mode. However, it 
is not the case for MGs in the islanded mode as DERs capacities are much less than the 
utility’s electricity supply. Therefore the limiting factors become DERs’ maximum output. 
On the other hand, the fault currents are varies as the DER’s type are varies, where the fault 
currents of rotating machines, such as co-generator and wind turbines, are extremely higher 
than their maximum rated current, whereas inverter based DERs has low fault current 
adjacent to the rating currents, between 110-200% [55]. Subsequently, many research 
studies aim to achieve intelligent protection schemes are currently in process.  
Papers [56] proposed adaptive protection schemes for MG in both islanded and grid-
connected modes. Validation of the offered method was conducted and concluded that still 
more efforts are required to achieve a robust protection scheme. New indices for metering 
digital protection algorithms were proposed in [57] in order to assess its performance, 
within islanded MG, in presence of harmonics, frequency deviation and time-varying 
loads. Numerous actual field data for a wind farm substation and electric arc furnace were 
applied to validate the proposed metering algorithm. A review of recent MG protection 
studies was illustrated in  [58] and a proposal for a new adaptive protection method was 
justified in order to achieve global decisions multi-agent protective plans. Paper [59] 
proposes a controller area network (CAN) based smart protection scheme for MG system. 
Where the dynamic state of DERs are monitored by measuring the operational performance 
attributes and environmental data. The proposed scheme has the ability to recognize the 
type and location of a fault in order to isolate a minimal faulted section. An intelligent 
power switch with integrated protection and self-diagnostic was proposed in [60], by using 
HV-CMOS technology to safely handle the ordinary and extraordinary automotive 
electrical and environmental conditions. Zero sequence components were offered in [61] 
for microgrid protection of single line to ground faults by utilizing coordinated neutral 
point of the generation units. The reference [62] utilizes negative sequence components of 




in [63] by creating IEC 61850 information structure of a micro energy grid. The proposal 
aims to create standards for design, operation and protection of microgrids. 
MG protection systems should consider the following requirements [64]: 
1. Dynamic configuration capability 
2. High-speed standard-based communication namely IEC 61850 should be utilized 
3. Prompt reaction operation in the case of deep voltage dips in order to maintain stability 
of the other healthy part of the grid and to ensure high protection for the assets and the 
public 
4. Selective operation in all kinds of faults 
5. Avoid unnecessary activation of protection devices  
2.6.2 CHP Protection Systems 
A static model was proposed in [65] by using conventional SPC charts to monitor the 
heat exchanger operation condition. The model capable to discover fouling of a heat 
exchanger. A method of early detection of fouling build-up of the coolant system of CHP 
units has been presented in [66]. By using the net transfer coefficient charts to assist 
engineers to distinguish between a pump failure and heat exchanger fouling remotely, 
saving maintenance engineer hours. Fouling of the heat transfer surfaces greatly reduces 
the heat recovery and severely affects the whole efficiency of the unit, as it reduces the 
overall efficiency of the CHP unit by about 25%. The article [67], proposes 
thermoeconomic and exergetic cost tools to detect faults and malfunctions in a combined 
heat and power plant (CHP). The results by using the proposed approach show promising 
solution for determining the location of malfunctions 
2.6.3 Cooling Protection Systems 
The article [68] offers a fuzzy logic based smart fault detection system for a cogeneration 
and cooling plant. The proposed system was tested in a case studies consists of gas turbine 
generator (GTG), heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) and a steam absorption chiller. 
The results show 95 to 100% accuracy for true fault detection for inlet temperatures in the 




unit performance assessment rules (APAR). The proposed tool consists experts’ 
knowledge-based set of rules for mapping the balance of mass and energy. APAR relies on 
the measurement data from I&C sensors and from control signals. The proposed fault 
detection tool was tested and validated in a commercial AHU. A proposed method in the 
article [70] is a combination of principal component analysis (PCA) and support vector 
data description (SVDD) methods named PCA-R-SVDD. These two methods individually 
are insensitive to faults of condenser fouling (CdF) and refrigerant leakage (RfL). The 
proposed method shows strength in detecting six of the common faults. For validation, the 
author utilized the experimental data for the centrifugal chiller that is presented in 
ASHRAE Research Project 1043 (RP-1043). 
In this study, the protection idiom is extended to prevent / mitigate the top event of 
blackout and brownout of the MEG. Numerous independent resilience layers (IRLs) for 
MEG are proposed in this study namely non-SIF and SIF IRLs. The proposed independent 
resilience layer (IRL) is derived from the independent protection layer (IPL), these layers 
are utilized to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of energy blackout and brownout. 
2.7 Micro Grid Fault Tolerant Control 
The interest on integrating renewable energy sources (RESs) in power system is 
significantly increase worldwide. This has a magnified negative impact on power quality 
and reliability if improper control strategy is used. Many researches offer solutions on these 
challenges. A brief survey on the existing challenges and recent developments of power 
reliability are discussed in the following paragraph. The reference [71] proposed a fault 
tolerant control scheme for a wind turbine connected to a MG. it uses adaptive filters based 
on nonlinear geometric approach in order to instantaneously estimate faults in the hydraulic 
pitch actuator. The approach was examined on a known wind turbine model. Paper [72] 
demonstrates a fault detection and isolation approach in MG. The proposed flexible 
structure has the ability to adjust itself based on the grid changes by changing the analytic 
redundancy relations (ARR). The approach scheme was implemented using power factory 
simulation platform. The article [73] demonstrates major issues of connecting renewable 
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 protective relay performance. In [74], a supervisory control scheme was 
illustrated to adopt the distributed generators power production and frequency set points in 
the MG. in order to accommodate the unexpected load variation and faults. The scheme 
was examined on a four-areas microgrids. 
In this thesis, a multi-level hierarchical decision making (MLHDM) is proposed as a 
non-SIF IRL. It is proposed to enhance the self-healing characteristics of MEG against 
uncertainty hazards during the system operation. The structural design of MLHDM 
consists of three simultaneous levels functioning together to attain resilient operation.  
2.8 Micro Energy Grid Security and Safety 
The energy grid security is defined as the capability of the energy grid to provide 
sufficient energy that meet the demand at reasonable price rates in addition to its capability 
to adapt disturbances [75]. The concept was extended to address the critical affection of 
energy supply interruption in economic as declared in [76]. Recently the concept was 
extended to include eco-friendly requirements as discussed in [77].  
Fig. 2.1: The main elements of energy grids security 
The energy grids security is presented in Fig. 2.1. The grids security consists the 













1. Availability: means the energy grid service to the public is ready to be used 
immediately  
2. Accessibility: means easy to approach the energy grids service. 
3. Acceptability: it refers to the agreement relation between the facility providers 
and the society to address environmental consequences in order to ensure 
sustainability.  
4. Affordable: to ensure the end-users pay reasonable rate for the energy services in 
order to ensure smooth economic performance. 
The ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511) standard defines a safety instrumented 
system (SIS) as an instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented 
functions (SIF). A SIS is a combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s). 
IEC 61508 uses the term "safety-related system" instead of uses the term SIS. This term 
describes the same principle but with different language context that can be broadly applied 
to many industries [79]. The main purpose of the control loop in the basic process control 
system (BPCS) is to maintain the process parameters within their prescribed limits. A SIS 
monitors process parameters and interferes when required [80]. The safety design is an 
essential process for resilient MEGs implementation, where based on the hazard level of 
the MEG a selected safety procedure should take place. Six parameters have to be 
considered in hazard analysis as follows [81]: 
1. Sensitivity: the nominal threshold value for protection system should identify the faults 
taking into consideration the MEG safety level. 
2. Selectivity: determine the zone where the fault occurred. In order to isolate the faulted 
area.  
3. Speed: the faster respond of the protection system to the fault, the minimal impacts on 
the MEG stability 
4. Security: the protection system should recognize both faults and abnormal condition but 
to act in the event of fault only. 
5. Redundancy: is required to increase the reliability of the protection system 




This study proposes a methodology of safety design and evaluation tools to achieve 
resilient micro energy grid (MEG). This method pursues to offer a tool to achieve an 
accurate design of resilient MEG, by proposing safety design tools namely developed 
hazard analysis and advanced risk assessment evaluation methods, then implement the 
required independent resilience layers (IRLs), consist of SIF and non-SIF components, to 
achieve an acceptable safety risk tolerance margin. 
2.9 Resilient Energy System 
The resilience term is a firmly associated with sustainability, where the sustainability is 
defined as the ability to maintain social, economic and environment at a certain desired 
levels over time. Therefore, it can be concluded that any sustainable system must be 
resilient as well [82]. Literature review illustrates three most acceptable definitions of the 
resilience that are engineering resilience, ecological resilience and adaptive resilience [83]. 
The engineering method perspective defines resilience as system’s robustness and 
immunity of external disturbances further to its self-healing capability to return the system 
to the stability region. The ecological approach identifies the uncertainties of the system 
and assures its ability to cope the disruption to keep functioning as designed. The adaptive 
or socio-ecological method describes resilience as autonomous learning capability to adapt 
the system’s characteristics for optimum operational performance and risk immunity. 
This study develops the resilience definition as an approach aimed to eliminate 
hazardous consequences on socio-econo-ecological parameters that influence respectively 
the life quality, economic activity, and environmental sustainability. Resilience guards 
ensure maintaining the system operates as designed. 
2.10 Hazard Analysis 
A layered fault tree model was modified in [84] in order to differentiate between islanded 
and grid-connected modes for the microgrid (MG). By considering the load priority 
measures the model is capable of defining the weak part of the system in order to enhance 
the design concepts. The hierarchical Monte Carlo simulation method was utilized to 




failure insights. The design concept was enhanced based on the assumption that the load 
priority measures are sufficient to define the weak part of the system. In [85] a comparison 
study between Bahill and Haimes risk analysis approaches was justified and a case study 
of the risk of incorporating solar photovoltaic systems into a commercial electric power 
grid. The study shows the strength and the weak points of each approach. A new design for 
a process named Diogenes was revealed in [86]. Diogenes helps systems’ engineers to 
identify the unintended, but predictable, consequences of fault propagation for new systems 
under design. An efficient multiplayer collaboration framework was presented in [87] to 
characterize sources of system risk from various expert opinions. It can be considered as a 
key solution for unstructured, multidimensional problems. Paper [88] introduces risk 
analyses for pinewood derbies, also it shows several risk analysis techniques and presents 
the accompanying problems. 
This study proposes a framework that addresses the demand of resilient MEG by using 
safety analysis tools for greater clarity decision making. The socio-econo-ecological 
method is proposed to design a resilient MEG by modifying MEG’s stability 
characteristics. 
2.11 Fault Diagnosis and Prognosis 
In [89] a fault diagnosis approach was proposed, for a building air-conditioning systems, 
based on the exponentially-weighted moving average control charts for centrifugal chillers.  
In [90] a fault detection method was presented, for air-source heat pump water 
chiller/heaters, based on principal component analysis model. Reference [91] implements 
a diagnostic Bayesian network of three layers in order to utilize more feature information 
of the chiller unit along with expert knowledge. The article in [92], proposes and 
implements a real-time distributed measuring nodes network to diagnose faults in 
uninterruptible high-power supply systems and high-power transformers of MG used for 
railway interlocking signaling installations. The proposed methodology is based on the 
thermal and electrical symptoms analysis and the mechanical degradation index by 
measuring the vibration. A failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) approach was 




(VRLA) batteries, and 3-phase high power transformers, utilized in switching converters 
and power isolation. The FMEA approach utilizes a distributed measuring nodes network, 
described in [92], based on electrical (voltage, current, impedance) and thermal 
degradation analysis and vibration-based mechanical stress diagnosis. 
In this study a hybrid technique was proposed by using BBN and ANFIS based 
technologies. The hybrid technique contributes an efficient tool for MEGs fault diagnosis. 
The results demonstrate that the hybrid BBN-ANFIS can perform fault diagnosis with 
complete or incomplete symptoms. The main strength of the proposed approach is due to 
its dependency on experts’ knowledge than the data from measurement instrumentation 
(I&C) in its decision-making process. 
2.12 Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian belief networks (BBN) is an expression for a probabilistic inference network 
that comprises the decision-making process based on Bayesian probability theory [94]. 
BBN was coined by J. Pearl in 1988, and it shows promises result in many different topics 
[95]. BBN is extensively used in safety assessment for systems with uncertainty and 
incomplete knowledge. Therefore, BBN is the base of different types of expert diagnosis 
systems in numerous fields such as nuclear power systems operation monitoring [96], oil 
and gas pipelines safety assessment [97], wind turbine fault diagnosis [98] and risk 
assessment of complex systems [99]. In [100], a comparison between BBN and the rule-
based expert system was performed for fault detection. The study shows that BBN has 
more reliability than the rule-based system. In [101], a software prototype was developed 
for online fault detection and diagnosis for a turbine engine. This software has the ability 
for monitoring and classifying the faults based on its source, type and components. Another 
case study on a gas turbine was studied in [102] using BBN and it shows an impressive 
accuracy of 96%, with high reliability in fault detection and diagnosis. Other developed 
BBNs were presented in [103], to provide a probabilistic framework for accurate faults 
prediction and diagnosis. BBN was developed by several researchers that focused on fault 
diagnosis of a solar assisted heat pump system, in order to achieve an accurate fault 




complex systems with uncertainty and incomplete information [105]. Compared to the 
neural network, BBN provides superior performance information, which made BBN the 
most important research topic in the field of artificial intelligence [106]. There are several 
applications for BBN in fault diagnosis. In [107], a BBN was constructed, for industrial 
process, by tabulating the probabilities for each node based on expertise contribution. In 
[108], they implement a BBN by extracting statistic features of different time domains, for 
rotation gearbox. In [109], BBN offered fault diagnosis of wind turbine gearbox by using 
time-frequency domain. The results of the ultimate articles show promising achievements. 
This thesis offers online fault analysis of MEG that predict risks and diagnose faults 
based on Bayesian belief network (BBN). The main objective is to develop an advanced 
and more robust predictive/diagnosis techniques to improve the MEG condition monitoring 
and alarming systems. 
2.13 Energy Management and Optimization 
Paper [110] proposed an architecture for resources management protocol for the 
microgrid (MG), based on DERs computational environment to achieve optimal 
scheduling for the electrical loads by using a genetic algorithm take in consideration tariff 
prices and forecasted power generation by renewable resources. The demonstration of the 
proposed architecture was validated on a multi-agent simulator platform. In [111] six 
different cases in MG system were studied to manage the MG consumption and generation 
further to control the utility connection in order to achieve optimal operation cost and 
minimal pollutant emission. A simple structure of MOPSO method using fuzzy logic was 
implemented and a promises results were shown using Matlab platform environment.Paper 
[112] classifies MG control strategies into three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary, 
where primary and secondary levels are related to the operation of the MG itself, and 
tertiary level concerns to the coordinated operation of the MG and the host grid. ESS is 
recognized as a key technology for the combination of intermittent renewable energy 
sources. GA was utilized in [16] to achieve energy saving management for four buildings 
in Sejong, smart grid. The experimental results show a major saving on energy 




[113] proposed A new class of MG, called provisional MG, to address prevailing 
challenges in MG deployments associated with islanding requirements. An uncertainty-
constrained optimal scheduling model was proposed to efficiently model the day-ahead 
operation of provisional MG considering usual operational uncertainties. The robust 
optimization was employed, where the original problem was decomposed into smaller and 
coordinated problems for uncertainty consideration. The proposed model was analyzed 
through numerical simulations, and it was shown that provisional MG offers economic 
benefits, ensure reliability, and prevent underutilization of deployed capital-intensive 
DERs. An intelligent distribution over the grid was proposed in [114] to balance the supply 
and demand of the MG. Where a distributed energy management approach based on the 
consensus and innovations method is presented and used to coordinate local generation, 
flexible load, and storage devices within the MEG. Takes advantage of the fact that, at the 
optimal allocation settings, the marginal costs given as a function of the power 
output/consumption need to be equal for all nonbinding network resources. Paper [115] 
proposed an extended distributed model predictive control (DMPC) framework 
specifically for a combined environmental and economic dispatch (EED) problem which 
is a non-trivial multi-objective optimization problem at large scale smart grid case study. 
The DMPC is applied to a smart grid composed of 11 consumer centers, 6 energy storage, 
11 generation systems and 31 transmission lines. Simulation results show reductions of 
generation costs up to 40% when predictions are included in the formulation. Furthermore, 
the simulation of forecast errors results in up to 8% generation over cost. Paper [116] 
presents a two-stage stochastic model with fuzzy chance-constrained programming for MG 
operation. The model is aimed to optimize the generation schedule for the dis-patchable 
DERs based on day ahead generation schedule and the real-time emission control criteria. 
A mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model was presented in [117] to define the 
optimal size and operation for seven CCHP units serving heating, cooling and electricity 
demands. Experimental results for optimal operation cost and minimal emission generation 
was conducted for a residential district in the east of Tehran. Paper [118] presents an 
optimization algorithm in order to determine the optimal arrangement of DERs operation in a 
microgrid. The proposed algorithm intended to minimize the fuel consumption only without 




In this study a MILP optimization technique was utilized to predict the MEG operation by 
using static MEG model. This static model is used to validate the dynamic MEG model that 
implemented using the Simulink platform. The comparison between MEG’s models verify 





 Design and Simulation of a MEG Case Study 
This chapter is aimed to build a MEG case study model that emulate existing MEG 
infrastructures and operation. This case study is implemented by using dynamic models for 
the main components of the MEG namely co-generator, TESs and chillers. The MEG 
dynamic model is implemented using Simulink and Matlab platform. The MEG dynamic 
model will be used throughout this thesis as a case study to assess the proposed risk analysis 
methodologies that are proposed in this thesis 
3.1 System Description 
MEGs consist of localized energy generation equipment. It may consist of 
microturbines, solar panels, wind turbines, fuel cells, etc., which can provide energy to a 
local area in a cleaner way. MEGs operate either in a main grid-connected mode or in an 
islanded mode [119]. In a main grid-connected mode, MEGs exchange energy generated 
by renewable sources with the utilities grid. In the case of energy outage on the main grid, 
MEGs can take charge and provide the required energy to the end users. However, the 
islanded mode has accompanying intermittency in the energy flow. The simulation results 
illustrate that the dynamic performance of the MEG during and after islanded-mode is 
better when supplementary storage devices supported the MEGs, as compared to those 
without energy storage. Therefore, it is a better option to have MEGs equipped with storage 
devices for better overall dynamic performance. 
In-depth, detailed models of MEG components dynamic performance are extensively 
available [120]. Nevertheless, integration of such detailed models for complete MEG 
optimization would eventually result in undesirably massive computation times and other 
associated challenges [15]. Therefore, reduced order models are necessary. Without losing 
important dependencies expressed by detailed models. 
A selected MEG shown in [15][17] is presented in this research as a case study for safety 
implementation of a resilient MEG. Different MEG’s configuration can be utilized for the 




The MEG model is shown in Fig. 3.1 has the ability for self-sufficiency in its electricity, 
cooling and heating demands most of the year by utilizing DG, PV, WT, and district 
heating/cooling units with TES and supercapacitor bank for swift and dynamic power 
backup. Despite that the MEG has the ability to operate in islanded mode, it is 
interconnected with the capital grid to ensure resilient operation in case of hazard scenarios, 
and offers backup source for uncertain increasing demands. A set of six electric thermal 
cooling units of varied size and performance characteristics, shown in Table 3-1, produces 
cold water to supply the cooling demand, and/or is stored in a 400 MWh TES tank for 
future use. An on-site 15 MW cogeneration gas turbine (CG) is the prime mover source of 
electrical power for the facility. Furthermore, exhaust gas from the CG is used to provide 
steam to a heat recovery steam generator. Where the steam is used for driving a 3 MW 
steam turbine in order to produce additional electrical power and to produce heat energy in 





Fig. 3.1: Proposed MEG case study model 
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Fig. 3.2: Steam loop schematic diagram [15] 
3.2 Detailed Model of MEG Components 
3.2.1 Co-Generator Gas Turbine 
The gas turbine is one of the effective power generation technology, which operates on 
the thermodynamic cycle or Brayton cycle.  This turbine is mainly composed of three 
stages: a compressor, a combustor and a turbine.  The compressor increases atmospheric 
pressure into the combustor. The combustor merges this air with fuel then burns the 
mixture.  Then the exhaust hot gases sent into the turbine, to convert the energy into 
mechanical work [121]. Fig. 3.3 shows the principal components of a simple-cycle gas 
turbine.  The gas turbine is used in the MEG to produce electrical power as a conversion 
of the turbine mechanical work with an electrical efficiencies range from about 20 to 25%, 
as well as produces hot exhausted gases which can be 700K to 866K, depending on the 
type of turbine. These high exhaust temperatures are a ground for several studies and 





Fig. 3.3: Gas turbine model 
 The dynamic behavior of the gas generator can be simulated by identifying the 
nonlinear form of mass and energy conservation equations for each component. In addition, 
applying some static equations to complete the linear model. Schematic of the gas turbine 
is shown in Fig. 3.4. 
 
Fig. 3.4: Schematic diagram for gas turbine 
The static model of a Co-Generator (CG) can be obtained by using thermodynamic 
equations and map the components in order to determine the off-design performance of the 
CG with constant output power [123]. There are three types that modeling the CG namely 
static, dynamic nonlinear and linearizing of dynamic nonlinear equations. The static model 
is the simplest one of the three models however it is the lowest accuracy among them as it 
cannot emulate the transient condition of the CG behaviour. On the other hand, the dynamic 
nonlinear model is the most accurate mimic, however it has more complicated 
mathematical computation and consequently lead to longer process time consumption. In 
this study the linearization model of dynamic nonlinear equations is utilized to have an 











 The efficiency of the prime mover such as steam turbine, gas turbine and diesel engine 







         (3-1) 
where 
 ?̇?𝑠 prime mover shaft power 
  ?̇?𝑓 the fuel power consumed by the system 
?̇?𝑓 = ?̇?𝑓𝐻𝑢          (3-2) 
 ?̇?𝑓 flow rate of the fuel mass 
 𝐻𝑢 the lower heating value of the fuel 







         (3-3) 
where ?̇?𝑒 is the useful electric power generated by the cogen. 







         (3-4) 
where ?̇? is the useful thermal power generated by the cogen. 
Therefore, the total efficiency of the cogenerator  
𝜂 = 𝜂𝑒 + 𝜂𝑡ℎ =
?̇?𝑒+?̇?
?̇?𝑓
        (3-5) 
3.2.2 Heat Recovery Steam Generator 
 The heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) is defined as an energy recovery heat 
exchanger that recaptures heat from a hot gas stream. The steam is generated to drive a 
steam turbine. A combined-cycle power station (CC) is a common application for an 
HRSG, where the hot exhaust gas produced from a gas turbine is fed to an HRSG to 
produce steam to drive a steam turbine Fig. 3.5. The CC produces electricity more 
efficiently than either the gas turbine or steam turbine individually, where the electrical 




combined electrical and heat energies [122]. The HRSG consists of four major 
components: Evaporator, Superheater, Economizer, and Drum. The different components 
are combined to meet the operating requirements of the unit [124]. The high quality heat 
from the gas turbine exhaust allows to utilize the thermal energy to generate electricity by 
a steam turbine along with the gas turbine in a combined cycle system process also allowing 
the thermal energy to be restored and used for heating or cooling of the premises and used 
to provide domestic hot water [125]. 





           (3-6) 
Where: WS = steam flow rate; Wg=exhaust flowrate to HRSG; Cp = specific heat of 
products of combustion; T1 = gas temperature after burner; T3 = saturation temperature in 
steam drum; L = a factor to account radiation and other losses= 0.985; hsh = enthalpy of 




; f = fuel factor, 1.0 for fuel oil, 1.015 for gas. 
 
Fig. 3.5: Combined cycle power plant 
In order to simplify the model, the CHP unit is compacted in a single block that has fuel 
















proportion to the fuel flow (?̇?𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) in 
𝑚3
𝑠⁄  times the constant fuel heating value (𝐻𝑖) 
𝑘𝐽
𝑚3
⁄ , as given below [127].  
𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 = ?̇?𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑥𝐻𝑖                                                           (3-7) 
The above equation is used in this study to calcualte the fule volume that is required to 
operate the CHP unit. 
The transfer function of the thermal energy is shown in the equation below. 
𝐺𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
𝑘1
(1 + 𝑘2. 𝑠 + (𝑘3. 𝑠)2)(1 + 𝑘4)
 
                                              (3-8) 
 
where the constants used are as follows 𝑘1 = 0.43472 , 𝑘2= 2.5774, 𝑘3= 1.7472, 𝑘4= 
7.409. 
And the transfer function of the electrical energy is shown in eq. 3-9. 
𝐺𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑘1
(1 + 𝑘2. 𝑠)
 
                                                                            (3-9) 
 
where the constants are as follows: 𝑘1 = 0.4386, 𝑘2= 0.61823. 
These two transfer functions are presenting a compact block of the CHP dynamic 
performance that will be used in this study in the Simulink case study Section 3.3. 
3.2.3 Thermal Energy Storage 
The principle idea behind using thermal energy storage (TES) is to provide a buffer to 
balance fluctuations in supply and demand of energy [128]. Energy demand in the 
residential, commercial and industrial regions fluctuates in course of day periods, 
intermediate periods (e.g. seven days) and seasons (spring, summer, autumn, winter). 
Consequently, various TES systems are utilized to match the demand as well as to reshape 
the actual demand on the energy sources. TES has been used for decades in different forms 
for space and process heating/ cooling applications. Different types of materials such as 
latent or phase change materials (PCM) and sensible heat materials have been applied to 




latent, the thermal energy is absorbed and released by a phase change of the storage media 
by fusion. However, the sensible heat storage materials were utilized based on its ability to 
raise or lower the temperature of storage media without a phase change [129]. 
 A stratified cylindrical tank operates either on transfer and retrieval mode consequently 
the concluded model is a hybrid. The relationship between the number of nodes used in 
simulation and the degree of stratification which the model predicts are shown in Fig. 3.6. 
Tank operates either in charging or discharging modes; therefore, the resulting model is a 
hybrid. The TES can be modeled using dynamic finite element based, which divides the 
tank into 100 control volumes along its height. Energy and mass conservation laws are 
applied to each control volume [123][130]. 





= 𝐶𝑝?̇?𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘(𝑇𝑖−1 − 𝑇𝑖) + 𝐶𝑝?̇?𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒(𝑇𝑖+1 − 𝑇𝑖) − 𝑈𝑃∆𝑥(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏) +
𝜀𝐴𝑥𝑠
∆𝑥
(𝑇𝑖+1 − 2𝑇𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖−1)         (3-10) 
Where: ρ: storage fluid density, Cp: storage fluid heat capacity, ∆x: length of node,?̇?: mass 
flow rate, T: time, U: tank fluid to ambient overall heat transfer coefficient, P: tanks 
perimeter, Axs: tank cross sectional area. 
The basic function of thermal energy storage is to accumulate the surplus thermal 
energy in order to be utilized when it is needed. In this study the thermal energy storage 
model is not consider internal losses of the TES, therefore it is represented by an integration 






 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥                                            𝑖𝑓 𝑆(𝑡 − 1) ≥  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑆0 +∫  𝑃𝑡ℎ(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑡ℎ(𝑡)        𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡ℎ(𝑡) >  𝐷𝑡ℎ(𝑡)
𝑡
𝑡0
𝑆(𝑡 − 1)                                                  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (3-11) 
Where 𝑆0 is the thermal energy in 𝑘𝐽 that stored initially in the TES, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the 
maximum thermal storage capacity that the TES can reserve in kJ, 𝑃𝑡ℎ is the input 





3.2.4 District Thermal Cooling Unit 
The district thermal cooling unit is modeled using the standard approach for an 
integration of static models for essential components, such as evaporators, condensers, 












− 1]              (3-12) 
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The thermal cooling model in this study can be presented as a constant amplifier of 
the COP value as the chiller units are conventional type which mean the operation status 
















3.3 A MEG Modeling and Simulation 
The performance of the proposed resilient MEG, which guarded by selected 
independent resilience layers (IRLs) can be validated by implementing a model of MEG 
case study in Simulink and Matlab programming platforms. The mathematical equations 
of the model performance can be converted into more tangible models by using interactive 
graphical shapes in the Simulink environment 
In this chapter, a MEG with adaptive control/scheduling algorithms for its local energy 
sources is implemented to study the MEG operation performance during normal and/or 
peak demands. Moreover, those adaptive algorithms facilitate self-healing capability 
during main/upstream grid failure. This is because the MEG can operate independently in 
isolated mode by using its generation sources and energy storage units to meet the local 
demand. 
3.3.1 Simulation of a MEG Case Study 
In order to demonstrate and validate the dynamic behavior of MEGs integrated with 
different combinations of IRLs that will be illustrated in Section 4.6, a MEG case study 
shown in Fig. 3.1 is implemented in the Simulink environment. Dynamic systems that have 
time-varying characteristics can be modeled and simulated accurately by using the 
Simulink platform and Matlab programming environments. Simulink has the ability to 
convert mathematical equations that describe the model behavior into interactive graphical 





The proposed MEG structure is implemented in the Simulink environment shown in 
Fig. 3.7, to study the system performance in different operational scenarios to examine the 
MEG resiliency for prescribed cooling, heating and electricity energy demands. 
3.3.2 Operational Scenarios of MEG Simulation 
Data for a one week in summer with two-hours sampling time has been analyzed to 
evaluate and improve the MEG system operation. The interaction between Co-generators, 
thermal cooling units (TES) and the utility’s grid are explored to increase MEG’s safety 
level, resilience, and self-healing.  
Four baseline strategies are explored in this section as follows:  
1. In the first baseline strategy, one IRL was utilized, i.e. Co-generator. 
2. In the second baseline strategy, two potentially valuable structures, namely TES 
and Co-generator, are used.  




3. In the third baseline strategy, a heuristic rule-based methodology using physical 
anticipation model is used to determine the operating attributes of the MEG without 
installing additional MEG’s hardware.  
The proposed IRLs integration are aiming to reduce the MEG’s failure hazard by 
optimizing DERs operation and TES energy storage. 
First Scenario Strategy: 
 
Fig. 3.8 illustrates the power demand profile for a one week in summer for the original 
MEG integrated with one IRL, i.e. Co-generator. The figure defines that the combination 
of Co-generator and renewable sources are unable to handle the electricity demand. Thus, 
the electricity-utility grid must interfere to cover the power deficiency caused by a sudden 
rise in the electricity demand. The power deficiency caused by two reasons, first due to the 
limited capacity of DERs and secondly due to the dynamic behavior of the co-generator 
that lead to a delayed response to the rapid change in the demand profile.  





Fig. 3.9: Cooling profile for foundation MEG(2hrs rate sample) 
Cooling profile in Fig. 3.9 shows the MEG cooling demand of a one week in summer 
without utilizing TES, the figure illustrates a high frequency of on-off operation of the 
district cooling units (DCU) during the course of the day. The more on-off operations lead 
to a high dramatical reduction in the DCU performance. Where during the DCU’s start-up 
the inrush current is more than double of rated current values. On the other hand, it can be 
noticed that all the DCUs are on duty most of the day with an increasing number of 
operating units during the on-demand period. In addition, the high correlation of cooling 
demand with electricity demand increases the operation complexity and increases the total 




Second Scenario Strategy: 
 
Fig. 3.10 presents the electricity demand profile of a one week in summer for a MEG 
consists two IRLs i.e. Co-generator and TES. The figure above illustrates that the co-
generator was capable to cover the electricity demand in the first four days by the support 
of RES. Whilst, in the last three days of the same week, the utility grid was interfered 
partially to cover the power deficiency caused by a sudden rise in the demand. The power 
deficiency occurred two times a day with a maximum capacity of 4 MW for an interval of 
two hours, while the Co-generator serves an average of 14 MW with a maximum 
production of 18 MW.  





Cooling profile in Fig. 3.11 shows the MEG cooling demand within a one week in 
summer under the second scenario conditions. The figure illustrates that despite the high 
correlation between cooling demand and electricity demand the use of TES improves the 
cooling imports with less operational hours of DCUs. 
 
Fig. 3.12 presents a sample of heating demand profile for one week in summer. The 
figure shows extensive coverage of heating demand by the heating energy generated by the 
Fig. 3.11: MEG cooling profile by utilizing co-generation and TES IRLs(2hrs rate sample) 




Co-generator. In addition, it can be noticed the Co-generator produces a surplus heating 
energy than needed. In addition, there is a low correlation between electricity demand and 
heating demand during the summer season. 
Third Scenario Strategy: 
The integration of the three IRLs into the original MEG promotes its operation to an 
islanded mode under most of the operating conditions without the need for utility grids 
interference. 
 
Fig. 3.13 shows the Co-generator ability to cover the power demand in the first five 
days with the support of RES, while in the last two days the utility grid interferes was 
lightly required to cover the deficiency of sudden rise in the power demand. The power 
deficiency occurred twice within the tested week, for a period of two hours in each, with 
maximum 3 MW while co-generator serves an average of 12 MW with a maximum 
production of 18 MW.  






The cooling profile in Fig. 3.14 shows an improvement in the thermal cooling unit 
operations, where cooling on demand was shifted completely to the off demand period, by 
rescheduling the operation of the DCUs. The reframing of the cooling profile has major 
advantages on electricity and cooling production industry, where reshaping the cooling 
demand is increasing the MEG’s capability without the need for additional physical 
hardware upgradation. In addition, it improves the MEG resilience and self-healing 
competence. 
 
Fig. 3.14: MEG cooling profile by utilizing IRL-1, IRL-2 and IRL-3 





The heating demand profile for a one week in summer was illustrated in Fig. 3.15. Wide 
coverage of the heating demand can be achieved by the heating generated from the co-
generator. However, the low correlation of electricity demand and heating demand 
particularly during the summer season makes asynchronous between the heating demand 
and the heating generated by co-generator. The comparison between Fig. 3.12 and 
Fig. 3.15 shows that still there is squandering in the heating production. 
3.4 Resiliency Requirements Analysis for MEG 
The most global threats such as climate change, civilization and depletion of natural 
resources are the main challenges of the energy industry. The resiliency and sustainability 
of energy industry in cities is affected by numerous threats that can be categorized as 
follows, see Fig. 3.16: 
1- Generation fluctuation 
2- Load demand fluctuation 
3- Weather volatility and climate change 
4- Cyber attacks and terrorism 
5- Technical malfunction such as technology, component 
 




To determine the threats impact on the energy entity is paramount to avoid interruption 
in energy supply [83]. The resilience is an approach aimed to eliminate hazardous 
consequences in socio-econo-ecological parameters that influence respectively the life 
quality, economic activity, and environmental sustainability. Resilient guards ensure 
maintaining the system operates as designed. 
The resilient MEG should be enhanced at the design stage to guarantee the availability, 
accessibility, affordability, and acceptability of the energy service under different 
circumstances in order to achieve resilient MEG. Thus, resilient MEG must consist the 
following characteristics to ensure a resilient performance: robustness, stability, flexibility, 
resourcefulness, coordination capacity, redundancy, diversity, foresight capacity, 
independence, interdependence, collaboration, agility, adaptability, self-organization, 
creativity and efficiency [133]. 
The literature on MEG resilience still limited. The core innovation of this study is the 
proposal of design a resilient MEG from a safety perspective. Where this study is an 
attempt to cope the gap between the requirements for a resilient MEG design and the safety 
analysis tools. 
A resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI) is proposed in this study to evaluate the 
MEG resilience. The RRPI is derived from safety analysis concepts in order to identify the 
MEG safety design criteria that are required for resilient MEG. In addition, RRPI is able 
to link this criterion with the essential components of the independent resilience layers 
(IRLs). IRLs are proposed in Section 4.6 to improve the resiliency of MEG at numerous 
hazardous events. 
3.5 Chapter’s Conclusions 
A safety design of a MEG is proposed in this study in order to mitigate major hazards 
that threaten the original MEG, by increasing the energy grids resilience by using three 
IRLs. The Co-generator, TES, and a heuristic rule-based methodology controller are used 
as IRLs to enable the MEG working in an islanded mode for normal energy demands during 
different seasons. Those IRLs increase the MEG reliability to more than double its normal 




offer a significant reduction in the utility grid risk severity. Subsequently, the IRLs enable 
the improvement of MEG performance with practical everyday considerations, such as 
equipment maintenance and variation in energy demand, that affect MEG operation and 
load distribution. Predicting future load profiles from historical data can provide a tolerable 
approximate tool for scheduling the dispatch of MEG resources. The optimal energy 
imports can be achieved by using real-time energy dispatch control for effective 





 Safety Design, Risk Assessment and Proposed 
Resilience Layers for MEG 
4.1 Design of Resilient Micro Energy Grid 
The current reliability, resiliency and sustainability methods are dealing with these 
hazards separately [134]. This study aims to propose a framework that addresses the 
demand of a resilient MEG by using safety analysis tools in order to offer a greater clarity 
to the decision makers. The socio-econo-ecological method that declared in Section 3.4 is 
proposed to design a resilient MEG by modifying MEG’s stability characteristics using the 
framework illustrated in Fig. 4.1 and described in the following points:  
1. Initiate the design process based on the available information of MEG’s hazard 
scenarios that need to be eliminated. 
2. Monitor the system’s resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI) during the 
hazard scenarios. (will be discussed in section 4.2) 
3. Eliminate fault consequences in order to keep the system functioning by adding 
non-SIF independent resilience layers (IRLs). (will be discussed in section 4.6) 
4. Adapt system’s characteristics, based on internal learning reasoning and expert 
knowledge on the learned lesson, by adding SIF IRLs to improve the system’s RRPI 









4.2 Proposed Resilience Matrix for MEGs 
Risks are generally measured based on probabilities theory. Risk assessment 
methodologies are based on the historical statistical information of similar systems’ 
characteristics that give the risk management team the ability to assure certainty of risk 
measurement in numeral values [135]. 
The safety design toward resilience of complex systems, such as MEG, requires 
extending MEG’s flexibility to cope with unknown variations, in addition, to deal with 
known variations 
The first use of risk matrix was in 1973 [136]. The risk matrix is an effective 
methodology used in risk analysis. The proposed resilience matrix (RM) is derived from 
the hazard matrix by adding a socio-econo-ecological attributes named resilience risk 
performance indicator (RRPI). The RM has the ability to visualize and rank the hazard 
event of a MEG based on its RRPI. The RRPI is a proposed indicator for system 
performance that assesses the society, economy and environment risk level for every 
hazard event. Therefore, RRPI is capable to assess the resilience of MEG design, which it 
is a paramount tool in risk analysis and decision-making process. 
The MEG foundation design in this research does not use inherent safeguard resilience 
layers. The proposed resilience table is shown in Appendix-I illustrates the major hazards 
that threaten the MEG system in electricity, cooling, heating and natural gas grids, and the 
possible remedial action for overcoming the related consequences, and for avoiding the 
risk of failure or blackout.  
Each row in the resilience matrix, Appendix-I, defines hazards that threating the MEG, 
also it shows relative statistical attributes such as the consequence severity of hazard event, 
risk occurrences (i.e. frequency, probability and avoidance), ecological risk index and 
RRPI. Furthermore, fault consequences and, suggested remedy actions are presented [137]. 
The RRPI value can be defined by using  (4-1 that derived from eq.2 10. 
The hazard events information were collected from historical data presented in numerous 
professional studies illustrated in CHAPTER 2 Literature Review. In addition to experts 




Base on  (2-10 the RRPI was developed and expressed in the following formula: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 (RRPI) = 𝑆𝑖 𝑥 𝐶𝑖 𝑥 𝐸𝑖  (4-1) 
Where:  
1. Si is an indicator of the consequence severity of the hazard event. The severity has four 
categories namely negligible, marginal, critical and catastrophic 
2. The Ci is the likelihood class of hazard event, which is a combination of three important 
parameters measuring the intensity of the hazard. This combination is illustrated in:  
𝐶𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝐴𝑖)  (4-2) 
The likelihood class has five categories i.e. very low, low, moderate, high and 
extremely high 
3. Pi is a probability factor that implies how likely a hazard event will occur. The 
probability has five categories namely negligible (1/3), rarely (2/3), possible 
(3/3), likely (4/3) and common (5/3). 
4. Fi is the frequency, which is the number of occurrences of a repeating hazard 
event per time. Frequency has five categories ie. Less (1/3), yearly (2/3), monthly 
(3/3), weekly (4/3) and daily (5/3). 
5. Ai is the possibility of avoiding failure occurrence. Avoidance has three 
categories namely likely (1/3), possible (3/3) and impossible (5/3). 
6. Ei is the ecological risk index that measures failure’s impact on the environment 
due to the failure consequence, such as greenhouse gases emission and 
squandering natural resources.  
The proposed RM has information about the expected hazard event consequences in the 
society, economy and environment. It also offers the available remedial / mitigation actions 




4.3 Hazard Analysis for Resilient MEG 
The safety design for the MEG aims to improve the stability of the energy system during 
abnormal conditions and to seize the fault/damage propagation. This can be achieved by 
interrupting and isolating faulted or failed components from the system, as well as 
providing resilience methods for properties, public and environment safeguards. 
 The dynamic structure of MEGs and their various operating conditions require the 
development of resilience method by using intelligent control and monitoring units that 
based on safety design criteria. 
 




The resilience analysis algorithm for MEG illustrates in Fig. 4.2 can be demonstrated in 
the following steps: 
1- Study hazards and estimate risks of a MEG such as hazards in electricity, heating, 
cooling, transportation sectors and hazards due to natural phenomena by 
implementing MEG’s resilience matrix and estimating RRPI  (4-1. 
2- Rank the hazard events based on its RRPI value in a descendant order. 
3- Eliminate hazards that have low severity and low ecological risk with high class, 
hazards have high severity with low class and low ecological risk, and hazards have 
low severity and low class  with high ecological risk  
4- Prioritize the filtered hazard events based on RRPI level  
5- Study prevention and mitigation solutions to deploy the necessary IRL(s) shown in 
Section 4.6. 
In general, risk analysis idiom measures the hazardous conditions that appear during 
operation intervals. Where the average time period between successive hazardous events 
is estimated to be over 10 years if safety attributes are considered during the design process 
[11]. Accordingly, the SIS is passive during normal operation, and it may probably be only 
activated once during the ten-year interval or more. Table 4-1 Illustrates the SIS operating 
conditions [138]. Fail-danger mode is the major hazard in the system. Where despite the 
system operating ordinarily in this circumstance, the automatic protection of the SIS is not 
guarded and there is no indication of that failure [139]. 



















It is clearly defined that hazard analysis alone is not sufficient for the right decision. 
Where the hazards should be prioritized and discussed with the decision-making team in 
light of the affordable level of RRPI, tolerant rate of fault consequences losses and the 
available budget / components that can be utilized for remedial actions. Fig. 4.3 illustrates 
MEG hazards based on the RRPI level shown in Appendix-I. The hazard events, shown 
in Table 4-2, have the highest risk ranks, where they are allocated in the high catastrophic 
range; those hazards must have priority in resilience actions. 
 
Fig. 4.3: Proposed resilience chart for a MEG 
While Table 4-3 illustrates the hazard events that allocated in the medium catastrophic 
range, which have less priority in the resilience actions.  
The comparison between the MEG resilience chart Fig. 4.3 and the MEG hazard chart 
Fig. 4.4 that introduced in [137] shows that the resilience chart has visualized the 
ecological risk index for every hazard events whereas it can be noticed that Fig. 4.4 is the 
virtical perspective of  Fig. 4.3 for the domain of class likelihood and severity. 
In order to mitigate the consequences of the group of hazards depicted in Table 4-2 and 
Table 4-3 the following systems / devices are proposed to be added to the MEG entity 






Fig. 4.4: MEG hazards chart 
Table 4-2: Hazard events in the high catastrophic range 




Faults in the power systems (generation, transmission or 
distribution) 
2 MEG has lack of DERs 
3 Cooling outage High correlation of cooling demand with electricity demand 
Table 4-3: Hazard events in medium catastrophic range 








Transportation energy demand contingency 
It can be noticed that all the above proposed systems / devices have direct positive impact 
on mitigating the consequences of the catastrophic and medium hazard events. Therefore, 





4.4 Safety Instrumented System Engineering Requirements 
Nevertheless, a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is similar to a process control system 
(BPCS) in numerous ways; the differences are found in the unique design, maintenance, 
and automated integrity requirements. Thus, in addition to the functional requirements of 
normal performance that are correlated with control system design, the requirements shown 
in Fig. 4.5 must be considered for SIS design [79]. 
 
Fig. 4.5: SIS design requirement 
4.4.1 Safety Integrity Level 
Safety integrity level (SIL) is an expression for the relative level of risk-reduction 
offered by a certain SIF, where SIL is an indication of system safety performance. IEC EN 
61508 has defined the relation of PFD (probability of failure on demand) and RRF (risk 
reduction factor) of low demand operation with SILs, as shown in Table 4-4 [79]. 
4.4.2 Safety Instrumented Function 
Safety instrumented function (SIF) is defined, in ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 
Mod), 3.2.71, as "safety function with a specified safety integrity level which is necessary 
to achieve functional safety" [140]. Safety function can be defined as a "function to be 
implemented by a SIS, other technology safety-related system or external risk reduction 
facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the process, with respect 




Design diagnostics to detect fail-danger 
automatically
Design manual test procedures to detect fail-danger




Table 4-4: Relationship between average probabilities of failure on demand to safety 
integrity levels (SIL) [79] 




4 Catastrophic community impact 10-4 to 10-5 10,000 to 100,000 99.99 to 99.999 
3 Employee and community impact 10-3 to 10-4 1,000 to 10,000 99.9 to 99.99 
2 
Major property and production 
impact; Possible injury to 
employee 
10-2 to 10-3 100 to 1,000 99 to 99.9 
1 
Minor property and production 
impact 
10-1 to 10-2 10 to 100 90 to 99 
4.5 Fault Tree Analysis for MEG 
Mean time to failure (MTTF) is one of the most important static parameters in safety 
engineering. It can be used to derive another important measurement, known as failure rate. 
The real-time failure rate is generally obtained by counting the number of failures during 
a certain time period for a selected quantity of identical components exposed to failure. 
   𝜆(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑(0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡)
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
       , ∀ 𝑇 > 𝑡 ≥ 0  
           (4-3) 
where t refers to the operation timeline, reliability is obtained by 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡, the 
probability of failure on demand is obtained by 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 ≈ 𝜆𝑡 and the mean time 
to fail is obtained by 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = 1/𝜆. 
The fault tree method is widely used to illustrate probability combinations. This 
technique begins with the definition of an "undesirable event," usually a system failure of 
some type. The analyst continues by identifying all events and combinations of events that 




failures of a specific failure mode. These different failure modes can be identified as 
different undesirable events in different fault trees. A developed fault tree analysis shown 
in Fig. 4.6 defines the top event probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a selected 
MEG. The developed method provides an effective tool to interconnect multiple failure 
modes in one entity. The PFD for a MEG can be estimated by using following equations: 
𝐹(𝑀𝐸𝐺) = 𝐹(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡) + 𝐹(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ 𝐹(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
(4-4) 
where: 
 𝐹(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑) ∗ 𝐹(𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) ∗ 𝐹(𝐶𝑜 − 𝑔𝑒𝑛) ∗
𝐹(𝑇𝐸𝑆) ∗ 𝐹(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔. )   
 𝐹(𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒) = (6 ∗ 𝐹(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟) ∗ 𝐹(𝐶𝑜 − 𝑔𝑒𝑛) ∗ 𝐹(𝑇𝐸𝑆) ∗ 𝐹(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔. ) 
 𝐹(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 𝐹(𝐶𝑜 − 𝑔𝑒𝑛) ∗ 𝐹(𝐵𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟) ∗ 𝐹(𝑇𝐸𝑆) ∗ 𝐹(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔. )  
 𝐹(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑) = 𝐹(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝐹(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟) + 𝐹(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) +
𝐹(𝐹𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠) + 𝐹(𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝐹(𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠)  
 𝐹(𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤) = 𝐹(𝑃𝑉) + 𝐹(𝑊𝑇) 
 F(PV)=F(Inverter)+F(Panels)+F(Hub)+F(C.B) + F(Ctrl) 
  𝐹(𝑊𝑇) = 𝐹(𝑆𝑎𝑤) + 𝐹(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠) + 𝐹(𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒) + 𝐹(𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑙. ) + 𝐹(𝐻𝑢𝑏) +
𝐹(𝐶. 𝐵. ) + 𝐹(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) + 𝐹(𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑐) 
 F(Co-Gen.)=F(Fuel pump)+F(Alternative)+F(Cooling Radiator)+F(AVR) 
The PFD associated with each individual system in MEG can be illustrated from 
historical database and expert’s knowledge [87]. PFDs for selected individual 






Table 4-5: Reliability data for utilities’ transmission and distribution components 
Components Failure Rate (f/yr.) Repair rate (h) Reference 
Substation 0.006 24 [141]  
Feeder line section 0.065 6 [141] 
Switches 0.006 4 [141] 
Fuses 0.006 4 [141] 
Transformer 0.015 10 [141] 





























































Mutual component for all energy types 
Solitary component for all energy types 
Six identical components have same PFD
Note: All values in the figure are represent the PFD     




































1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑇 
Repair rate (h) Reference 
Solar system (PV) 0.2487 0.7798 0.2202 41.473 [142][143] 
Wind Turbine (WT) 0.402 0.6690 0.3310 130 [144] 
Co-generator (CG)  
Gas turbine 
0.3 0.7408 0.2592 111.6 [145] 
Utility grid 0.7224 0.4856 0.5144 7.655 [146]  
Diesel generator 
(electrical + mechanical) 
0.9 0.4066 0.5934 3.9 [145] 
Chiller Unit 0.003 0.997 0.003 - [147] 
TES 0.0250 0.9753 0.0247 - [148] 
Boiler 0.7964 0.4509 0.5491 - [149] 
Fuel Cell (FC) 0.876 0.4164 0.5836 - [150] 
Battery (including 
controller and inverter) 
0.2992 0.74141 0.25858 48.9 [142][143] 
Micro Turbine 0.6257 0.5349 0.4651 - [151] 
Control computer and 
sensor system (Alarm) 
0.1522 0.8588 0.1412 - [152] 
Power management 
system 
0.1522 0.8588 0.1412 - [152] 






Table 4-7: Failure distribution and failure rate of wind turbine  
Type Distribution of failure % Failure rate (f/yr.) Reference 
Hub 0.3 0.001 [144] 
Blades / Pitch 13.4 0.052 [144] [154] 
Generator 5.5 0.021 [144] [154] 
Electric system 17.5 0.067 [144] 
Control system 12.9 0.05 [144] 
Drive train 1.1 0.004 [144] 
Sensors 14.1 0.054 [144] 
Gear box 9.8 0.045 [144] [154] 
Mechanical breaks 1.2 0.005 [144] [154] 
Hydraulics 13.3 0.061 [144] 
Yaw system 6.7 0.026 [144] [154] 
Structure 1.5 0.006 [144] 
Entire unit 2.7 0.011 [144] 
The probability of the energy blackout of a MEG can be determined by compensating 
the failure rates of MEG’s individual components into eq. (4-4). It shows that the top event 
risk reduced by 1400 times when utilizing the proposed combination of IRLs, details will 
be discussed in Section 4.6. The PFD became 7.688e-4 while it was 1.0814 for the 






Table 4-8: Reliability data of PV components 
Type Failure rate (f/yr.) PFD 1-e^(-λT) Repair rate (h) Reference 
PV Panel 0.04     0.0392 18.25 [142][143] 
DC/AC inverter 0.143     0.1332 52.143 [142][143] 
Boost DC/DC 
converter 
0.0657     0.0636 62.5 [142][143] 
4.6 Proposed Independent Resilience Layers and Layer of Resilience 
Analysis 
The proposed independent resilience layer (IRL) is derived from the independent 
protection layer (IPL) that illustrated in [155]. The IRL can be defined as a device, system, 
or action that has the capability to maintain the process operate as designed without 
proceeding to undesired consequence scenarios. It must be independent from the initiating 
event or the action of any other layers of protection associated with the scenario. The 
fundamental characteristics of IRLs can be summarized as follows:  
 Potential ability on suppressing the propagation of fault consequence, if the IRL 
functions as intended  
 Auditable capability, where it assumed effective in terms of statistical validation of risk 
indices (by documentation, review or testing) 
LORA used to determine whether the selected IRL(s) is (are) sufficient in tolerating 
certain risk and suppressing the hazard of consequence scenarios. Where every IRL has its 
own PFD. 
 PFD= pn  , where n indicates the layer level                                (4-5) 





LORA path= fn =(∏ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖=𝑛−1
𝑖=1 )xf0 (4-6) 
where f0 is the probability of the initiating event  
LORA’s formula can be extended to cover multi path resilience assessment for namely 
electricity, heating and cooling energy, as shown in Fig. 4.7, by using the following 
equation. 
LORA Multi-path= fMulti-n =1-[(1- fElectricity)x (1- fHeating)x (1- fCooling)] (4-7) 
where fn is the LORA path in (4-6) for Electricity, Heating and Cooling 
respectively 
 
4.6.1 Proposed Layer of Resilience Analysis for MEG 
IRLs combination shown in Fig. 4.7 was proposed to mitigate the hazardous events that 
mentioned in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 for a MEG. These IRLs are required to tolerate the 
hazard of losing energy in the MEG, by utilizing co-generators, TES and supervisory fault-
tolerant predictive energy management control. Consequently, adding IRLs into a MEG 
realizes the concurrent goals of increasing the energy availability, improving the 
production quality/cost and reducing greenhouse gases emission, in other words it 
improves the MEG resilience. Details of the proposed IRLs in this study are as follows:  
I. IRL-1 co-generators, such as fuel cells, micro gas turbines, and hybrid turbine, to 
overcome the lack of power production during on-peak hours and to cope the 
intermittency of renewable energy resources (RESs). 
II. IRL-2 Thermal energy storage is an effective solution for MEG operation due to the 
following advantages: 
A- Centralized infrastructure, where large thermal reservoirs provide flexibility 
to manage cooling dynamics, reduction of greenhouse gases emission and 
mitigation of energy failure risks. 
B- Reshape the energy profile by reserving the off-peak production to be used at 




III. IRL-3 Supervisory fault-tolerant energy management (FTEM) controller plays an 
essential role on MEG’s resilience, where management of distributed resources 
near to RESs is the most effective means for increasing penetration of renewable 
sources. CHAPTER 5 proposes a multi-level hierarchical decision making as a non-
SIF IRL for resilient MEG. 
IV. IRL-4 intelligent alarm system is an important SIF layer, where its main role is to 
monitor the health status of the MEG and provide a real-time information about the 
correspondent fault type and location. Numerous types and techniques of alarm 
systems can be utilized such as Bayesian belief network based fault diagnosis 
system that proposed in CHAPTER 6. 
V. IRL-5 Emergency shutdown system (ESD) is an essential SIF layer due to its ability 
in suppressing the consequences of fault propagation.  
 
 

















Table 4-9: Examples of independent resilience layers (IRLs) 
No. IRL Examples 
1 
MEG Storage system (E/T/C):  Energy storage units are classified based 
on their technology, the following are 
the most popular energy storages: 
batteries, supercapacitors, flywheels, 
hydro tanks, thermal energy storage and 
superconducting magnetic energy 
storage 
2 
Prime mover Co-generators, fuel cells, micro gas 
turbines, geothermal resources and 
hybrid turbine systems 
3 
Intelligent control systems for normal 
operation to ensure rigid performance 
Various models based on individual 
units and systems within the MEG 
4 
Smart energy asset management for 
both sources and load within the MEG 
boundary 
By using management and optimization 
methods 
5 
Emergency control of resilient systems 
during abnormal conditions 
The proposed hierarchical decision 
making of three control level 
6 
Risk assessment platform and alarm 
systems 
Fault diagnosis system i.e. the proposed 
BBN-ANFIS based risk analysis 
7 
MEG safety shutdown and restoration 
systems 
Various models based on individual 
units and systems within the MEG 
8 
Upper-level centralized/decentralized 
MEG management with utility grids. 




Several combinations of different IRLs can be implemented to augment the MEG 
resiliency. Table 4-9 shows examples of IRLs that can be used for designing a resilient 
MEG 
Some of these IRLs were used and discussed in this thesis, the reset can be implemented 
and studied in future researches to explore different techniques and compare their 
performances on MEGs resilience. 
LORA shows a reduction on system risk level from 0.9845, SIL- 0, for the conventional 
energy grid to 0.0017, SIL-2, with a selected non-SIF-IRLs, i.e. Co-gen, TES and 
management control. Fig. 4.8 shows LORA diagram and calculation for a MEG integrated 
with selected non-SIF-IRLs. 
 
Fig. 4.8: LORA diagram for the incorporating the selected non-SIF IRLs into a MEG 
Adding the selected SIF-IRLs, shown in Fig. 4.7, into the MEG entity reduces LORA 
path value by a factor of 2.85x10-3. The new LORA value is defined by compensating the 
associated PFD values in (4-6 and 4-7as shown: 
LORA = f5 =1-[(1-1.01 x10
-6)x(1-2.01 x10-6)x(1-1.83 x10-6) = 4.85x10-6  
Thus, SIL margin increases to a range beyond SIL- 4 level. 
4.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Successful self-sufficiency operation of MEG increases the energy resilience toward 











of failure than the resilience MEG. The previous scenario that depicted in Fig. 4.7 of a 
MEG assumes every DERs in the MEG able to supply the full energy demand individually; 
in other words, the MEG has a full sufficiency to operate in islanded mode if any DER is 
available. To evaluate the impact of partial switching to islanded mode for the MEG 
described in Fig. 4.7, the probability of successful islanded is tested in five steps between 
0% and 100% for every IRLs namely Renewable energy, Co-generator, TES, management 
control, Alarm system and ESD. Results for 15,625 cases that listed in Appendix II 
Sensitivity analysis for LORA and illustrated. Fig. 4.9 shows the effect of utilizing the 
IRLs on the failure rate of MEG. The contribution of each IRLs are varied from 0 to 100% 
in five steps that created 15,625 different cases. The figure demonstrated that the higher 
contribution of every IRLs the lower failure rate the MEG has. 
 
Fig. 4.9: Sensitivity analysis for the resiliency of a MEG 
The failure rate varies from 0.9845 f/year for utility’s dependent to 4.85021x10-06 for a 
self-sufficiency resilient MEG. The individual contribution of every IRLs on MEG failure 





















































































































































Table 4-10: MEG’s risk level by using the selected IRLs individually 
IRL Renewable Co-gen TES Management Alarm ESD 
Risk level 0.966 0.476 0.054 0.102 0.091 0.0143 
On the other hand, it is important to mention that the contribution of each IRL on LORA 
depends on the ratio of IRL capacity to the daily energy demand therefore this ratio should 
take place in the MEG risk level calculation. Table 4-11 provides the calculation of LORA 
for the MEG case study by taking in consideration the contribution ratio of every IRLs. 
Consequently, the PFD of the MEG is 7.15996x10-05 and SIL-4 category. 
Table 4-11: Risk level for a MEG with a shared contribution ratio of every IRLs 
IRLs Renewable Co-gen TES Management Alarm ESD MEG 
Capacity 4 MW 16 MW 400 MWh N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Peak power 





N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Contribution % 20.6% 82.4% 80.6% 100% 100% 100% - 
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Electricity 
0.656 0.255 0.055 0.008 0.001 2.16E-05 - 
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.796 0.310 0.066 0.009 0.001 2.62E-05 - 
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.725 0.282 0.060 0.008 0.001 2.38E-05 - 
Risk level 0.981 0.631 0.171 0.025 0.004 7.16E-05 7.16E-05 
4.7 LORA-ISA Optimization Base for Resilient MEG Design 
In this section, the interior search algorithm (ISA) is introduced to support engineers on 
finding an optimal design for MEG’s components. The novel methodology uses ISA in 




described in Section 4.6. The proposed ISA structure takes in consideration the main 
constrains that facing resilient MEG design namely operation costs, greenhouse gases 
emission, capital cost and the system reliability. In such complex and nonlinear problems 
the local search algorithms, i.e. Nelder-Mead simplex method, is not an appropriate choice. 
Therefore, a global optimization algorithm is required [156].  
4.7.1  Interior Search Algorithm 
The elements are divided into two simultaneous optimization groups. Composition 
group is one group that changes the composition of elements to find better finesses and 
the other is the mirror group that produces more decorative environment. The following 
is describe the detailed ISA algorithm [157]: 
1- Arbitrarily select the locations of elements within lower bounds (LB) and upper 
bounds (UB), then evaluate their fitness values. 
2- Find the global best element, 𝑥𝑔𝑏
𝑗
. This element has the minimum objective function 
among the jth iteration. 
3- Divide the rest of elements arbitrarily into two groups named a composition group 
and a mirror group by using a threshold value α and arbitrary variables r1 (ranging 
from 0 to 1 for each element). Elements with r1 ≥ α go to the composition group and 
the rest go to the mirror group. 
4- To optimize the global best, it is recommended to shift its location slightly by using 





+ 𝑟𝑛 × 𝜆  (4-8) 
where 𝑟𝑛: a vector of normally distributed random numbers,  
 𝜆: a scale factor equal to 0.01×(UB-LB). 
5- Each element in the composition group and its boundary conditions, upper and lower 
bounds, are arbitrarily changed : 
𝑥𝑖
𝑗
= 𝐿𝐵𝑗 + (𝑈𝐵𝑗 − 𝐿𝐵𝑗) × 𝑟2  (4-9) 






 is the ith element in the jth iteration;  
LBj and UBj: lower and upper bounds of the elements in j
th iteration and they 
are, respectively, the minimum and maximum values of all elements in the (j-
1)  iteration. 
6- The elements of the mirror group, a mirror is randomly placed between each element 
and the fittest element (global best). The location of a mirror for the ith element in 





+ (1 − 𝑟3)𝑥𝑔𝑏
𝑗
  (4-10) 
where r3: a random value between 0 and 1. The location of the image or virtual 






  (4-11) 
7- Determine the fitness values of the new updated locations of the elements and 
images. Then update each location if its fitness is enhanced for revival design. For a 













                           𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 (4-12) 
8- If any of the stop criteria is not satisfied, repeat the above steps from step 2. 
4.7.2 Cost Function Optimization for Resilient MEG Design 
The optimal resilient design for MEG’s components can be achieved by using the 
proposed optimization methodology that illustrated in Fig. 4.10. The proposed 
methodology is aimed to provide an effective design tool for resilient MEG that 
considers minimizing the risk level of MEG, operation / maintenance cost, greenhouse 
gases emissions and capital cost of MEG infrastructure. These optimization elements are 
presenting the resiliency parameters, namely socio-econo-ecological attributes, which 
were illustrated in detail in sections 3.4 and 4.1. ISA was proposed to minimize the 




Min ( fCost ) = Min ( µrisk x fRisk  + µCo2  x  fCo2 + µOC x  fOC + µCC x fCC )  (4-13) 
Where: fRisk is LORA Multi-path risk level derived from 4-7 by adding the contribution 
factor of each IRL 
fRisk =1-[(1- fElectricity) x (1- fHeating) x (1- fCooling)]  (4-14) 
𝑓𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =∏𝑥𝑖  x 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑖  x 𝛾𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐−𝑖 + (1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1
  (4-15) 
𝑓𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =∏𝑥𝑖  x 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑖 x 𝛾𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡−𝑖 + (1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1
  (4-16) 
𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 =∏𝑥𝑖 x 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑖 x 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑙−𝑖 + (1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1
  (4-17) 
fCo2 is the greenhouse gases emission for a selected MEG entity 
𝑓𝑐𝑜2 = [𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  x (1 − 𝛼1x 𝑥4)] x [(1 − (𝑥1
+ 𝑥2)) x 𝛾𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜2 + 𝑥1 x 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜2
+ 𝑥2 x 𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜2] 
 (4-18) 
fOC is the operation cost for the MEG 
𝑓𝑂𝐶 = [𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  x (1 − 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑥3)]
∗ [(1 − (𝑥1 + 𝑥2)) x 𝛾𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑢𝑦 + 𝑥1 x 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟
+ 𝑥2 x 𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟] 
 (4-19) 
fCC is the capital cost for the MEG 
𝑓𝐶𝐶 = 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  x [𝑥1 x  𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑥2 x 𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙]
+ [𝑥3 x 𝛾𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 x 𝛼3 x 𝛾𝑇𝐸𝑆 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙]𝑥 [1






Fig. 4.10: ISA based LORA structure 
The parameters of the proposed LORA-ISA model for design a resilient MEG are 
defined in Table 4-12. The optimum set of the IRLs’ contribution factors, 𝑥𝑖, are selected 
based on The minimum cost function in  (4-13).  
Table 4-12: Constant value of specification 
Symbol Description Value Ref 
𝑥𝑖 Contribution factor for IRL 0-1 NA 




The coefficient is 1 if the IRL has an 
impact on the energy stream 




























Co2 reduction factor for utilizing 
advanced energy management 
0.3 NA 
𝛾𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜2 The utility’s greenhouse emission 865 kg/MWh [158] 
𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜2 The renewable’s greenhouse emission 0 kg/MWh [159] 
𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜2 
The co-gen’s (Gas Turbine) greenhouse 
emission 
570 [160] 
𝛼2 Cost reduction factor for utilizing TES 0.2 NA 
𝛾𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑢𝑦 





𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟 Renewable sources operation rate  10 CAD$/MWh [162]  
𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟 Co-generator operation rate 110 CAD$/MWh [118] 




𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 Co-generator capital rate 900 CAD$/MWh [159] [160] 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 Total MEG Energy demand in a week 19.42 MWh NA 
𝛼3 
Cooling storage coefficient (7 days, 10 
ten times for usage a day)  
1/(7*10) [163] 
𝛼4 
Budget rate for capital cost for the 







The contribution parameter of each cost 
value 
1, 10-8, 10-8 NA 
4.7.3 Constraints 
In order to define the optimal selection of IRLs, the optimization algorithm should 
consider the components’ limitation and the system constraints. The following constraints 
were selected based on experts knowledge, stakeholder(s) needs and manufacturer(s) 
recommendation. 
0 ≤ 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≤ 1  (4-21) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1     𝑖 = 1, 2, …6 (4-22) 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  x (𝑥1x 𝛾𝑅𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝑥2 x 𝛾𝐶𝑜−𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) ≥ 0 (4-23) 
The statistical results of the LORA-ISA are illustrated in Table 4-13. With the selected 
six IRL  elements the proposed procedure recognized the optimum value after about 10,000 
structural analyses. The convergence trace of the results is illustrated in Fig. 4.11. 





















Fig. 4.11: Convergence trace for a MEG consists six IRLs 
4.8 Chapter’s Conclusions 
In this chapter, a study of safety design and risk analysis for MEG was developed to 
achieve a resilient MEG design and implementation. Framework for the safety design 
methodology was presented and discussed. A developed resilience analysis algorithm for 
MEG was proposed to assist the decision-making team in prioritizing hazardous events. 
Afterward, advanced fault tree and proposed LORA were utilized to estimate the risk 
reduction value and the associated SIL of integrating a selected combination of IRLs in the 
MEG. Selected SIF and non-SIF IRLs were utilized to achieve a resilient MEG by 
increasing SIL. The extremely high hazards, that have low severity and low ecological risk 
with high class, hazards have high severity with low class and low ecological risk, and 
hazards have low severity and low class with high ecological risk, were eliminated to focus 
on the major effective hazards and propose suitable IRLs to prevent their consequences. 
The results showing that the proposed non-SIF IRLs reduce the risk of MEG blackout by 
100 times and the proposed SIF IRLs offer another 1000 times reduction in the threaten 
risks of the base MEG. In light of the promising results in this research, it can be affirmed 




verification. The proposed tool can be widely utilized in design and verification of large 
complex systems. 
The sensitivity analysis in Section 4.6.2 and Appendix II Sensitivity analysis for LORA 
assess the contribution of every IRLs on LORA and MEG’s resilience level. The results 
show that number of cascaded IRLs used in MEG and the ratio of each IRL contribution 
has a direct impact on the MEG resilience. The SIL varies from SIL-0 for the base MEG 
to SIL-4 for the guarded MEG by six IRLs  
It can be noticed that SIF IRLs are usually auxiliary systems that does not have direct 
effect on the operation cost and environment parameters of the energy system. However, 
SIF IRLs have significant effect on the systems’ reliability. On the other hand, the non-SIF 
IRLs have direct effects on socio-econo-ecological parameters, where the type and capacity 
of the non-SIF IRL is able to improve the running cost, greenhouse gases emission and the 
overall system’s reliability as illustrated in Section 7.2.   
The novel combination of Interior search algorithm (ISA) and LORA was employed to 
support engineers on finding an optimal design for MEG’s components. The proposed ISA 
structure takes in consideration the main constrains that facing resilient MEG design 
namely operation costs, greenhouse gases emission, capital cost and the system reliability. 
Results shows optimal values for IRLs for design a resilient MEG that considers risk 
calculation in the optimization cost function that. To the best of the author's knowledge, so 
far there is no other publication reporting design of resilient MEG based on LORA-ISA 




 Resilient MEG Design using Proposed non-SIF 
IRL (Multi-Level Hierarchical Decision Making) 
Effective design of fault-tolerant management system of a MEG realizes a full 
capability of resilient and eco-friendly energy production [164]. MEG comprises complex 
systems with dynamic response characteristics at various time-scales. Thus, a hierarchical 
pattern is recommended for the control of such complex systems [165]. It includes an 
overall supervisory control that determines the set point of critical performance parameters 
of the MEG based on the energy production and demand during the day course. For 
instance, the decision of which distributed energy resources (DERs) should be operating 
(on/off states), and at what conditions they must be operating (at energy levels, power level, 
temperatures, pressures, mass flow rates, and so on) [15]. 
A multi-level hierarchical decision making (MLHDM) is one of the IRLs that is 
proposed in this study as a non-SIF IRL. It enhances the self-healing characteristics of 
MEG against uncertainty hazards during the system operation. The structural design of 
MLHDM consists of three successive levels that functioning together to attain resilient 
operation. 
5.1 Background 
Numerous control methodologies for MEG have been proposed and studied. The 
centralized, decentralized and multilevel hierarchical decision making of MEG have been 
discovered in previous theoretical and laboratory experimental studies [16][166][27][167]. 
The difference between these controls structures are shown in Fig. 5.1, Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3. 
1- Decentralized control methodology of the MEG can be summarized as follows; the 
individual energy sources have the right to share the demand as per their specific capacity 
and local control characteristics. Those are fixed during installation and planning phases. 
Consequently, it is difficult to make any re-scheduling for Instantaneous energy production 
for each source to achieve optimum generation cost and emission conditions. This fact led 
to underutilize the energy sources, although they may have high efficiency and lower 





Fig. 5.1: Decentralized MEG control methodology 
2- Centralized control methodology of the MEG mainly consists of a central control system 
for remote control all energy sources in the MEG boundary. Optimal performance can be 
achieved by using centralized control system, but it has a significant disadvantage on the 
reliability of energy system where if the central controller fails, most likely the overall 
energy system will collapse. The centralized control methodology is relying on the 
communication network, where the speed and reliability of the communication system have 
a direct impact on the MEG performance, reliability and resiliency. 
 
Fig. 5.2: Centralized MEG control methodology 
3- A multilevel hierarchical decision making of the MEG provides a better methodology to 
overcome most of the obstacles accompanying centralized and decentralized control 
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methodologies [169]. This control type has a significant role in achieving an optimum 
operation of the MEG system similar to centralized control methodology but under lower 
speed and reliability level of the communication network requirements. However, the main 
challenge of hierarchical decision-making methodology is the necessity for clear boundaries 
of control range and domain based on control levels [170]. In the hierarchical decision 
making, the supervisory control and predictive control levels generally depend on the 
communication network to achieve the MEG system optimization operation same as a 
centralized methodology. But hierarchical has the advantage of decentralized methodology, 
where the reactive control level is not depending on the communication network. This 
feature immunizes the MEG from loss of operation once failure occurred in higher level 
control and/or network. Whilst the hierarchical may lose the optimal performance during 
such hazardous event. 
 
Fig. 5.3: Hierarchical MEG decision making methodology 
The MEG performs dynamic control over energy sources, enabling autonomous and 
automatic self-healing operations. During normal or peak usage, or at times of the capital 
energy grid failure, a MEG can operate independently of the capital grid and isolate its 
generation nodes and energy loads from disturbance without affecting the capital grid's 
integrity [171]. 
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This section proposes a MEG topology has the capability for self-sufficiency of 
electricity, cooling and heating demands majority of the year by utilizing co-generation unit 
(CG), solar power (PV), wind turbine farm (WT), heat recovery steam generator (HRSG), 
and district cooling units (DCUs) with thermal energy storage (TES). Also, it is supported 
by the supercapacitor bank for swift and dynamic power backup. A multi-level hierarchical 
decision making is proposed to provide autonomous self-healing supervisory and control 
for MEG. The control architecture consists of three levels working together to achieve the 
overall operational goal. 
5.2 Hierarchical Decision Making Architecture 
A hierarchical decision-making design is proposed and applied in order to manage the 
energy resources efficiently and effectively utilizes the MEG components. It comprises of 
three levels, including a self-ruling decision-making level, a predictive control level, and a 
reactive control level. Each level has its own local objective and they work together to 
realize a resilient operational performance. The higher level controller involves a fault 
tolerant control formulation, in order to deal with uncertainty hazardous conditions and to 
determine the best action for each subsystem. The predictive control level harnesses a pre-
scheduled operational timing to manipulate the chiller units (DCUs) operation. The 
predictive control aims to operate the DCUs at off demand timing for charging the TES 
which required to cover an on-demand peak period. The lower level controller is a load 
following control for the demand that needs a fast response. Fig. 5.4 shows the hierarchical 





Fig. 5.4: Hierarchical decision making architecture for MEG 
The efficiency of any control strategy depends on the selected performance parameters 
and the control structure [169]. A central decision-making control determines the control 
parameters based on the obtainable information collected by the subsystems. Nevertheless, 
the centralized method might be difficult to realize in large-scale systems, where the 
process of transmission and transformation of the information are more complex. 
Decentralization of the information and control structures is a feasible solution to overcome 
this dilemma. the decomposition of a large system into subsystems is mainly aimed to 
minimize the required computation process further to reduce the amount of information 
required for the decision-making level [172]. 
In the past, the MEG has been classified as either an islanded or a grid-connected mode. 
But the resilient energy grids demands for a flexible MEG that can operate in both grid-
connected and islanded modes [173]. This system is open the door for great challenges, 
where establishing such systems requires for integrating different technologies of energy 
sources, energy storage, and energy management systems. In addition to, safety issues such 
as fault monitoring, predictive maintenance, or protection, which are fundamentals for 

























This chapter concerns on developing the decision-making and predictive control levels 
to manage the cooling demand and to minimize its negative impacts on the electrical energy 
system. Fuzzy (Sugeno) rules were implements for softening the conflict between pre-
scheduled chiller units (DCUs) operation and reactive control response. 
5.2.1 Design of adaptive neuro-fuzzy decision-making method 
The fuzzy method is considered as a simple and tangible approach for solving dynamic 
nonlinear systems. Sugeno or Takagi-Sugeno-Kang fuzzy system was proposed in this 
study for its ability to provide a systematic method of producing fuzzy rules for definite 
input/output streams. The main difference between Mamdani and Sugeno is that the 
Sugeno output membership functions are either linear or constant.  
Fig. 5.5 shows an adaptive-network-based fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) have an 
optimized structure of 5 layers organized as follow 2:10:25:25:1.  
 
Fig. 5.5 Optimized ANFIS architecture 
This structure was created from an initial data using MATLAB environment. Takagi-




and one output, which is tuned online using a combination of least-squares estimation and 
back-propagation methods. The error between reference chillers operation and actual 
chillers operation is used to tune the neuro-fuzzy model parameters. Functions of each layer 
in the ANFIS architecture are formalized as follows [174]: 
Layer 1: it is a fuzzification layer where each node is symbolized by a membership. Five 
Gaussian curve membership functions are designated to each input as shown in Fig. 5.5, 
and its node equations are given as follows: 









                   (5-1) 
where c is MF’s center and σ is MF’s width 
 
Fig. 5.6: Gaussian curve fuzzy membership 
Layer 2: Each node in this layer is a multiplier which multiplies the input signals and 
forwards the result to the 3rd layer 
𝜇𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜇𝐴𝑖(𝜉1). 𝜇𝐵𝑗(𝜉2) ….,𝑖=𝑗=1,2,3,4,5                   (5-2) 
This equation characterizes the firing strength of a rule. 
Layer 3: Each node in this layer calculates the normalized firing strength of each rule as 
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shown in the following equation: 








Layer 5: is the final output layer of the fuzzy system. The output of the system is the 
summation of all incoming signals from layer 3, computed as follows: 




𝑖=1 , . .   𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,                   (5-5) 
5.2.2 Electrical and Cooling Energy System Procedure 
Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8 are summarizing the general procedure of cooling and electrical 
systems at a resilient MEG,  note that the heating system was not mentioned in this section 
because the heating demand is covered by the heating energy produced by the co-generator 
and HRSG. 



































































5.3 Case Study Simulation and Discussions 
5.3.1 Simulation of a MEG with MLHDM 
A case study for the proposed resilient MEG system is presented in this section using 
the Simulink environment. Fig. 5.9 shows proposed resilient MEG has three IRLs 
including a hierarchical decision-making system. The proposed MEG system is 
implemented in the Simulink environment platform to study the system performance in 
different operational scenarios in order to examine the MEG system resilience for 
prescribed cooling, heating and electricity energy demands.  
 




Studying the following scenarios can realize a clear vision about the proposed IRLs 
performance and their effects on MEG resilience:  
Scenario1: Study the operation and performance of MEG (Co-generation with built-in 
reactive controllers) 
IRL-1 was applied in order to improve the MEG’s resilience level by integrating a 
co-generator. The co-generator eliminates the renewable resources penetration and it 
covers around 60% of the energy demand requirements. In other words, this means a 
reduction of the severity risk of energy failure to 60% of the utility grid total failure 
multiplied by the PFD of the co-generator. 
Scenario-2: Study the operation and performance of MEG (TES and co-generation with 
built-in reactive controllers) 
This scenario illustrates IRL-2 capability on improving the MEG self-healing 
performance. IRL-2 shaves the peak demand at on-peak period by generating it at earlier 
off-peak periods. It can be shown that IRL-2 safeguards more than 17% of the total 
energy demand. 
Scenario-3: Study the operation and performance of MEG with TES, co-generation and 
a hierarchical decision-making system  
IRL-1, IRL-2 and IRL-3 were provided to the MEG in order to increase its capability 
and to make it operates in the islanded mode, which means IRL-3 is providing the 
remainder of the 23% of the total energy demand by manipulating the energy sources 
imports using a hierarchical decision-making approach in the MEG’s structure. 
Scenario-4: Study the operation and performance of MEG with TES, co-generation and 
a hierarchical decision-making system during fault 
5.3.2 Results and discussion 
In order to assess and evolve the MEG system operation, a data for a one week in 
summer with one-hour sampling time has been studied carefully. The interaction between 




to increase the MEG’s level of safety, resilience, and self-healing. Three scenarios were 
examined in this section:  
Scenario-1, one IRL, co-generation, was utilized   
Scenario-2, two potentially valuable structures were utilized namely TES and co-
generator.  
Scenario-3, by using all the three IRLs namely, co-generator, TES and MLHDM during 
normal operation 
Scenario-4, resilient MEG that comprises the three IRLs during fault event (four district 
cooling units are out of service). 
The objective of the proposed strategies is to verify the performance of the proposed 
resilient MEG by utilizing a multi-level hierarchical decision making (MLHDM) with TES 
and Co-generator for the optimal reshaping of the energy demands. Hence, to propose a 
safety design approach that is able to reduce the impact of hazardous scenarios on the 
MEG’s operational conditions. Performance indices of DERs, utility grid imports, and 
DCUs operation have been processed in order to achieve an optimum management of the 
electricity, heating and cooling energy profiles. 
a) Scenario-1 Foundation MEG design with co-generation  
Fig. 5.10 illustrates the power demand profile for a one week in summer for the original 
MEG structure with one IRL namely the co-generation. It can be noticed that the 
combination of DERs, i.e. Co-generator and RES were unable to satisfy the customer’s 
power demand. Thus, the utility power handled the power deficiency.  
The MEG cooling demand of a one week in summer is shown in Fig. 5.11. The figure 
presents a high frequency of on-off operation of the DCUs. In every start-up the DCUs the 
inrush current crosses beyond a double of the unit’s rated current, which increases the 





Fig. 5.10: Power profile for foundation MEG 
 




b) Scenario-2 Resilient MEG design comprises TES and cogeneration IRLs with built-
in reactive controllers 
 
Fig. 5.12: MEG power profile by utilizing co-generation and TES IRLs 
Fig. 5.12 presents the power demand profile for a one week in summer using co-
generator and TES IRLs. The figure shows that the local DERs are not sufficient to cover 
the power demand during the course of the day, where the deficiency caused by a sudden 
rise in the power demand must be handled by the utility grid. The power deficiency 
occurred in two to four hours intervals a day with a maximum 8 MW while co-generator 
serves an average of 14 MW with a maximum production capacity of 18 MW.  
 




Cooling profile in Fig. 5.13 shows the MEG cooling demand for a one week in summer. 
Where the MEG is integrating a co-generator and TES. The figure illustrates that the TES 
improves the cooling production with less operational hours of the DCUs, regardless of the 
high correlation between the cooling and electricity demands. 
Fig. 5.14 presents a sample of the heating demand profile for the same test week period. 
The figure shows that the heat generated by the co-generator was sufficient to meet the 
heating demand. Also, it can be noticed that there is a low correlation between electricity 
demand and heating demand during the summer season. 
c) Scenario-3 Resilient MEG design comprises three IRLs namely, co-generator, TES 
and MLHDM during normal operation 
Integrating the three IRLs have impressive results on the safety of a MEG, where it 
reduces the need for utility grid imports. 






Fig. 5.15 shows more smooth power profile of the utility grid. The deficiency between 
total power demand and DERs production occurred on the first two days for a period of 
one hour in each. Mainly this happens due to the scheduled charging of the TES during the 
night. It can be clearly noticed that the proposed system succeeds in shifting the cooling 
demand power requirement to off-demand period. No power deficiency occurred during 
this period. 
 





Fig. 5.16: Cooling profile for a resilient MEG comprises IRL-1, IRL-2 and IRL3 
The cooling profile in Fig. 5.16 shows an improvement in the thermal cooling units 
operations, where the on-peak cooling was shifted completely to the off-peak periods by 
using a hierarchical decision making and rescheduling the operation of the DCUs. The 
shifting of cooling on demand has a major positive impact on both power and cooling 
profiles. subsequently, it increases the MEG capability without additional upgradation of 
the physical hardware of the MEG infrastructure. Furthermore, it increases the MEG 
resilience and self-healing capability. 
  




A trial of the heating demand profile for one week in summer was presented in  . 
Widespread coverage of the heating demand can be achieved by the heat generated from 
the co-generator unit. However, the figure demonstrates an exaggerated heating production 
by the co-generator with respect to the heating demand in summer. 
d) Scenario-4 Resilient MEG that comprises three IRLs during a fault event 
In order to examine the behavior of a hierarchical decision making on the MEG 
resilience four out of six DCUs were turned out of service to simulate a fault event in the 
cooling system. In this case, the pre-schedule chiller operation failed to produce the 
required cooling energy during the off demand period, therefore DCUs must operate during 
the on-demand period to cover the cooling demand shortage, as illustrated in Fig. 5.18. 
The controller reaction helps to maintain serving cooling energy during a fault event 
occasion, as shown in the figure. Nevertheless, the MEG has lost the optimal flat profile 
for co-generator power production, it becomes following the energy demand profile, as 
shown in Fig. 5.19.   
 





Fig. 5.19: Power profile or a resilient MEG at hazard event 
5.4 Chapter’s Conclusions 
Operating during fault event is one of the challenges in MEG protection and control 
systems. The study presents a synthesis of safety control laws to a MEG system that 
composed various energy sources and storages. A proposal of non-SIF IRL namely 
hierarchical decision-making in three-level structure was implemented using an adaptive-
network-based fuzzy inference. Coordination between control levels has been realized in 
order to achieve a higher resilience of the MEG and to optimize the energy production 
profile(s) based on the aggregated information that collected from local subsystems. This 
information determine some ”directions” for the reactive and decision-making control 
levels, which refine the overall energy profiles. 
Utilizing the proposed IRLs in the conventional MEG are improving the MEG’s 
reliability to more than twice of its normal capacity, while the co-generator, TES, and 
MLHDM offer a significant reduction in the severity of the utility grid risk as discussed 
in CHAPTER 4. Subsequently, utilizing the IRLs improve the MEG performance with 
practical everyday considerations, such as equipment maintenance and variation in energy 
demand, that affect energy generation and distribution. Predicting future load profiles from 




resources. The optimal energy imports can be achieved by using real-time energy dispatch 
control for effective management of MEG resources and energy flow mapping. 
The case study scenarios show the different performance of the three control 
methodologies that discussed in 5.1. Hence, the second methodology, Centralized MEG 
Control, is not among these scenarios as it has a similar performance to the MLHDM, 
nevertheless it relies on the communication reliability. The statistical economical and 




 Proposed Intelligent Reasoning Framework for 
MEG Based on BBN-ANFIS (SIF-IRL) 
By definition, MEG fault diagnosis is a differentiation of faults and abnormal conditions, 
e.g. intermittency and noncoincidence of RES, based on expert knowledge and/or historical 
data of MEG blackout [175]. Where the significant information of MEG’s state can be 
extracted from sensors data [19]. Then artificial intelligence analysis, for this information, 
can diagnose symptoms [176]. 
Thus, fault diagnosis identifies fault root once it is detected. Usually, mapping the 
symptoms to faults in fault diagnosis procedure is a complex inference process. Generally, 
one fault may cause numerous symptoms, also different faults may cause similar symptoms. 
Fault diagnosis using rule-based method is common in fault diagnosis research. Where, 
rules are commonly established from expert knowledge, theoretical principles, or historical 
data. In the rule-based reasoning, a fault is diagnosed as soon as the corresponding rule is 
satisfied [177]. 
Bayesian belief network (BBN) was introduced earlier in Section 2.12. The BBN is 
vastly applied in fault diagnosis, probabilistic inference and knowledge discovery. The 
structure of BBN is a combination of combinatorial and probabilistic features, BBN is built 
over a directed acyclic graph (DAG) consist of a set of nodes linked via directional arcs 
[178]. Despite the BBN is guaranteed to be accurate for tree topologies, it is quite difficult 
to attain a full set of MEG’s fault data. 
6.1 Proposed fault analysis approach for MEG 
The proposed approach in this study offers online fault analysis process of MEG that is 
considered a SIF-IRL for resilient MEG. The proposed approach is able to predict risks and 
diagnose faults based on Bayesian belief network (BBN). The main objective is to develop 
an advanced and more robust predictive/diagnosis techniques to improve the MEG 
condition monitoring and alarming systems. Fig. 6.1 shows the flow scheme of BBN-based 




fault detection and BBN implementation, as well as fault prognostic and diagnostic 
processes. 
 
Fig. 6.1: Flow scheme of the BBN-based MEG fault prognosis and diagnosis approach 
6.1.1 Hazard and Resilience Analysis  
The MEG hazard and resilience analysis focus on determining safety performance 
indices. Typically, the safety indices are extracted from maintenance record and expert’s 
knowledge. The MEG hazard analysis was discussed in detail in Section 4.2. 
6.1.2 Fault Detection using BBN Implementation 
In order to implement BBN structure for MEG fault detection purpose, the following 
steps should be considered.  
Step-1: Identify the MEG’s state and determine faulted nodes. 
Step-2: Classify the nodes into three layers, i.e. causes, consequences and 
observation layers. 
Step-3: Define links between parent nodes and descent nodes of successive layers 
then allocate the correspondent CPT of each node accordingly. The details 
are extensively discussed in Section 6.2.  
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6.1.3 Fault Prognosis and Diagnosis 
Fault prognosis and diagnosis are the final product of the MEG fault analysis based-
BBN approach. They provide the most realistic justification of the symptoms’ inputs. The 
outputs are the prior and posterior probabilities respectively, as illustrated in Table 6-3 and 
Table 6-5 in section 6.4. 
6.2 Bayesian Inference 
The bayesian theorem is applied to define the conditional probability p(v|w), where V 
and W are random events. The following condition cases should be considered [179]: 
1. If node W is a descendant of 𝑉 (𝑊 ∈ 𝐷(𝑉)) and 𝑝(𝑊) > 0, then first Bayes’ 







    (6-1) 
Where v is a true variable of the random variable V, and p(v,w) is the joint probability. 
The right side term is prior probability, which is known in advance, and the left side term 
is the posterior probability that needs to be defined. In fact, the posterior probability is the 
essential concept of Bayesian inference   
2. If node W is a parent of 𝑉, (𝑊 ∈ 𝐶(𝑉)), then all other parent nodes should be 
identified and applying the following formula, predictive query: 
   𝑝(𝑣|𝑤) =  ∑ 𝑝(𝑣|𝑢 ⋀…𝑢 ) . 𝑝(𝑢 ⋀… |𝑤)    (6-2) 
3. If node W is neither a parent of V nor a descendant of 𝑉, (𝑊 ∈ 𝑂(𝑉)) then there 
are two options: 
i. If V has no parents, then:  
   𝑝(𝑣|𝑤) = 𝑝(𝑣)       (6-3) 
ii. If V has parents, then: 




The prior probability of the fault causes v, 𝑝(𝑣), and the conditional probability of the 
symptom w given v, (𝑝(𝑤|𝑣)), can be determined based on the statistical features extracted 
from the historical maintenance records or assigned by specialists. Subsequently, the 
posterior probability 𝑝(𝑣|𝑤) calculated by using   (6-1. In general, BBN for MEG is 
complex as shown in Fig. 6.2. There is a large number of related events of faults causes 
and symptoms observations, which can exponentially magnify the computation 
requirements of prior probabilities. BBN is offering an effective and powerful method to 
manage such difficulties effectively, further to its ability in interpolating the missing data 
of the BBN [180].  
 
6.3 BBN Topology 
In general, the BBN consists of two parts, namely the BBN structure and the nodes’ 
parameters. The BBN structure is a graphical presentation of nodes’ connections among 
successive layers. Node parameters are qualitative expositions of the probabilistic 
relationship among the model.  





Table 6-1: Node parameters in the fault causes layer 
 Node Status 
Prior 
probability 
Hazard Event Notes Reference 
A Overload 
Healthy 0.6014.  Feeder line section, 
main feeder (10km) 




The load demand is higher than the 
grid capability 
B Lack of DER 
Healthy 0.9811  The MEG has three 
DERs namely PV, 









Healthy 0.57635  Renewable sources 
energy production 
are sensitive to 
weather fluctuation 
during the day 
course [154]. * 
 
Risky 0.42365 
Unstable energy production by 




False 0.9811  
This MEG has three 
DERs namely PV, 




Negative impacts on grid 
parameters such as active power 
(P), reactive power (Q), voltage 
(V), phase shift (α) and frequency 





Healthy 0.9371  
Failure rate is 0.065 
Table 4-5 
[181][141] 




Healthy 0.6703  Failure rate is 
0.04/km for 10km in 
average, Table 4-5 
[141] 
Risky 0. 3297 DNS 
G Transformers 
Healthy 0.9851  
Failure rate is 0.015 
Table 4-5 
[181][141] 
Risky 0.0149 DNS 
H Utility grid 
Healthy 0.4856  
Failure rate is 
0.7224 Table 4-6 
[146]  
Risky 0.5144 DERs should cap the demand 
*by taking the MEG case study the total energy for RES is 284.6963 MWh per week, the 




The BBN structure and node parameters can be determined by either expert knowledge 
or historical data or a mixture of both [175]. Table 6-1 illustrates the prior probability of 
the nodes allocated in the layer of causes; these nodes are extracted from historical data 
provided in [182] and [183]. These nodes are root nodes as they do not have parents. On 
the other hand, child nodes have a conditional probability table (CPT) relied on parental 
probability values (e.g. Table 6-2 for node “Fire” in the observation layer). 
Several algorithms can be utilized for performing the inference. Mainly, the algorithms 
are classified into two categories as follows: 
 Exact algorithms, such as the junction tree algorithm 
 Approximate algorithms e.g. the weighting likelihood sampling and the Gibbs 
sampling algorithm.  
In this study, the exact algorithm is used for the interest of accuracy. 
Table 6-2: Conditional probability table (CPT) for node “Fire” at 3rd layer in Fig. 6.2 
 Explosion False True 
 Over-gas emission False True False True 
Fire 
False 0.99 0.1 0.2 0.01 
True 0.01 0.9 0.8 0.99 
The inference process is either a prediction query, when the fault causes are known, or 
diagnosis query, when certain observation symptoms are exist. Therefore, the BBN is 
utilized to provide the probability of observation symptoms and to evaluate the posterior 
probability of the fault roots subsequently. 
6.3.1 BBN structure for MEG 
The proposed BBN for MEG consists of three layers which are as follows: Fault causes 




a) Fault causes – layer 1: This layer consists most of the potential failure hazards 
on MEG 
b) Fault consequences – layer 2: This layer composes the direct consequences of 
the failure indicated in layer 1. These consequences can be determined by 
expertise or special measurement instruments 
c) Failure observation – layer 3: This layer contains alarm indicators, performance 
indices and visible observation corresponding certain fault causes. 
6.3.2 BBN node parameters 
The node attributes for BBN can be categorized into two classes: prior probabilities for 
root nodes in the 1st layer, as shown in Table 6-1 and conditional probabilities among rest 
of the nodes within the 2nd and 3rd layers, as illustrated in Table 6-2. 
6.4 Application Case Study of BBN Framework for MEG’s Fault 
Diagnosis 
The fault diagnosis BBN-based approach was conducted on the MEG case study 
described in CHAPTER 3. 
The BBN is adapted to detect and diagnose faults based on expert knowledge and field 
operation team’s feedback. The hazards matrix for a MEG case study is found in 
Section 4.2. This statistical data is utilized in BBN construction then the k2 algorithm can 
be used to adapt the BBN structure and to adjust nodes probabilities [184]. Finally, the 
network query process can be done for selected shreds of evidence by utilizing the junction 
tree algorithm [185]. To the best of the author's knowledge, so far there is no other 
publication reporting MEG fault prognosis and diagnosis based on BBN. 
6.4.1 BBN structure 
The BBN structure is illustrated in Fig. 6.2. Eight nodes comprise the fault causes layer. 
Each node has two states, e.g. healthy and risky, which indicate normal and faulty operation 





a) Fault Prognostic 
Table 6-3 presents the conditional probability of fault prognostic in the observation 
query direction, it shows the observation probability for each node in the observation layer 
based on the assumption that one or two concurrent fault events is(are) occurring at the 
same time. 
Table 6-3: The conditional probability of fault prognostic for one and two combined fault 
causes of a MEG 
# Fault causes Nodes 








15 16 17 18 19 
1 Overload 0.8314 0.5799 0.8000 0.6109 0.6708 
2 Lack of DER 0.6250 0.3624 0.5904 0.4935 0.5952 
3 Intermittency of RES 0.6283 0.4240 0.7043 0.5904 0.6970 
4 Integration of multi DERs 0.6152 0.4296 0.7602 0.5130 0.5958 
5 Fault in transmission line 0.8430 0.5575 0.8368 0.6192 0.6885 
6 Fault in distribution line 0.8695 0.5263 0.9068 0.7688 0.8967 
7 Fault in transformers 0.8309 0.3621 0.7970 0.5159 0.6229 
8 Utility grid failure 0.6021 0.3646 0.5924 0.6158 0.7540 
1-2 Overload-Lack of DER 0.8682 0.5799 0.8000 0.6109 0.6708 
1-3 Overload-Intermittency of RES 0.8543 0.6253 0.8551 0.6938 0.7544 
1-4 Overload-Integration of multi DERs 0.8437 0.6901 0.8773 0.6414 0.6716 




1-6 Overload-Fault in distribution line 0.9370 0.7860 0.9428 0.8346 0.9143 
1-7 Overload-Fault in transformers 0.9118 0.5799 0.8830 0.6134 0.6745 
1-8 Overload-Utility grid failure 0.8318 0.5819 0.8006 0.7214 0.8010 
2-3 Lack of DER-Intermittency of RES 0.6551 0.4240 0.7043 0.5904 0.6970 
2-4 
Lack of DER-Integration of multi 
DERs 
0.6552 0.4296 0.7602 0.5130 0.5959 
2-5 
Lack of DER-Fault in transmission 
line 
0.8599 0.5575 0.8368 0.6193 0.6886 
2-6 
Lack of DER-Fault in distribution 
line 
0.8806 0.5263 0.9068 0.7688 0.8967 
2-7 Lack of DER-Fault in transformers 0.8412 0.3621 0.7970 0.5159 0.6229 
2-8 Lack of DER-Utility grid failure 0.6267 0.3646 0.5924 0.6158 0.7540 
3-4 
Intermittency of RES-Integration of 
multi DERs 
0.6466 0.5027 0.8093 0.6122 0.6974 
3-5 
Intermittency of RES-Fault in 
transmission line 
0.8551 0.5693 0.8768 0.6929 0.7678 
3-6 
Intermittency of RES-Fault in 
distribution line 
0.8814 0.5495 0.9303 0.8291 0.9253 
3-7 
Intermittency of RES-Fault in 
transformers 
0.8424 0.4236 0.8451 0.6108 0.7181 
3-8 
Intermittency of RES-Utility grid 
failure 
0.6299 0.4267 0.7056 0.7249 0.8716 
4-5 
Integration of multi DERs-Fault in 
transmission line 




The fault consequence layer consists of six nodes, which account for major 
consequences of the failure due to faults stated in fault causes layer.  
Five nodes form the observation layer, i.e. demand not served (DNS), High Temp 
Alarm, Trip Alarm, Pollution and Fire. 
The observation or symptom nodes indicate the performance indices such as sensor 
instruments. The fault pattern for the selected fault detection approach is defined using arcs 
and parameters (CPT). Each node has two states i.e. Healthy/Risky, or True/False. It is 
useful to note that the nodes in the fault observation layer are mostly essential but not 
enough for detecting and diagnosing the faults in the fault causes layer, where other factors 
4-6 
Integration of multi DERs-Fault in 
distribution line 
0.8865 0.5664 0.9464 0.7773 0.8968 
4-7 
Integration of multi DERs-Fault in 
transformers 
0.8419 0.4293 0.8737 0.5352 0.6236 
4-8 
Integration of multi DERs-Utility 
grid failure 
0.6333 0.4321 0.7613 0.6344 0.7543 
5-6 
Fault in transmission line-Fault in 
distribution line 
0.9007 0.6537 0.9174 0.8016 0.9051 
5-7 
Fault in transmission line-Fault in 
transformers 
0.8751 0.5579 0.8351 0.6302 0.7057 
5-8 
Fault in transmission line-Utility grid 
failure 
0.8434 0.5594 0.8372 0.7286 0.8121 
6-7 
Fault in distribution line-Fault in 
transformers 
0.8984 0.5262 0.9183 0.7819 0.9135 
6-8 
Fault in distribution line-Utility grid 
failure 
0.8696 0.5267 0.9070 0.8558 0.9413 
7-8 
Fault in transformers-Utility grid 
failure 




may also lead to the same certain fault causes. Fig. 6.3 and Table 6-4 illustrates the fault 
observation frequency based on the fault causes combination shown in Table 6-3. It is clear 
that “Trip Alarm” node has the highest frequency among all possible fault causes events 
with 70 % and then “DNS” 48 %. However, two other nodes namely “ High Temp. Alarm” 
and “Pollution Alarm” are not the main reason for any of the case studies in Table 6-3 but 
they have second and third highest probabilities for many cases in this table. 











Frequency Percent 48% 0% 70% 0% 15% 
 
Fig. 6.3: Fault observation frequency based on fault causes combination shown in 
Table 6-3 
b) Fault Diagnosis 
The process direction of the fault diagnosis query is opposite to the prognostic query’s 
direction, where information of observation layer status is known and the diagnostic 
probability of fault causes are required. In Table 6-5, the diagnosis symptoms of one and 

























Table 6-5: The conditional probability of fault diagnosis for one and two combined faults 














































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
15 
Demand not served 
(DNS) 
0.5716 0.0203 0.4556 0.0200 0.0915 0.4970 0.0213 0.5276 
16 High Temp. Alarm 0.6411 0.0189 0.4945 0.0225 0.0973 0.4838 0.0149 0.5139 
17 Trip Alarm 0.5430 0.0189 0.5041 0.0244 0.0896 0.5117 0.0201 0.5124 
18 Pollution Alarm 0.4960 0.0189 0.5056 0.0197 0.0794 0.519 0.0156 0.6373 
19 Fire 0.4516 0.0189 0.4949 0.0190 0.0732 0.5019 0.0156 0.6470 
15-16 
Demand not served 
(DNS)-High Temp. 
Alarm 
0.7217 0.0196 0.4795 0.0225 0.1111 0.5693 0.0173 0.5161 
15-17 
Demand not served 
(DNS)-Trip Alarm 
0.5965 0.0195 0.4757 0.0218 0.0987 0.5755 0.0220 0.5134 
15-18 
Demand not served 
(DNS)-Pollution 
Alarm 
0.5835 0.0195 0.4954 0.0202 0.0941 0.6199 0.0184 0.6068 
15-19 
Demand not served 
(DNS)-Fire 



















0.5599 0.0189 0.5201 0.0220 0.0918 0.6255 0.0177 0.6008 
17-19 Trip Alarm-Fire 0.5303 0.0189 0.5121 0.0217 0.0878 0.6239 0.0182 0.5904 
18-19 Pollution Alarm-Fire 0.4952 0.0189 0.5102 0.0194 0.0800 0.5655 0.0158 0.6592 
Fig. 6.4 and Table 6-6 illustrates the fault observation frequency based on the fault 
causes combination shown in Table 6-5. It is clear that “Overload” and “Utility grid 
failure” nodes have the highest frequency among all possible fault causes events 33% and 
27% respectively. However, three other nodes namely “Lack of DER”, “Intermittency of 
RES” and “Fault in transformer” are not the main reason for any of the case studies in 
Table 6-5 but they have second and third highest probabilities for many cases in this table. 























































































































Fig. 6.4: Fault observation frequency based on fault causes combination shown in 
Table 6-5 
6.4.2 Implementation of BBN-based MEG Fault Analysis using Matlab 
The BBN-based fault analysis of MEG can be implemented using Matlab platform, as 
shown in Fig. 6.5. BBN allows three types of inquiry process as follows: 
1- Predictive query: 
What is the probability of the cause of “Overload” lead to the observation of “DNS”? 
P (15|1) = 16.86 % False 
              83.14 % True 
2- Diagnosis query can be as follows: 
What is the probability of observing “DNS” caused by the occurrence of “Overload”? 
P(1|15) = 42.84 % False 
         57.16 % True 




What is the probability of both causes “Overload” and “Intermittency of RES” lead to 
observe “DNS”? 
P(15|1,3) = 14.57 % False  
  85.43 % True 
 
6.5 Fault Diagnosis of Micro Energy Grids Using BBN and ANFIS 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The proposed MEG safety assessment approach in this section splits the analysis process 
into two main disciplines, i.e. Bayesian belief network (BBN) layer and adaptive-network-
based fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) layer. The motivation of using ANFIS is to declare 
the ambiguous produced in the BBN output nodes and to incorporate the experts’ 
knowledge to the data collected from measurement instrumentation (I&C) in order to 
provide a more precise decision-making process. 
The proposed hybrid technique considers the following data sets that are essential for 
safety analysis:  
Fig. 6.5: BBN implementation of MEG using Matlab platform 
P (a|x) = 57.16 % 




 Deterministic dataset of credible information such as system topology, operation 
parameters, units specification, etc.; 
 Statistical data - historical observation of the system operation life cycle; and 
 Linguistic data – defines the system behavior by expert’s knowledge contribution.  
The main challenges associated with MEG safety assessment are dealing with 
randomness, vagueness and uncertainties. 
Many fuzzy models were presented to deal with vagueness [186] and many reasoning 
approaches were illustrated to deal with uncertainties [22]. However, integration of 
different safety assessment methods for complex systems is still in the early stages. 
6.5.2 BBN-ANFIS Based Fault Diagnosis Model 
The proposed approach consists of two cascaded layers i.e. BBN layer and ANFIS layer. 
Where the output of the BBN layer is the input to the ANFIS layer. Therefore, safety 
assessment process runs in consequence from top to bottom as given in Fig. 6.6. 
Deterministic data of MEG has sufficient information to create BBN qualitative structure 
for MEG diagnosis approach. The linguistic data is mainly used to build the ANFIS 
structure. The quantitative term of each node in the BBN and ANFIS structures can be 
illustrated from statistical data analysis, which is the conditional probability tables (CPT) 
and the membership function (MF) respectively [187]. 
The inputs to the BBN layer are MEG’s condition measurements, which is extracted 
from the deterministic data of the MEG. Fig. 6.2 illustrates the BBN structure of a MEG. 
The BBN consists of five parameters of condition measurements that form the observation 
level and the parameters are: demand not served (DNS), high-temperature alarm, trip 
alarm, pollution level and fire alarm. The BBN structure also consists of the output 
parameters which form the causes level and include: overload, lack of DER, intermittency 
of RES, integration of multi DERs, faults in the transmission line, faults in distribution 
line, faults in transformer and utility grid failure. 
The main role of ANFIS layer is to process the BBN output values to provide an accurate 





Fig. 6.6: Hybrid MEG safety assessment approach 
6.5.3 Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy interference system 
The modern expert systems are utilizing fuzzy logic theory for reasoning the input data 
instead of Boolean logic [188]. The fuzzy expert system converts a set of user-supplied 
human language rules to their mathematical equivalents. 
ANFIS is an integration of neural network (NN) and fuzzy logic (FL) [189]. Fuzzy logic 
has the capability to convert human knowledge and insights into a quantitative process and 
rules. Nevertheless, there is no defined rule governing the converting process of human 
knowledge to rule-based fuzzy inference system (FIS), further to a long process time to 
refine the shapes and ranges of the membership functions (MFs). The NN has a greater 
capability in the learning process. Thus, the NN was used to refine the MFs automatically 
[174]. 











6.5.4 Application of hybrid BBN-ANFIS for MEG Safety Assessment 
In accordance with the literature, numerous faults may cause an energy blackout. The 
most common fault events and their observation parameters were presented in ref. [155]. 
The BBN structure in Fig. 6.2 is proposed to reasoning links between fault observation and 
fault causes layers (diagnosis symptoms) as shown in Table 6-5.  
Fig. 6.7 shows an ANFIS structure of the MEG safety assessment decision-making stage. 
The ANFIS architecture consists of five main layers, each layer consists of a number of 
nodes distributed as follows: 8-112-14-141. The first and fourth layers consist of adaptive 
nodes while fixed nodes are used among the other layers.  
 
The eight input nodes that form the first layer of ANFIS are the diagnosis symptoms of 
a MEG illustrated in Table 6-5 and each node in this layer has three Gaussian membership 
functions  
















         (6-5) 
Where c is the center of the membership function and σ its width. 
Unlikely, the output layer consists of one node that provides a decision of which input 
node(s) is (are) causing the hazardous event. 
The scheme of fuzzy reasoning mechanism of ANFIS is illustrated in Fig. 6.8. Fourteen 
if-then rules are governing the process where the columns represent the eight inputs and 
one output data.  
Fifteen cases with complete symptoms, see Table 6-5, were utilized to evaluate the 
hybrid BBN-ANFIS performance for fault diagnosis of a MEG.  
Fig. 6.8 illustrates the first case in Table 6-5, where the symptom nodes states are 
medium, medium, medium, medium, medium, medium, medium and medium, respectively 
and the nodes summation is normalized. Based on this evidence, the posterior probability 
of each fault can be computed to obtain the most candidate fault among all, in this case, is 
the “Fault in transformer”, with a probability of 98.31%. 
 




6.6 Chapter’s Conclusions 
The study in this chapter introduces a MEG SIF IRL namely MEG alarm system that 
using an intelligent reasoning framework based on BBN-ANFIS. The proposed BBN 
structural consists of three layers for MEG fault prognosis and diagnosis processes. The 
BBN is an accurate computation of the uncertainties occurrence in MEG fault analysis. 
Different sources of knowledge and information can be integrated to emulate the diagnostic 
thinking and diagnosis process of expert’s knowledge. BBN can be utilized for instant fault 
prognosis process as well as it can be used for real-time fault diagnosis analysis. It is worth 
noticing that the more information involved in the BBN, the higher smartness it would be. 
Correspondingly, the more evidence included in the query process, the more precise the 
outcomes would be. 
As exposed through the results, of the fault prognostic and diagnostic queries for MEG, 
the BBN approach performs properly for the uncertainties in MEG. The results in Table 6-3 
and Table 6-5 came in line with the expectation shown in the hazard matrix of MEG [8] 
and the resilience matrix Appendix I, which based on experts’ knowledge and field 
operation database.  
Moreover, the BBN approach retains several other advantages. The BBN approach 
merges diagnostics and prognostics features effectively, as most of the potential hazard 
scenarios of MEG can be explicated in the BBN model. However, it is in a tentative way. 
The development of fault prognostic and diagnostic approaches are for the sake of MEG 
safety improvement during the engineering design stage and during the operation of MEG 
respectively. 
A hybrid technique, using BBN and ANFIS based technologies, contributes an efficient 
tool for MEGs fault diagnosis. Where the results demonstrate that the hybrid BBN-ANFIS 
can perform fault diagnosis with complete or incomplete symptoms. The main strength of 
the proposed approach is due to its dependency on experts’ knowledge than the data from 
measurement instrumentation (I&C) in its decision-making process. The results show a 




would potentially provide a solution to the reasoning problem of complex systems. This 
may be an interest of the authors for future works. 
The proposed BBN-ANFIS based safety alarm system for MEG has no direct impact on 
the MEG performance as it is not part of the operation process however, it has a major 
advantage on the resilience of the MEG as it promote awareness about the system health 
status during the operation. The statistical economical, ecological and reliability 





 Validation of Data and Methodologies 
This chapter aims to validate the data and methods used/proposed in this research. Three 
main items will be validated namely the simulation of MEG operation, LORA and BBN. 
7.1 Validation of MEG Simulation 
In order to validate the MEG operation that simulated in this study by using the Simulink 
platform, another software named optimization and management tool for complex multi-
generation systems that implemented by the mean of XEMS13 software platform [190] 
will be utilized. XEMS13 is mainly for operational optimization using MILP approach. 
However, it will be utilized in this section to validate the simulation design for resilient 
MEG case study [191]. 
7.1.1 MEG system description 
The inherent MEG system is shown in Fig. 7.1 has the ability for self-sufficiency for its 
electricity, cooling and heating demands most of the year by employing a on-site 13MW 
co-generation gas turbine (CGU) prime mover combined with auxiliary steam turbine of 
3MW, 2 MW of solar power (PV) and 2 MW of wind turbines (WT) as renewable 
resources, in addition to six district cooling units (DC) of 2.1MW capacity and COP = 6.0 
for each. Also, consist of two thermal energy storage (TES) tanks of capacity 25MWh and 
200MWh for heating and cooling energy respectively. Further to a 2 MWh super-capacitor 





Fig. 7.1: Proposed MEG configuration model 
In this case study, the MEG has the capability to switch to the grid-connected mode in 
the case of emergency. The CGU operates on NG to generate electricity and the 
consequential thermal energy is recovered via heat recovery steam generator to serve the 
heating demand, which found excessive in this case study. Therefore the absorption chiller 
is proposed to be utilized to convert the surplus heating to cooling energy, in order to avoid 
squandering of heating energy and to reduce electricity requirements for cooling.  
In case of the power, production is more than the electricity demand, the surplus power 
can be sold to the utility grid. On the other hand, the lack of electricity production must be 
purchased from the utility grid. For the purposes of validation, a two different model for 
the MEG systems were established using static model for optimization algorithm XEMS13 


















7.1.2 Simulation results 
The hourly electricity cost profile for one week in summer is shown in Fig. 7.2, based 
on actual energy prices in Ontario–Canada [192][161]. The selling price varies during the 
day due to several factors where it becomes negative in some interval when power 
generation is higher the demand. While the purchasing price is higher than selling as it is 
the nature of utility grid management and operation. 
One week in summer was selected to test the operation of MEG in the harsh condition 
in term of heavy demands and weather conditions.  
 
Fig. 7.2: Selling and purchasing price of capital grid 
This study is to achieve the optimum operation cost for the MEG operation by efficient 
operation capacity and minimal numbers of the MEG devices operation. The operation cost 
for the inherent MEG system for one week in summer is 153,780 CAD$ with the operation 
profile shown in Fig. 7.3, Fig. 7.4 and Fig. 7.5. 
 





Fig. 7.4: Cooling profile for the inherent MEG 
 
Fig. 7.5: Heating profile for the inherent MEG 
From the figures above it can be defined that the co-generation unit working at an 
average of 75% of its capacity also the six district cooling chillers are working daily at off-
peak interval to charge the TES with the required daily demand cooling energy. Further to 
squandering of the heating energy generated by the co-generation. 
In order to mitigate the excessive loss in the heating energy, it is proposed to add an 
absorption chiller of 7 MW capacity and to remove the heating TES of 25 MWh. 
The optimization technique for the static model of the new MEG structure, with 
absorption chiller of 7MW capacity, shows that the operation cost becomes 122,394 CAD$, 
with a cost reduction of more than 21% from the inherent MEG system operation cost. 




1. The co-generation unit works at full capacity during the weekdays and at around 
80% during the weekend, as shown in Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.7 
2. The number of district cooling chillers required to run the MEG was reduced to 
three instead of six as it is the case in the inherent system as shown in Fig. 7.8 
and Fig. 7.9 
3. No squandering on heating energy by converting the surplus to cooling through 
the absorption chiller as illustrated in Fig. 7.10 and Fig. 7.11 
 
Fig. 7.6: Hourly electricity profile for the MEG system in one week in summer (static 
module) 
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Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.7 demonstrations of the hourly power production profiles of the MEG 
system during one week in summer. Where EChill is the energy consumed by district 
cooling units (1, 2 and 3), Ue  is the power demand Pv2 is the wind turbine generation,  
Pv1 is the Solar power contribution, Pp1 is the purchased power from the capital grid, Ps1 
is the power sold to the capital grid and Pe1 is the cogeneration power contribution.  
 
Fig. 7.8: Hourly cooling energy profile (MWh) for the MEG system in one week in 
summer (static module) 
 
Fig. 7.9: Hourly cooling energy profile for the MEG system in weekday profile 
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The optimization technique contributes an optimum operation for the district cooling 
units where only three units are sufficient to cover the cooling demand during the certain 
period, as shown in Fig. 7.8 and Fig. 7.9. Where Uc is the cooling demand, PStcount1 
represents the TES discharging, PStcin1 is the TES charging, Abs1 is the cooling energy 
contributed from absorption chiller and EChi is the chillers energy production. 
 
Fig. 7.10: Hourly heating energy profile (MWh) for the MEG system in one week in 
summer (static module) 
 
 
Fig. 7.11: Hourly heating energy profile for the MEG system in weekday profile 
(Monday) (static module) 
The hourly heating energy profile for the MEG system was shown in Fig. 7.10 and 
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energy produced by the co-generation unit, Absin is the absorption power output and Ut is 
the heating demand. From the figures above it clearly defined that the heating energy 
produced by the co-generation excesses the heating demand and the surplus heating can be 
converted to cooling by utilizing the absorption chiller in order to achieve the maximum 
utilization of energy. 
In order to validate the results given by the static MEG model, the optimized co-
generation operation profile and the minimum district cooling chillers operation schedule 
were examined in the dynamic MEG model, shown in Fig. 7.13. The operation cost of the 
dynamic model is 132,710 CAD$ and the energy profiles can be shown in Fig. 7.12-
Fig. 7.16. 
 










Fig. 7.14: Grid purchasing energy, rate and total amount for the MEG (dynamic 
model) 
Fig. 7.12 demonstrates the hourly sold energy to the capital grid, selling rate and selling 
revenue CAD$/MWh for a period of one week in summer, also Fig. 7.14 shows the hourly 
purchased energy from the capital grid, selling rate and selling revenue CAD$/MWh for 
the aforesaid period. 
 
Fig. 7.15: MEG power profile for one week in summer (dynamic model) 
The hourly power profile for the dynamic MEG model is shown in Fig. 7.15, it can be 
clearly defined that the behavior of the dynamic model is similar to the static MEG shown 
in Fig. 7.6. Hence, the interaction with the utility grid was reduced with respect to the 





Fig. 7.16: MEG colling energy profile for one week in summer (dynamic model) 
The results given by the dynamic MEG model (using Simulink) are quite similar to the 
one given by static MEG model (using XEMS13) as shown in Fig. 7.17. The static 
comparison in Table 7-1 shows minor varieties between Simulink and XEMS13 that can 
be caused by the different behavior of static and dynamic modules.  
 




Table 7-1: Statics comparison for power generation by the co-generator using Simulink 
and XEMS13 (kW) 
 MEG Simulink  MEG XEMS13 Error (Simulink-XEMS13) 
Max. 16000 kW 16000 kW 15.74-33.19% 
Min. 9598.9 kW 9633.2517 kW 0% 
Median 15999.85 kW 16000 kW 0% 
Average 14842.46 kW 14546.41 kW 1.99% 
Operation 
Cost 
132,710 CAD$ 122,394 CAD$ 7.77% 
 
The 2% diversity in the Co-generation operation in Table 7-1 is within the acceptable 
tolerance margin, however it causes around 7% difference in the operation cost between 
the foresaid models. 
Sankey diagram provides a simple visualization tool for material or energy flows with 
proportional arrow magnitudes [193]. The energy statics data for the one week in summer 
of MEG operation can be illustrated in a Sankey diagram. The energy flow are converted 






Fig. 7.18: Sankey diagram for one summer week: on the left side the contributes of the 
primary energy and on the right side the final energy conversion (kWh) 
7.2 Validation of LORA 
LORA is proposed to assess the resilience of MEG and to determine the impact, of 
adding/removing IRLs to the MEG entity, on the resilience of the energy service. In this 
section, validation of LORA can be done by implementing LORA for the MEG structures 
mentioned in Section 7.1. LORA for these structures are shown in Fig. 7.19 and Fig. 7.20  
in order to visualize the difference in structure and risk attributes with the MEG case study-





Fig. 7.19: LORA path diagram for MEG case study-2 
 




































0.0247 0.1412 0.1412 0.0198
0.0247
0.1032
























   1𝑥10− 
    𝑥10−4
SIL-3
   6𝑥10− 
> SIL-4


















Table 7-2 illustrates a comparison between three different MEG’s structures that 
mentioned in the above. It shows that the more IRLs used in the MEG the lower value of 
LORA and the more resilience of the entire energy system. This conclusion comes in line 
with the operating performance that presented in different operational scenarios shown 
in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 5.  
On the other hand, the table illustrates that the three different MEG structures have 
different attributes’ values.  In addition, Table 7-2 proofs that each IRL has a different 
effect on the three attributes. Nevertheless, the effect is not necessary to be the same on 
these attributes. 
Table 7-2: LORA comparison for the three case studies 

































































































































RES 0.9662 6,970.1 (2) 
  
Operation Cost 373,890 CAD$ 
CO2 6,970.1 Ton/Week 












































1.38x10-3 3,322.0 (5) 
    
Operation Cost 154,440 CAD$   Operation Cost 153,780 CAD$  CO2 
4,556.3 Ton/Week 
PFD 1.03x10-3 
Operation Cost 132,710 CAD$  
CO2  3,322.0 Ton/Week 
PFD 1.38x10-3 
CO2 4,955.3  Ton/Week 


























3.86x10-6 3,322.0 (5) 





Table 7-3 shows the effect of using different prime mover co-generation technology in 
the MEG case study-2plus. The economic and ecological attributes of different DERs 
technologies are illustrated in Table 7-4. Further details on the calculation of the total 
attributes of each DERs in the MEG case study are illustrated in Appendix III Data 
Validation. 
Table 7-3: LORA comparison for different co-generator technology used in case-study2plus  
   
 MEGs with a  GT prime 
mover 
MEGs with a FC prime 
mover 
MEGs with a MT prime 
mover 































































































































































































































Operation Cost 373,890 CAD$ 




























































































    
Operation Cost 132,710 
CAD$,  CO2 3,322.0 
Ton/Week 
PFD 1.38x10-3 
Operation Cost 183,000  
CAD$, CO2 2,990.3 
Ton/Week (8) 
PFD 3.0 x10-3 
Operation Cost 108,380 
CAD$, CO2 4,078.5 
Ton/Week (8) 
PFD 2.43 x10-3 
Operation Cost 190,900 
CAD$, CO2 3,828.3 
Ton/Week (8) 

















































* Absorption chiller is not the optimum choice with DE prime mover since the DE’s output is electricity 
only.  Therefore,     utilizing Abso. Chiller will not has an effect on the operation cost at the normal condition 
but it increases the MEG’s reliability during partial DERs outage. 




Table 7-3 declares that each co-gen. technology has different effect on the three 
attributes (i.e. economical, ecological and reliability) which not necessary to be in the same 
direction and/or rate. Table 7-5 summaries the performance of the MEG with different 
prime-mover in term of operation cost, greenhouse gas emission and reliability. 
Table 7-4: Economic and ecological attributes of different DERs technologies 
Attribute 
DER Technologies 






























Depends on the course 
time of the day 









570 [160] 657 [142] 865 [158] 
NOx 0 [159] 0 [159] 0 [195] 
0.068 
[160] 
0.4 [160] 6.69 [142] - 








CO 0 [159] 0 [159] 
0.0194 
[195] 
246.8 143.96 1275.1 - 
PM10  0 [159] 0 [159] 0 18.51 16.45 160.4 - 
Noise (dB) [159] 0 84 46 60 70 75 - 
(a) Photovoltaics (PV), wind turbines (WT), fuel cell (FC), micro-turbine (MT), gas turbines (GT), 
diesel engines (DE), utility grid (UG). (b) Noise emissions of DG units are measured at a distance 
of 3m.(c) 1 US$ ≈ 1.2 CAD$ 
Table 7-5: Attributes comparison between the prime movers shown in Table 6-3 
          Prime-mover 
Attributes 
GT FC MT DE 
Economic 2 3 1 4 
Ecological 2 1 4 3 




* 1 indicates the best performance among the other prime-movers in a selected attribute and 4 is the 
worst performance 
 Utilizing MT prime mover in the MEG has the best operation rate among the other prime 
movers used in  
Table 7-3. However it is not the case for gas emission. On the other hand, utilizing FC 
prime mover has the best ecological attribute although it has bad attributes in operation rate 
and reliability. GT prime mover has moderate performance on the three attributes. Finally, 
the DE has the worst reliability and economic attributes in addition to high greenhouse gas 
emission. Therefore, choosing the best fit prime mover technology is challenging the 
design engineers under the restrictive standards that determine the acceptable range of the 
three attributes and which of these attributes has higher priority on the design criteria.  
Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 illustrate that utilizing SIF IRLs have major impact on systems 
reliability however there are no impact on the operation cost or environment parameters of 
the MEG. In contradiction, utilizing non-SIF IRLs have a direct effect on the three 
contributes. In addition, implementing the non-SIF IRLs in the MEG asset, normally takes 
time and affect the system operation during construction period, which not the case for 
incorporating the SIF IRLs in the MEG entity.   
7.3 Validation of BBN 
The BBN based intelligent reasoning for fault diagnosis of wind turbine gearbox that 
presented in [103] is implemented in order to validate the programming code for BBN that 
implemented in this research study to compute the BBN reasoning for MEG. 
Fig. 7.21 shows the BBN structure for gearbox failure which presented in [103]. The 
comparison between the results in [103] and the model implemented in Fig. 7.22 is shown 





Fig. 7.21: BBN for gearbox failure [103] 
 
Table 7-6: Comparison between computation results in [103] and the BBN model 
implemented by using developed BBN program that used in this study 
No.# Query P(A|B) [103] P(A|B) this study 
1 
Diagnostic Query 
P(Begrime (a) | Large Mag 1x (m)) 
18.91 % True 
81.09 % False 
18.91 % True 
81.09 % False 
2 
Predictive Query 
P(SRS index (q) | Lack of Lubrication (e)) 
8.49 % True 
91.51 % False 
8.43 % True 
91.57 % False 
3 
Inter-causal Query 
P(Fatigue (g), Corrosion (h) | SRS Index (q)) 
23.97 % True 
76.03 % False 
24.02 % True 





Fig. 7.22: BBN Implementation of gearbox failure [103] using developed BBN 





 Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Summary 
The consistent increase of deploying DERs, including renewable energy sources, for 
energy production requires better understanding of how stochastic power generation affects 
the stability of energy grids. The main objective of this research is to offer a sophisticated 
study on the design and implementation of a resilient MEG using safety analysis tools by 
developing advanced risk analysis approaches. Employing risk analysis in MEG design 
improves its resiliency and offers an effective safety tools for designing resilient MEGs. It 
is important to mention that the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis are 
depending on a MEG case study that was illustrated in CHAPTER 3, therefore the results 
may varies for other MEG structures, load types and location. 
8.2 Conclusions 
This dissertation describes a novel method for design resilient MEG infrastructure by 
using safety analysis tools. The proposed method came in five main stages as follows: 
1. A resilience matrix (RM) and a resilience risk performance indicator (RRPI) were 
proposed in this work resilience MEG design. The RRPI consists information of socio-
econo-ecological of each hazard event that provides informative knowledge that is 
useful and important for the design engineers and decision maker personnel.  
2. Principles of two risk analysis models were developed to offer effective safety tools 
for MEGs’ risk evaluation namely the developed fault tree analysis (FTA) and the 
proposed layer of resilience analysis (LORA). The proposed safety analysis tools were 
utilized for design a resilience MEG by estimating the risk level of LORA path and 
define the associated SIL for a MEG entity that consists selected combination of varies 
types and capacities of independent resilience layers (IRLs).  
3. Numerous combination of IRLs (SIF and non-SIF) were proposed inorder to ensure 
achieving adequate level of MEG’s resilience that predetermined by the engineers. 
Hence, the group of hazards that have low severity and low ecological risk with high 




have low severity and low class  with high ecological risk were eliminated to address 
the most effective hazards and propose suitable IRLs that precludes faults propagation. 
The results in CHAPTER 4 show that the selected non-SIF resilience layers reduced 
the risk of MEG blackout PFD by 10−3 while the selected SIF protection layers offer 
another 10−3 reduction of the risk of the original MEG. In addition, it can be noticed 
that SIF IRLs are usually auxiliary systems that does not have direct effect on the 
operation cost and environment parameters of the energy system. However, SIF IRLs 
have significant effect on the systems’ reliability. In contrast, the non-SIF IRLs have 
direct effects on socio-econo-ecological parameters, where the type and capacity of 
the non-SIF IRL is able to improve the running cost, greenhouse gases emission and 
the overall system’s reliability as illustrated in Section 7.2.   
The novel combination of interior search algorithm (ISA) and LORA was employed 
to support engineers on finding an optimal design for MEG’s components. The 
proposed ISA structure takes in consideration the main constrains that facing resilient 
MEG design namely operation costs, greenhouse gases emission, capital cost and the 
system reliability. Results shows optimal values for IRLs for design a resilient MEG 
that considers risk calculation in the optimization cost function that. To the best of the 
author's knowledge, so far there is no other publication reporting design of resilient 
MEG based on LORA-ISA optimization algorithm. 
 In light of the promising results of this research, it can be affirmed that the proposed 
methodology offers an effective safety analysis tool for resilient MEG design and 
validation. Therefore, the proposed risk modeling approaches can be extensively 
applied in designing and validation for similar mega systems. 
4. A proposal of non-SIF IRL namely hierarchical decision making of three control 
levels was implemented in Simulink platform by using an adaptive-network-based 
fuzzy inference as demonstrated in CHAPTER 5. Collaboration between different 
control levels has been attained to improve MEG’s resiliency and to achieve optimistic 
profiles of energy generation. This has been done by accumulating data from local 
subsystems that obtains directive information to the reactive controller level and to the 




Utilizing the proposed IRLs into the conventional MEG improve the MEG’s reliability 
to more than twice of its normal capacity, while the co-generator, TES, and 
hierarchical decision making offer a significant reduction in the severity of the utility 
grid risks. Subsequently, employing IRLs into MEG improve the performance with 
practical everyday considerations, such as equipment maintenance and variation in 
energy demand, that affect MEGs’ energy generation and distribution. Predicting 
future load profiles from historical data can provide a tolerable approximate tool for 
scheduling the dispatch of MEG resources. The optimal energy imports can be 
achieved by using real-time energy dispatch control for effective management of MEG 
resources and energy flow mapping. 
The results in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 5 show a direct proportion relation 
between the sampling rate resolution and accurate performance of energy profiles. 
5. A MEG’s alarm system using intelligent reasoning model was proposed as a SIF-IRL 
to boost the resilience level for MEG. This model is based on BBN and ANFIS, where 
the BBN structure consists of three layers, for MEG fault prognosis and diagnosis 
process. BBN can be utilized for instant fault prognosis process as well as it can be 
used for real-time fault diagnosis analysis. It is worth to notice that the more 
information involved in the BBN, the higher smartness it would be. Subsequently, the 
more evidence involved in the query process, the more accurate results would be. 
Moreover, BBN approach retains several other advantages. The BBN approach 
merges diagnostics and prognostics features effectively, as most of the potential 
hazard scenarios of MEG can be explicated in BBN model. However, it is in a tentative 
way. The development of fault prognostic and diagnostic approaches are for the sake 
of MEG resilience improvement during engineering design stage and during the 
operation of MEG respectively. 
A hybrid technique, using BBN and ANFIS based technologies, contributes an 
efficient tool for MEGs fault diagnosis. Where the results demonstrate that the hybrid 
BBN-ANFIS can perform fault diagnosis with complete or incomplete symptoms. The 
main strength of the proposed approach is its dependency on experts’ knowledge more 
than data from measurement instrumentation (I&C) in the decision-making process. 




diagnosis of a MEG that would potentially provide a solution to the reasoning problem 
of complex systems.  
On the other hand, the results show that the MEG’s safety alarm system has no direct 
impact on MEG’s performance, in term of operation cost and greenhouse gas 
emission, as it is not a part of the operation process nevertheless, it has positive impact 
on RRPI of the MEG as demonstrated in CHAPTER 7. 
More applications for the proposed approach can be examined. In addition, it can be 
applied to build a dedicated BBN for fault prognosis and diagnosis for similar energy 
systems. Hence, minor modification may be required on the BBN structure and/or 
ANFIS to fit the specific needs of the system under investigation. 
Finally, validation of the data and approaches that used/offered in this dissertation 
were performed in CHAPTER 7. Different techniques and case studies were utilized 
to ensure the proposed methods namely, the simulation of MEG operation, LORA and 
BBN, are accurate and used properly.  
8.3 Innovative contributions in the research study 
Risk analysis for complex systems like MEG that has interaction between numerous 
components and energy vectors is relatively a new topic that needs to be tackled by 
innovative and specific safety tools. 
This study addresses most hazards that combining energy grid operation and analyses 
their consequences in what forms the resilience matrix (RM) of MEG. 
The concept of independent resilience layer (IRL) is another contribution that was 
developed through the thesis and where the implementation is leading to an important 
contribution to achieve higher resilience of the MEG. 
The FTA method was developed and LORA was proposed for MEGs safety analysis to 
assess the resilience level for the MEG. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the 
first time the proposed safety analysis tools are suggested for design a resilience MEG by 




Intelligent reasoning methodologies exploiting neural networks and Bayesian analysis is 
a new approach that can translate the resilience matrix in an effective tool for increasing 
the MEG resiliency. 
This research reveals numerous contributions in design and validation of resilient MEG. 
The key milestones that were achieved in this dissertation can be summarized as follows, 
see Fig. 8.1: 
1. Study hazards and resilience action for MEGs by proposing a resilience matrix framework 
for MEG and contribute an RRPI to measure the strength of MEG’s resiliency 
2. Develop safety analysis tools namely fault tree analysis (FTA) and propose LORA with 
IRLs for improving the MEG’s resiliency 
3. Implement non-SIF IRL namely multi-level hierarchical decision making to improve the 
resiliency of a MEG case study 
4. Implement SIF IRL that is intelligent reasoning algorithm (Alarm system) by using BBN 
and ANFIS for safety analysis and fault diagnosis  
 
Fig. 8.1: Contribution of this research study 
This research has seven academic publications presented in numerous high reputation 
publishers in a form of journal articles, conference papers and chapter-books. 
The Most significant achievements of this study are listed as follows: 
1- Study hazards in 
MEGs, propose a 
MEG Resilience 
Matrix and propose 
resileince risk 
indicator (RRPI)
2- Develop FTA 
method for MEGs 
safety analysis and 
propose LORA with 




making to improve 
the operation 
resilience for a MEG
4- Implement an 
intelligent reasoning 
algorithms for MEG 
using BBN-ANFIS 





1- Article published in Elsevier-Sustainable cities and society Impact Factor 3.160 
2- Article published in MDPI-Energies Impact Factor 2.676 
3- Best Paper Award at IEEE-SEGE-2017 
8.4 Future works 
The main thrust of future development of MEG risk analysis will be in supporting the 
safety assessment tools development and potentially proposing numerous IRLs to study 
their impacts on MEG resiliency.  
Another area for potential future work is to support implementing a real application of 
resilient MEG that serves varies load types such as factories, residential buildings.  
The resilience matrix can be extended to cover more risk information, parameters and 
expertise’s recommendation in order to improve the qualification and quantification of risk 
modeling tools for various types of MEG. More research can be conducted to develop the 
RRPI for more accurate evaluation of MEG resilience measurements. 
Moreover, the proposed LORA can be developed and tested on numerous types of MEG 
for better evaluation risk modeling tool for optimal design of resilient MEG.  
On other hand, K2- learning algorithm can be adopted in BBN structure to provide a 
more accurate nodes values for MEG’s alarm system. 
Finally, a recommendation to implement an actual resilient MEG that serving different 
load types such as factories or residential buildings is required in order to get a real data 
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Appendix I Proposed Resilience Matrix for MEG 
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3= Moderate   
























Low: x<30   
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 (1) On Society 
 (2) On Economy 











[199] [200]  
2 [198] 3 [197] 3 18 L 11 
(1) Demand not Served 
(DNS) 
1- Upgrade grid capacity 
2- Shift on-peak power 
demand 
3- dynamic grid mapping 
based on load demand and 
priority 
1- Intelligent Energy 
Storage System(super 
capacitor, Fly Wheel, TES 
and pumped hydro, or 
hydrogen storage 
2- Intelligent Fault 
Tolerant Controller 
3- ranking the loads as per 
its prioritization level 
(2) Overheated transmission 
and distribution cables, 
Asset Damage, fire and 
power blackout 
(3) Fire causes CO2 
Emission 
2 




3 [197]  5 [197] 4 60 H 2 
(1) Interruption on service 
High dynamic 
performance from the 
distributed power and 
energy system by : 
• Store off-peak power 
production for using at on-
peak demand  
• Utilize Gas Generator 
• Connect to Capital Grid 
(Utility) 
1- Intelligent Energy 
Storage System (super 
capacitor, Fly Wheel, TES 
and pumped hydro, or 
hydrogen storage. 
2- Load Following or 
dispatchable Generator 
(fuel cells, micro-gas 
turbines, and hybrid fuel 
cell gas turbine systems) 
3- Higher level Self-
Healing Management 
Controller 
(2) Power interruption 
and/or blackout 
(3) Lack of DER= more 
demand on Fossil fuel 
generators which cause 
Emission 
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4 [40] 3 [40] 4 48 M 4 
(1) Disturbance on service 
(2) Intermittency and non-





(3) Lack of DER= more 
demand on Fossil fuel 
generators 
4 
Integration of multi 
sources DERs  
[58] [197] 
(R7)  
3 [197] 3 3 27 L 6 
(1) Operation Failure of 
Sensitive Devices 
1- full utilization of DERs 
to increase energy 
efficiency 
2- improve power quality  
3- enhance system 
stability 
1- Advanced D-FACTS 
system on AC/DC MEG to 
achieve resilient MEG  
2- Create Robust KPI 
parameters able to 
optimize feedback control 
coefficients 
(2) Negative impacts on grid 
parameters such as active 
power (P), reactive power 
(Q), voltage (V), phase shift 
(α) and frequency (ƒ). On 
other word Bad Power 
Quality 
(3) Excessive on Energy 
Resources and Emission 
5 








4 [199] 3 5 60 H 3 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 
1- Isolate the minimal 
affected branch 
2- Switch off and isolate 
the DERs allocated in the 
affected zone 
1-Wide area Monitoring 
and Alarm systems 
2- Utilizing numerical 
smart relays 
3- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
4- Periodical testing and 
maintenance procedure 
(2) Power failure and/or 
outage may cause loss of 
business  and production 
(3) Fire cause CO2 
Emission 
6 






1 [85] 5 [85] 4 20 L 8 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 1- open the main switch 
gear (islanded mode) 
2- standby all available 
DERs  
3- reduce the load based 
on priority and power 
production availability 
1-Monitoring and Alarm 
systems for Utility grid 
energy quality and status 
2- Safety management 
controller dealing with 
hazards scenarios 
3- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
(2) Power failure and/or 
outage may cause loss of 
business  and production 






[85] 2 [85] 1 [85] 2 4 L 29 
(1) Operation Failure of 
Sensitive Devices 
(2) Negative impacts on grid 
parameters such as active 
power (P), reactive power 
(Q), voltage (V), phase shift 
(α) and frequency (ƒ). On 
other word Bad Power 
Quality 
(3) Excessive on Energy 
Resources and Emission 
1- full utilization of DERs 
to increase energy 
efficiency 
2- improve power quality  
3- enhance system 
stability 
1- Advanced D-FACTS 
system on AC/DC MEG to 
achieve resilient MEG  
2- Create Robust KPI 
parameters able to 
optimize feedback control 
coefficients 
8 
Grid frequency goes 
out of +/-0.5Hz 
limits  
[85] 1 [85] 2 [85] 2 4 L 30 
9 
Electric storage 
system fails  
[85] 1 [85] 1 [85] 2 2 L 36 






unavailable in a 
timely manner  
(2) Power interruption 
and/or blackout High dynamic 
performance from the 
distributed power and 
energy system by : 
• Store off-peak power 
production for using at on-
peak demand  
• Utilize Gas Generator 
• Connect to Capital Grid 
(Utility) 
1- Intelligent Energy 
Storage System (super 
capacitor, Fly Wheel, TES 
and pumped hydro, or 
hydrogen storage. 
2- Load Following or 
dispatchable Generator 
(fuel cells, micro-gas 
turbines, and hybrid fuel 
cell gas turbine systems) 
3- Higher level Self-
Healing Management 
Controller 
(3) Lack of DER= more 
demand on Fossil fuel 








[85] [203] 1 [85] 2 [85] 2 4 L 31 
12 
Solar Panel output 
drops by 60 MW in 
a 15 min. 
[40] [85] 2 [85] 2 [85] 3 12 L 17 
(1) Breakers could trip 
leaving customers without 
electric power. 
1- Store off-peak power 
production for using at on-
peak demand  
2- dynamic grid mapping 
based on load demand and 
priority 
1- adopt an advanced 
power storage units such 
as super capacitor 
(2) Voltage on the grid 
could drop and frequency of 
main generators could 
change 








3 [85] 1 [85] 2 6 L 24 
(1) The customer can no 
longer sell electricity to 
utility grid 1- dynamic network based 
on load demand and 
priority 
2- reduce the load based 
on priority and power 
production availability 
1- Intelligent Alarm 
systems for panel power 
quality and status 
2- Adopt SIS management 
dealing with hazards 
scenarios 
(2) Feeder circuit voltage 
could get out of phase with 
the grid 
(3) Increase the demand on 
coal-fired generators 
14 
Short to ground on 
distribution grid  
[85] 1 [85] 2 [85] 1 2 L 37 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 
1- dynamic network based 
on load demand and 
priority 
2- reduce the load based 
on priority and power 
production availability 
1- Intelligent Alarm 
systems for panel power 
quality and status 
2- Adopt SIS management 
dealing with hazards 
scenarios 
(2) Equipment could be 
damaged, particularly 
transformers and capacitor 
banks. 
(3) Increase the demand on 
coal-fired generators 
15 
Failure of DC to AC 
inverters  
[85] 3 [85] 1 [85] 2 6 L 25 
(1) The customer can no 
longer sell electricity to 
utility grid 
1- Isolate the minimal 
affected branches 
2- Switch off and isolate 
the affected inverters 
1- Utilizing numerical 
smart relays 
2- Periodical testing and 
maintenance procedure 16 
Transient local 
outages  






accumulate layers of 
dust or other 
particles  
[85] 1 [85] 2 [85] 2 4 L 32 
(2) Power failure and/or 
outage may cause loss of 
business  and production 
(3) Increase the demand on 
coal-fired generators 18 Junction box fails  [85] 1 [85] 2 [85] 1 2 L 39 









[15]* [17] 4 4 4 64 H 1 
(1) Demand not served 
Shift on-peak cooling 
demand to off-peak 
demand 
1- Utilize TES tanks 
2- Predictive energy 
management 
3-  ranking the Cooling 
demand as per its 
prioritization level 
(2) Increase on-peak 
electricity demand could 
cause interruption and/or 
blackout 
(3) Increase demand on 




with lack of Chiller 
units  
[17] [15]* 1 [147] 4 4 16 L 14 
(1) Uncomfortable condition 
for human 
1- isolate the affected 
chiller unit from both 
electrical and cooling 
network 
2- stand by all absorption 
chiller units for 
compensation purpose 
3- update the management 
control to reschedule 
storage strategies by Store 
off-peak cooling 
production for using at on-
peak demand 
1- Utilize TES tanks 
2- Intelligent contingency 
energy management (for 
emergency procedure) 
3- Utilizing numerical 
smart valves 
(2) Can't meet the on-peak 
cooling demand 
(3) Reduces the cooling 
efficiency. Also, using 
individual A/C units lead to 
increase Global Worming 
22 
Faults in the 
Cooling system 
(Chiller, TES, 
Pumps or Pipes and 
valves) systems  
[25]* 1 [148] 4 5 20 L 9 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 
(2) Cooling energy failure 
may cause loss of business 
and production 
(3) May cause pollution 
by liquid and gases spreads 
or by direct fire 
1- Isolate the minimal 
affected branch 
2- switch off and isolate 
the Cooling DERs 
allocated in the affected 
zone 
1- Utilizing numerical 
smart meters 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
3-  Periodical testing and 
maintenance  procedure 
23 
Leak in the cooling 
pipe branch  
[70]* 1 3 4 12 L 18 
24 Cooling Overload  [70] [204]* 2 3 4 24 L 7 
(1) Uncomfortable condition 
for human 
1- reduce the load as per 
priority index to match the 
production capacity 
2- peak shave management 
for dispatchable loads to 
balance between power 
production and demand 
1- Utilizing numerical 
smart meters 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
3- Utilize absorption 
chillers 
(2) Can't meet the on-peak 
cooling demand 
(3) Reduces the cooling 




individual A/C units lead to 
increase Global Worming 








[127][131]* 2 [127] 3 3 18 L 12 
(1) Uncomfortable condition 
for human 
1- Store off-peak Hot 
water production for using 
at on-peak demand 
1- Utilize TES tanks 
2- Predictive energy 
management 
(2) Failure to meet the Hot 
water on-peak demand 
(3) Alternative heat sources 
like furnace produce 
emission 
26 Thermal overload  
[127] [131] 
[205]* 
1 [205] 3 2 6 L 26 
(1) Uncomfortable condition 
for human 
(2) Failure to meet the Hot 
water on-peak demand 
(3) Alternative heat sources 
like furnace produce more 
emission 
1- reduce the load as per 
priority index to match the 
production capacity 
2- peak shave management 
for dispatchable loads to 
balance between power 
production and demand 
3- discharge the thermal 
storage energy 
4- switch off the 
absorption chillers 
1- Utilizing numerical 
smart meters 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
3- Safety management 
controller dealing with 
hazards scenarios 
27 
Faults in the 
Heating system 
(Cogen, Boiler, 
TES, Pumps or 
Pipes and valves) 
systems  
[68]* 1 4 5 20 L 10 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 1- isolate the minimal 
affected branch 
2- switch off and isolate 
the thermal DERs 
allocated in the affected 
zone 
1-Wide area Monitoring 
and Alarm systems 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
3- Periodical testing and 
maintenance procedure 
(2) Heating energy failure 
may cause loss of business 
and production 
(3) Fire cause CO2 
Emission 
28 
Loss of electrical 
boiler  
[206] 1 [206] 3 [206] 2 6 L 27 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 
1- Isolate the Electrical 
boiler from power and 
thermal networks 
2- Standby Co-gen and gas 
boiler to cover the thermal 
deficiency 
3- Update the management 
control to reschedule 
storage strategies 
1-Wide area Monitoring 
and Alarm systems 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
3- Periodical testing and 
maintenance procedure 
(2) Heating energy failure 
may cause loss of business 
and production 
(3) Alternative heat sources 
like furnace produce 
emission 
29 Loss of gas boiler  [67][206] 1* 3 2 6 L 28 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 
1- Isolate the Electrical 
boiler from power and 
thermal networks 
2- Standby Co-gen and 
electrical boiler to cover 
1-Wide area Monitoring 
and Alarm systems 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
(2) Heating energy failure 





(3) Alternative heat sources 
like furnace produce more 
emission 
the thermal deficiency 
3- Notify the control room 
to reschedule storage 
strategies 







Gas Leak in Co-
gen's feeder pipe 
[205] 2* 3 3 18 L 13 
(1) Loss of Life's , Injury 
and suffocation 
(2) Damage in assets and 
loss of business 
(3) toxic gases and CO2 
Emission 
1- Close the affected 
branch 
2- switch off and isolate 
the Co-gen from electrical 
and heating networks 
3- switch to grid 
connected mode to cover 
the lackage in power 
production 
4- standby boiler furnace 
to serve the thermal 
demand 
1-Wide area Monitoring 
and Alarm systems 
2- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 
31 
Gas Leak in boiler's 
feeder pipe  
[206] 1 [206] 3 [206] 3 9 L 22 
1- Close the affected 
branch 
2- switch off and isolate 
the gas boiler from gas 
and heating networks 
3- standby electrical boiler 
to serve the thermal 
demand 
4- switch to grid 
connected mode to cover 
the lackage in power 
production 
32 
Gas Leak in the 
Main Pipes  
[207] 1 [207] 4  4 16 L 15 
1- Isolate the affected 
pipes 
2- switch off all systems 
which feeded by the 
affected pipes 
33 Lack of fuel  [85] 1 [85] 2 [85] 2 4 L 34 
(1) Unsatisfied condition for 
customers 
(2) Heating energy failure 
may cause loss of business 
and production 
(3) Alternative heat sources 
like furnace produce more 
emission 
1- Isolate the Electrical 
boiler from power and 
thermal networks 
2- Standby Co-gen and 
utility to cover the 
deficiency in energy 
3- Notify the control room 
to reschedule storage 
strategies 
1- Emergency Shutdown 
system ESD 









2 [200] 4 5 40 M 5 
(1) Loss of Life's , Injury 
and delay 
1- Achieve energy 
management balance 
1- Energy Storage System 







(2) failure in energy threaten 
the safety for Properties and 
the public 
between transportation 
units and MEG for more 
reliability and security 
enhancement, reduced 
emissions and improved 
energy quality. 
Wheel, TES and pumped 
hydro, or hydrogen 
storage. 
2- Following Generator 
(fuel cells, micro-gas 
turbines, and hybrid fuel 
cell gas turbine systems) 
3- Intelligent management 
Controller 
(3) Back-up Engines works 








Violent storms / 
Tree failing 
[85] [198]  
[199] [200] 
[202] [210] 
3 [210] 3 [210] 1 9 L 23 (1) Loss of Life's , Injury 
and delay 
Isolate the affected 
area from the service 
1- Intelligent 
Management Controller 
2- Smart Relays and 
metering 
36 Earth Quake  [40] [210] 1 [210] 5 [210] 2 10 L 20 
(2) failure in energy threaten 
the safety for properties and 
the public 
(3) Spreading the damages 
and may initiate new hazards 
37 Water Flood  [210]  1 [199] 5 2 10 L 21 
(1) Loss of Life's , Injury 
and delay 
Isolate the affected area 
from the service 
1- Intelligent Management 
Controller 
2- Smart Relays and 
metering 
(2) failure in energy threaten 
the safety for properties and 
the public 
(3) Spreading the damages 
and may initiate new hazards 
38 





4 [200] 2 [200] 2 16 L 16 
(1) Loss of Life's , Injury 
and delay 
Isolate the affected area 
from the service 
1- Intelligent Management 
Controller 
2- Smart Relays and 
metering 
(2) Electrical devices might 
get damaged 
(3) Spreading the damages 
and may initiate new hazards 
39 Wild Fire [210] 2 [210] 3 [210] 2 12 L 19 
(1) Loss of Life's , Injury 
and delay 
Isolate the affected area 
from the service 
1- Intelligent Management 
Controller 
2- Smart Relays and 
metering 
(2) Electrical devices might 
get damaged 
(3) Spreading the damages 
and may initiate new hazards 
* The severity and likelihood values are estimated based on experts’ knowledge and engineers 




8.5 Severity Value Computation Procedure 
The calculation of severity risk values of a certain hazard event can be done by different 
techniques that are varies on the results but they are all common on the base as they are 
subject to previous project experience and experts’ knowledge and judgement [45] [87] 
[110] [207] [211]. The following procedure is well known in the industry [212]: 
1- The occurrence frequency is defined from maintenance historical data of 
similar projects. 
2- Allocate the worst value 𝑆𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 to the most severe hazard event. This is the 
reference value to the other hazard events 
3- Compare each hazard event to the most severe hazard event by assess how 
many of this hazard event (𝑁𝑖) would be equal the impact of the worst event.  





5- Normalize the severity values to have similar range to the occurrence values 
 
8.6 Electrical-MEG Hazards 
 The following points can summarize the main hazard events in electrical-MEG 
1- Overload (above the grid Capability): the electrical demand could be increased 
suddenly for a short period due to different reasons such as extremely hot and cold 
weather that may lead to several negative impacts as follows: 
I. Impacts on human: demand not served (DNS) 
II. Impact on the facility: overheated transmission and distribution cables, Asset 
Damages, fire and power blackout. 
III. Impacts on environment: fire causes CO2 emission 






 Remedial actions or IRLs Requirements 
1 Upgrade grid capacity Consume time and cost much money 
2 Shift on-peak power demand 
By using Intelligent Energy Storage 
System such as super capacitor, Fly 
Wheel, TES and pumped hydro, or 
hydrogen storage. 
3 
Dynamic grid mapping based 
on load demands and priorities 
Intelligent energy management 
2- Lack of DER: DERs could be out of service due to scheduled routine maintenance 
or due to breakdown and failure. However, many negative consequences may occur due to 
this even as follows: 
i. On human: interruption of service 
ii. On the facility: could lead to risks of losing the electricity power of a wide 
region or general blackout. 
iii. On the environment: lack of DER means increasing the demand on fossil 
fuel generators, which cause a dramatic increase in greenhouse gases 
emissions.  
Preventing IRL action can be through high dynamic performance from the distributed 
power and energy system by: 
Remedial actions or IRLs Requirements 
 Store off-peak power production for 
using at emergency or at on-peak 
demand,  




 Utilize backup Co-generator units, 
Gas generators, fuel cell, gas-oil 
generators 
 Connect to the Capital Grid (utility). High dynamic controller 
3- Utilize of on-site renewable sources: despite renewable resources are known as eco-
friendly power sources, they have the accompanying hazard of intermittency and 
non-coincidence in electricity production, which may cause lack of power 
sufficiency. This can be prevented by utilizing the IRLs mentioned in point 2. 
4- Integration of multi-DERs: has Negative impacts on the grid’s vital parameters, 
such as active power (P), reactive power (Q), voltage (V), phase shift (α) and 
frequency (ƒ). The following remedial actions and IRLs can be utilized: 
Remedial actions or IRLs Requirements 
 Full utilization of DERs to increase 
energy efficiency, 
Intelligent energy management and 
optimization 
 Improve power quality, Adding D-FACTS 
 Enhance system stability. Power factor correction system 
8.7 Cooling-MEG Hazards 
 Cooling-MEG resilience could be affected by following hazards: 
1- High correlation between cooling demand and electricity demand: this relation has 
negative effects on the MEG resilience as illustrated in the following points: 
i. Impacts on humans: uncomfortable condition (temperature and humidity 
beyond convenient limits). 
ii. Impacts on the facility: the on-peak demand for both electricity and cooling 
grids are accrued at the same time, and this subsequently leads to an increase 
in the actual electricity of on-peak demand, which might cause interruption 
and/or blackout for both services. 
iii. Impacts on the environment: Increases the demand on Fossil Fuel generation, 




 This hazard can be avoided by shifting on-peak cooling demand to off-peak demand 
by utilizing TES and intelligent management control. 
2- MEG contingency with the lack of Chiller unit: this may cause a major deficiency 
in the energy service. Thus, several undesirable influences may occur accordingly: 
i. Impacts on humans: uncomfortable condition due to DNS 
ii. Impacts on facility: shortage on cooling production leads to lack of service 
iii. Impacts on the environment: individual A/C units are one of the solutions to 
overcome the lack of service. A/C unit usage has an impact on electricity 
demand and global warming. 
 This hazard can be evaded by storing off-peak cooling production for use at the on-
peak demand by using TES and management control to ensure higher MEG reliability 
levels. 
8.8 Thermal Heating-MEG Hazards 
 From the historical data on heating demand, it can be clearly defined that there is an 
irregular heating demand with a low correlation with electrical demand, which may lead to 
a failure to meet the on-peak heating demand. Consequently, several negative impacts may 
occur, such as the following: 
i. Impacts on humans: uncomfortable condition (temperature and humidity). 
ii. Impacts on the facility: failure to meet the heating on-peak demand. 
iii. Impacts on the environment: increases the requirement for alternative heat sources 
such as furnaces, which increase the gases emissions. 
 To prevent the hazard of heating failure, a strategy to storing off-peak heating 
production should be utilized. 
8.9 Transportation MEG Hazards 
Transportation is a vital service for the society and the public; therefore, the energy 
demand conjugated with it is essential for its resiliency. Any interruption might have 




i. Impacts on humans: loss of life, injury, and delay. 
ii. Impact on the facility: failure in energy threaten the safety of properties and the 
public. 
iii. Impacts on the environment: backup Engines work by using fossil fuel, which 
increases emissions. 
 Achieving an energy management balance between transportation units and MEG 
is one of the main solutions for more reliability, security enhancement, emissions 





Appendix II Sensitivity analysis for LORA 
Excerpts from sensitivity analysis table  















Contribution % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Electricity 
0.7224 0.7224 0.7224 0.7224 0.7224 0.7224   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.984428916 
2 
Contribution % 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.64134672   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245   
  Risk level 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.979882492 
3 
Contribution % 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.56029344   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.975336068 
4 
Contribution % 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.47924016   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.970789643 
5 
Contribution % 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.7964   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.7245   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.966243219 
6 
Contribution % 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.58861152 0.58861152 0.58861152 0.58861152   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.940827945 0.940827945 0.940827945 0.940827945 0.940827945 
7 
Contribution % 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.522569307 0.522569307 0.522569307 0.522569307   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.931328765 0.931328765 0.931328765 0.931328765 0.931328765 0.931328765 
8 
Contribution % 50% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.456527095 0.456527095 0.456527095 0.456527095 0.456527095   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.921829584 0.921829584 0.921829584 0.921829584 0.921829584 0.921829584 
9 
Contribution % 75% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.390484882 0.390484882 0.390484882 0.390484882 0.390484882   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.912330404 0.912330404 0.912330404 0.912330404 0.912330404 0.912330404 
10 
Contribution % 100% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.64890672   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.5903226   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.902831224 0.902831224 0.902831224 0.902831224 0.902831224 0.902831224 
11 
Contribution % 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.45482304 0.45482304 0.45482304 0.45482304 0.45482304   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.852170528 0.852170528 0.852170528 0.852170528 0.852170528 0.852170528 
12 
Contribution % 25% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.403791895 0.403791895 0.403791895 0.403791895 0.403791895   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.838332989 0.838332989 0.838332989 0.838332989 0.838332989 0.838332989 
13 
Contribution % 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.35276075 0.35276075 0.35276075 0.35276075 0.35276075   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.82449545 0.82449545 0.82449545 0.82449545 0.82449545 0.82449545 
14 
Contribution % 75% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.301729605 0.301729605 0.301729605 0.301729605 0.301729605   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.810657912 0.810657912 0.810657912 0.810657912 0.810657912 0.810657912 
15 
Contribution % 100% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.50141344   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.4561452   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.796820373 0.796820373 0.796820373 0.796820373 0.796820373 0.796820373 
16 
Contribution % 0% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.32103456 0.32103456 0.32103456 0.32103456 0.32103456   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.702570406 0.702570406 0.702570406 0.702570406 0.702570406 0.702570406 
17 
Contribution % 25% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.285014482 0.285014482 0.285014482 0.285014482 0.285014482   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.686791345 0.686791345 0.686791345 0.686791345 0.686791345 0.686791345 
18 
Contribution % 50% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.248994405 0.248994405 0.248994405 0.248994405 0.248994405   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.671012285 0.671012285 0.671012285 0.671012285 0.671012285 0.671012285 
19 
Contribution % 75% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.212974327 0.212974327 0.212974327 0.212974327 0.212974327   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.655233224 0.655233224 0.655233224 0.655233224 0.655233224 0.655233224 
20 
Contribution % 100% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.35392016   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.3219678   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.639454163 0.639454163 0.639454163 0.639454163 0.639454163 0.639454163 
21 
Contribution % 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.18724608 0.18724608 0.18724608 0.18724608 0.18724608   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.476141325 0.476141325 0.476141325 0.476141325 0.476141325 0.476141325 
22 
Contribution % 25% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.16623707 0.16623707 0.16623707 0.16623707 0.16623707   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.462600016 0.462600016 0.462600016 0.462600016 0.462600016 0.462600016 
23 
Contribution % 50% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.14522806 0.14522806 0.14522806 0.14522806 0.14522806   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.449058706 0.449058706 0.449058706 0.449058706 0.449058706 0.449058706 
24 
Contribution % 75% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.124219049 0.124219049 0.124219049 0.124219049 0.124219049   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.435517397 0.435517397 0.435517397 0.435517397 0.435517397 0.435517397 
25 
Contribution % 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.20642688   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.1877904   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.421976088 0.421976088 0.421976088 0.421976088 0.421976088 0.421976088 
26 
Contribution % 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.7224 0.54626082 0.54626082 0.54626082 0.54626082   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.918391507 0.918391507 0.918391507 0.918391507 0.918391507 
27 
Contribution % 25% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.484970356 0.484970356 0.484970356 0.484970356   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.907367944 0.907367944 0.907367944 0.907367944 0.907367944 
28 
Contribution % 50% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.423679892 0.423679892 0.423679892 0.423679892   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.896344381 0.896344381 0.896344381 0.896344381 0.896344381 
29 
Contribution % 75% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.362389428 0.362389428 0.362389428 0.362389428   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.885320818 0.885320818 0.885320818 0.885320818 0.885320818 
30 
Contribution % 100% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777 0.60221777   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788 0.547848788   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.874297255 0.874297255 0.874297255 0.874297255 0.874297255 
31 
Contribution % 0% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.445093316 0.445093316 0.445093316 0.445093316   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.843537303 0.843537303 0.843537303 0.843537303 0.843537303 
32 
Contribution % 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.395153846 0.395153846 0.395153846 0.395153846   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.931328765 0.829456261 0.829456261 0.829456261 0.829456261 0.829456261 
33 
Contribution % 50% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.456527095 0.345214376 0.345214376 0.345214376 0.345214376   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.921829584 0.815375219 0.815375219 0.815375219 0.815375219 0.815375219 
34 
Contribution % 75% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.390484882 0.295274906 0.295274906 0.295274906 0.295274906   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.912330404 0.801294177 0.801294177 0.801294177 0.801294177 0.801294177 
35 
Contribution % 100% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039 0.490687039   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192 0.446387192   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.902831224 0.787213135 0.787213135 0.787213135 0.787213135 0.787213135 
36 
Contribution % 0% 50% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.45482304 0.343925812 0.343925812 0.343925812 0.343925812   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.852170528 0.733175408 0.733175408 0.733175408 0.733175408 0.733175408 
37 
Contribution % 25% 50% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.403791895 0.305337336 0.305337336 0.305337336 0.305337336   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.838332989 0.71748152 0.71748152 0.71748152 0.71748152 0.71748152 
38 
Contribution % 50% 50% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.35276075 0.26674886 0.26674886 0.26674886 0.26674886   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.82449545 0.701787633 0.701787633 0.701787633 0.701787633 0.701787633 
39 
Contribution % 75% 50% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.301729605 0.228160384 0.228160384 0.228160384 0.228160384   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.810657912 0.686093746 0.686093746 0.686093746 0.686093746 0.686093746 
40 
Contribution % 100% 50% 25% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308 0.379156308   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597 0.344925597   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.796820373 0.670399858 0.670399858 0.670399858 0.670399858 0.670399858 
41 
Contribution % 0% 75% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.32103456 0.242758308 0.242758308 0.242758308 0.242758308   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.702570406 0.580436901 0.580436901 0.580436901 0.580436901 0.580436901 
42 
Contribution % 25% 75% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.285014482 0.215520826 0.215520826 0.215520826 0.215520826   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.686791345 0.565345495 0.565345495 0.565345495 0.565345495 0.565345495 
43 
Contribution % 50% 75% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.248994405 0.188283344 0.188283344 0.188283344 0.188283344   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.671012285 0.550254088 0.550254088 0.550254088 0.550254088 0.550254088 
44 
Contribution % 75% 75% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.212974327 0.161045862 0.161045862 0.161045862 0.161045862   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.655233224 0.535162681 0.535162681 0.535162681 0.535162681 0.535162681 
45 
Contribution % 100% 75% 25% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577 0.267625577   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001 0.243464001   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.639454163 0.520071274 0.520071274 0.520071274 0.520071274 0.520071274 
46 
Contribution % 0% 100% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.18724608 0.141590805 0.141590805 0.141590805 0.141590805   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.476141325 0.378452863 0.378452863 0.378452863 0.378452863 0.378452863 
47 
Contribution % 25% 100% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.16623707 0.125704316 0.125704316 0.125704316 0.125704316   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.462600016 0.366949955 0.366949955 0.366949955 0.366949955 0.366949955 
48 
Contribution % 50% 100% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.14522806 0.109817828 0.109817828 0.109817828 0.109817828   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.449058706 0.355447048 0.355447048 0.355447048 0.355447048 0.355447048 
49 
Contribution % 75% 100% 25% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.124219049 0.09393134 0.09393134 0.09393134 0.09393134   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.435517397 0.343944141 0.343944141 0.343944141 0.343944141 0.343944141 
50 
Contribution % 100% 100% 25% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846 0.156094846   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406 0.142002406   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.421976088 0.332441234 0.332441234 0.332441234 0.332441234 0.332441234 
51 
Contribution % 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.7224 0.37012164 0.37012164 0.37012164 0.37012164   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.765541204 0.765541204 0.765541204 0.765541204 0.765541204 
52 
Contribution % 25% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.328593992 0.328593992 0.328593992 0.328593992   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.750083423 0.750083423 0.750083423 0.750083423 0.750083423 
53 
Contribution % 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.287066344 0.287066344 0.287066344 0.287066344   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.734625641 0.734625641 0.734625641 0.734625641 0.734625641 
54 
Contribution % 75% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.245538696 0.245538696 0.245538696 0.245538696   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.719167859 0.719167859 0.719167859 0.719167859 0.719167859 
55 
Contribution % 100% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554 0.40803554   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575 0.371197575   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.703710077 0.703710077 0.703710077 0.703710077 0.703710077 
56 
Contribution % 0% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.301575112 0.301575112 0.301575112 0.301575112   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.674788087 0.674788087 0.674788087 0.674788087 0.674788087 
57 
Contribution % 25% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.267738385 0.267738385 0.267738385 0.267738385   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.931328765 0.659032481 0.659032481 0.659032481 0.659032481 0.659032481 
58 
Contribution % 50% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.456527095 0.233901657 0.233901657 0.233901657 0.233901657   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.921829584 0.643276876 0.643276876 0.643276876 0.643276876 0.643276876 
59 
Contribution % 75% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.390484882 0.200064929 0.200064929 0.200064929 0.200064929   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.912330404 0.627521271 0.627521271 0.627521271 0.627521271 0.627521271 
60 
Contribution % 100% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358 0.332467358   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784 0.302451784   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.902831224 0.611765665 0.611765665 0.611765665 0.611765665 0.611765665 
61 
Contribution % 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.45482304 0.233028585 0.233028585 0.233028585 0.233028585   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.852170528 0.563260623 0.563260623 0.563260623 0.563260623 0.563260623 
62 
Contribution % 25% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.403791895 0.206882777 0.206882777 0.206882777 0.206882777   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.838332989 0.548372319 0.548372319 0.548372319 0.548372319 0.548372319 
63 
Contribution % 50% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.35276075 0.18073697 0.18073697 0.18073697 0.18073697   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.82449545 0.533484015 0.533484015 0.533484015 0.533484015 0.533484015 
64 
Contribution % 75% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.301729605 0.154591163 0.154591163 0.154591163 0.154591163   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.810657912 0.518595711 0.518595711 0.518595711 0.518595711 0.518595711 
65 
Contribution % 100% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176 0.256899176   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993 0.233705993   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.796820373 0.503707407 0.503707407 0.503707407 0.503707407 0.503707407 
66 
Contribution % 0% 75% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.32103456 0.164482057 0.164482057 0.164482057 0.164482057   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.702570406 0.42882222 0.42882222 0.42882222 0.42882222 0.42882222 
67 
Contribution % 25% 75% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.285014482 0.14602717 0.14602717 0.14602717 0.14602717   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.686791345 0.416206068 0.416206068 0.416206068 0.416206068 0.416206068 
68 
Contribution % 50% 75% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.248994405 0.127572283 0.127572283 0.127572283 0.127572283   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.671012285 0.403589916 0.403589916 0.403589916 0.403589916 0.403589916 
69 
Contribution % 75% 75% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.212974327 0.109117396 0.109117396 0.109117396 0.109117396   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.655233224 0.390973765 0.390973765 0.390973765 0.390973765 0.390973765 
70 
Contribution % 100% 75% 50% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994 0.181330994   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202 0.164960202   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.639454163 0.378357613 0.378357613 0.378357613 0.378357613 0.378357613 
71 
Contribution % 0% 100% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.18724608 0.095935529 0.095935529 0.095935529 0.095935529   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.476141325 0.269336285 0.269336285 0.269336285 0.269336285 0.269336285 
72 
Contribution % 25% 100% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.16623707 0.085171563 0.085171563 0.085171563 0.085171563   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.462600016 0.260636862 0.260636862 0.260636862 0.260636862 0.260636862 
73 
Contribution % 50% 100% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.14522806 0.074407596 0.074407596 0.074407596 0.074407596   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.449058706 0.251937438 0.251937438 0.251937438 0.251937438 0.251937438 
74 
Contribution % 75% 100% 50% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.124219049 0.06364363 0.06364363 0.06364363 0.06364363   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.435517397 0.243238015 0.243238015 0.243238015 0.243238015 0.243238015 
75 
Contribution % 100% 100% 50% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812 0.105762812   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411 0.096214411   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.421976088 0.234538591 0.234538591 0.234538591 0.234538591 0.234538591 
76 
Contribution % 0% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.7224 0.19398246 0.19398246 0.19398246 0.19398246   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.489625896 0.489625896 0.489625896 0.489625896 0.489625896 
77 
Contribution % 25% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.172217628 0.172217628 0.172217628 0.172217628   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.475844302 0.475844302 0.475844302 0.475844302 0.475844302 
78 
Contribution % 50% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.150452796 0.150452796 0.150452796 0.150452796   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.462062708 0.462062708 0.462062708 0.462062708 0.462062708 
79 
Contribution % 75% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.128687964 0.128687964 0.128687964 0.128687964   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.448281114 0.448281114 0.448281114 0.448281114 0.448281114 
80 
Contribution % 100% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331 0.21385331   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363 0.194546363   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.43449952 0.43449952 0.43449952 0.43449952 0.43449952 
81 
Contribution % 0% 25% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.158056908 0.158056908 0.158056908 0.158056908   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.414969901 0.414969901 0.414969901 0.414969901 0.414969901 
82 
Contribution % 25% 25% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.140322923 0.140322923 0.140322923 0.140322923   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.931328765 0.402647316 0.402647316 0.402647316 0.402647316 0.402647316 
83 
Contribution % 50% 25% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.456527095 0.122588938 0.122588938 0.122588938 0.122588938   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.921829584 0.390324732 0.390324732 0.390324732 0.390324732 0.390324732 
84 
Contribution % 75% 25% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.390484882 0.104854953 0.104854953 0.104854953 0.104854953   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.912330404 0.378002147 0.378002147 0.378002147 0.378002147 0.378002147 
85 
Contribution % 100% 25% 75% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677 0.174247677   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376 0.158516376   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.902831224 0.365679562 0.365679562 0.365679562 0.365679562 0.365679562 
86 
Contribution % 0% 50% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.45482304 0.122131357 0.122131357 0.122131357 0.122131357   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.852170528 0.333378696 0.333378696 0.333378696 0.333378696 0.333378696 
87 
Contribution % 25% 50% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.403791895 0.108428219 0.108428219 0.108428219 0.108428219   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.838332989 0.322973035 0.322973035 0.322973035 0.322973035 0.322973035 
88 
Contribution % 50% 50% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.35276075 0.09472508 0.09472508 0.09472508 0.09472508   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.82449545 0.312567373 0.312567373 0.312567373 0.312567373 0.312567373 
89 
Contribution % 75% 50% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.301729605 0.081021942 0.081021942 0.081021942 0.081021942   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.810657912 0.302161712 0.302161712 0.302161712 0.302161712 0.302161712 
90 
Contribution % 100% 50% 75% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044 0.134642044   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639 0.12248639   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.796820373 0.291756051 0.291756051 0.291756051 0.291756051 0.291756051 
91 
Contribution % 0% 75% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.32103456 0.086205805 0.086205805 0.086205805 0.086205805   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.702570406 0.24454469 0.24454469 0.24454469 0.24454469 0.24454469 
92 
Contribution % 25% 75% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.285014482 0.076533514 0.076533514 0.076533514 0.076533514   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.686791345 0.236548377 0.236548377 0.236548377 0.236548377 0.236548377 
93 
Contribution % 50% 75% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.248994405 0.066861223 0.066861223 0.066861223 0.066861223   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.671012285 0.228552065 0.228552065 0.228552065 0.228552065 0.228552065 
94 
Contribution % 75% 75% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.212974327 0.057188931 0.057188931 0.057188931 0.057188931   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.655233224 0.220555752 0.220555752 0.220555752 0.220555752 0.220555752 
95 
Contribution % 100% 75% 75% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411 0.095036411   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403 0.086456403   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.639454163 0.21255944 0.21255944 0.21255944 0.21255944 0.21255944 
96 
Contribution % 0% 100% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.18724608 0.050280254 0.050280254 0.050280254 0.050280254   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.476141325 0.148160289 0.148160289 0.148160289 0.148160289 0.148160289 
97 
Contribution % 25% 100% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.16623707 0.044638809 0.044638809 0.044638809 0.044638809   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.462600016 0.143100263 0.143100263 0.143100263 0.143100263 0.143100263 
98 
Contribution % 50% 100% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.14522806 0.038997365 0.038997365 0.038997365 0.038997365   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.449058706 0.138040237 0.138040237 0.138040237 0.138040237 0.138040237 
99 
Contribution % 75% 100% 75% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.124219049 0.03335592 0.03335592 0.03335592 0.03335592   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.435517397 0.132980211 0.132980211 0.132980211 0.132980211 0.132980211 
100 
Contribution % 100% 100% 75% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778 0.055430778   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417 0.050426417   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.421976088 0.127920186 0.127920186 0.127920186 0.127920186 0.127920186 
101 
Contribution % 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.7224 0.01784328 0.01784328 0.01784328 0.01784328   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.054393469 0.054393469 0.054393469 0.054393469 0.054393469 
102 
Contribution % 25% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.015841264 0.015841264 0.015841264 0.015841264   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.052465957 0.052465957 0.052465957 0.052465957 0.052465957 
103 
Contribution % 50% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.013839248 0.013839248 0.013839248 0.013839248   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.050538444 0.050538444 0.050538444 0.050538444 0.050538444 
104 
Contribution % 75% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.011837232 0.011837232 0.011837232 0.011837232   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.048610932 0.048610932 0.048610932 0.048610932 0.048610932 
105 
Contribution % 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108 0.01967108   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515 0.01789515   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.046683419 0.046683419 0.046683419 0.046683419 0.046683419 
106 
Contribution % 0% 25% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.014538705 0.014538705 0.014538705 0.014538705   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.044472348 0.044472348 0.044472348 0.044472348 0.044472348 
107 
Contribution % 25% 25% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.012907462 0.012907462 0.012907462 0.012907462   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.931328765 0.042890655 0.042890655 0.042890655 0.042890655 0.042890655 
108 
Contribution % 50% 25% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.456527095 0.011276219 0.011276219 0.011276219 0.011276219   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.921829584 0.041308962 0.041308962 0.041308962 0.041308962 0.041308962 
109 
Contribution % 75% 25% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.390484882 0.009644977 0.009644977 0.009644977 0.009644977   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.912330404 0.039727268 0.039727268 0.039727268 0.039727268 0.039727268 
110 
Contribution % 100% 25% 100% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996 0.016027996   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968 0.014580968   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.902831224 0.038145575 0.038145575 0.038145575 0.038145575 0.038145575 
111 
Contribution % 0% 50% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.45482304 0.011234129 0.011234129 0.011234129 0.011234129   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.852170528 0.034482151 0.034482151 0.034482151 0.034482151 0.034482151 
112 
Contribution % 25% 50% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.403791895 0.00997366 0.00997366 0.00997366 0.00997366   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.838332989 0.033251318 0.033251318 0.033251318 0.033251318 0.033251318 
113 
Contribution % 50% 50% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.35276075 0.008713191 0.008713191 0.008713191 0.008713191   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.82449545 0.032020485 0.032020485 0.032020485 0.032020485 0.032020485 
114 
Contribution % 75% 50% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.301729605 0.007452721 0.007452721 0.007452721 0.007452721   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.810657912 0.030789652 0.030789652 0.030789652 0.030789652 0.030789652 
115 
Contribution % 100% 50% 100% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912 0.012384912   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786 0.011266786   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.796820373 0.029558819 0.029558819 0.029558819 0.029558819 0.029558819 
116 
Contribution % 0% 75% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.32103456 0.007929554 0.007929554 0.007929554 0.007929554   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.702570406 0.024422638 0.024422638 0.024422638 0.024422638 0.024422638 
117 
Contribution % 25% 75% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.285014482 0.007039858 0.007039858 0.007039858 0.007039858   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.686791345 0.023547733 0.023547733 0.023547733 0.023547733 0.023547733 
118 
Contribution % 50% 75% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.248994405 0.006150162 0.006150162 0.006150162 0.006150162   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.671012285 0.022672828 0.022672828 0.022672828 0.022672828 0.022672828 
119 
Contribution % 75% 75% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.212974327 0.005260466 0.005260466 0.005260466 0.005260466   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.655233224 0.021797923 0.021797923 0.021797923 0.021797923 0.021797923 
120 
Contribution % 100% 75% 100% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828 0.008741828   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605 0.007952605   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.639454163 0.020923019 0.020923019 0.020923019 0.020923019 0.020923019 
121 
Contribution % 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.18724608 0.004624978 0.004624978 0.004624978 0.004624978   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.476141325 0.01429357 0.01429357 0.01429357 0.01429357 0.01429357 
122 
Contribution % 25% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.16623707 0.004106056 0.004106056 0.004106056 0.004106056   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.462600016 0.013779688 0.013779688 0.013779688 0.013779688 0.013779688 
123 
Contribution % 50% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.14522806 0.003587133 0.003587133 0.003587133 0.003587133   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.449058706 0.013265806 0.013265806 0.013265806 0.013265806 0.013265806 
124 
Contribution % 75% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.124219049 0.003068211 0.003068211 0.003068211 0.003068211   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423   
Risk level 0.970789643 0.435517397 0.012751924 0.012751924 0.012751924 0.012751924 0.012751924 
125 
Contribution % 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744 0.005098744   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423 0.004638423   
Risk level 0.966243219 0.421976088 0.012238042 0.012238042 0.012238042 0.012238042 0.012238042 
126 
Contribution % 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.7224 0.7224 0.56730072 0.56730072 0.56730072   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.62541292 0.62541292 0.62541292   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.56894985 0.56894985 0.56894985   
Risk level 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.930133857 0.930133857 0.930133857 0.930133857 
127 
Contribution % 25% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.503649579 0.503649579 0.503649579   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.62541292 0.62541292 0.62541292   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.56894985 0.56894985 0.56894985   
Risk level 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.919856374 0.919856374 0.919856374 0.919856374 
128 
Contribution % 50% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.439998438 0.439998438 0.439998438   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.62541292 0.62541292 0.62541292   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.56894985 0.56894985 0.56894985   
Risk level 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.90957889 0.90957889 0.90957889 0.90957889 
129 
Contribution % 75% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.376347298 0.376347298 0.376347298   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.62541292 0.62541292 0.62541292   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.56894985 0.56894985 0.56894985   
RISK LEVEL 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.899301407 0.899301407 0.899301407 0.899301407 
130 
Contribution % 100% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.7964 0.62541292 0.62541292 0.62541292   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.7245 0.56894985 0.56894985 0.56894985   
RISK LEVEL 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.889023923 0.889023923 0.889023923 0.889023923 
131 
Contribution % 0% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.58861152 0.462236627 0.462236627 0.462236627   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.509586447 0.509586447 0.509586447   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.463580338 0.463580338 0.463580338   
RISK LEVEL 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.940827945 0.858531949 0.858531949 0.858531949 0.858531949 
132 
Contribution % 25% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.522569307 0.410373677 0.410373677 0.410373677   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.509586447 0.509586447 0.509586447   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.463580338 0.463580338 0.463580338   
RISK LEVEL 0.979882492 0.931328765 0.931328765 0.844888494 0.844888494 0.844888494 0.844888494 
133 
Contribution % 50% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.456527095 0.456527095 0.358510728 0.358510728 0.358510728   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.509586447 0.509586447 0.509586447   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.463580338 0.463580338 0.463580338   
RISK LEVEL 0.975336068 0.921829584 0.921829584 0.831245039 0.831245039 0.831245039 0.831245039 
134 
Contribution % 75% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.390484882 0.390484882 0.306647778 0.306647778 0.306647778   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.509586447 0.509586447 0.509586447   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.463580338 0.463580338 0.463580338   
RISK LEVEL 0.970789643 0.912330404 0.912330404 0.817601584 0.817601584 0.817601584 0.817601584 
135 
Contribution % 100% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.64890672 0.509586447 0.509586447 0.509586447   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.5903226 0.463580338 0.463580338 0.463580338   
RISK LEVEL 0.966243219 0.902831224 0.902831224 0.803958129 0.803958129 0.803958129 0.803958129 
136 
Contribution % 0% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.45482304 0.45482304 0.357172533 0.357172533 0.357172533   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.393759974 0.393759974 0.393759974   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.358210826 0.358210826 0.358210826   
RISK LEVEL 0.984428916 0.852170528 0.852170528 0.749889791 0.749889791 0.749889791 0.749889791 
137 
Contribution % 25% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.403791895 0.403791895 0.317097775 0.317097775 0.317097775   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.393759974 0.393759974 0.393759974   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.358210826 0.358210826 0.358210826   
RISK LEVEL 0.979882492 0.838332989 0.838332989 0.734297573 0.734297573 0.734297573 0.734297573 
138 
Contribution % 50% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.35276075 0.35276075 0.277023017 0.277023017 0.277023017   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.393759974 0.393759974 0.393759974   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.358210826 0.358210826 0.358210826   
RISK LEVEL 0.975336068 0.82449545 0.82449545 0.718705355 0.718705355 0.718705355 0.718705355 
139 
Contribution % 75% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.301729605 0.301729605 0.236948259 0.236948259 0.236948259   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.393759974 0.393759974 0.393759974   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.358210826 0.358210826 0.358210826   
RISK LEVEL 0.970789643 0.810657912 0.810657912 0.703113137 0.703113137 0.703113137 0.703113137 
140 
Contribution % 100% 50% 0% 25% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.50141344 0.50141344 0.393759974 0.393759974 0.393759974   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.4561452 0.4561452 0.358210826 0.358210826 0.358210826   
RISK LEVEL 0.966243219 0.796820373 0.796820373 0.687520918 0.687520918 0.687520918 0.687520918 
141 
Contribution % 0% 75% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.32103456 0.32103456 0.25210844 0.25210844 0.25210844   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.277933502 0.277933502 0.277933502   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.252841313 0.252841313 0.252841313   
RISK LEVEL 0.984428916 0.702570406 0.702570406 0.596513807 0.596513807 0.596513807 0.596513807 
142 
Contribution % 25% 75% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.285014482 0.285014482 0.223821873 0.223821873 0.223821873   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.277933502 0.277933502 0.277933502   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.252841313 0.252841313 0.252841313   
RISK LEVEL 0.979882492 0.686791345 0.686791345 0.581253254 0.581253254 0.581253254 0.581253254 
143 
Contribution % 50% 75% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.248994405 0.248994405 0.195535306 0.195535306 0.195535306   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.277933502 0.277933502 0.277933502   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.252841313 0.252841313 0.252841313   
RISK LEVEL 0.975336068 0.671012285 0.671012285 0.5659927 0.5659927 0.5659927 0.5659927 
144 
Contribution % 75% 75% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.212974327 0.212974327 0.167248739 0.167248739 0.167248739   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.277933502 0.277933502 0.277933502   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.252841313 0.252841313 0.252841313   
RISK LEVEL 0.970789643 0.655233224 0.655233224 0.550732147 0.550732147 0.550732147 0.550732147 
145 
Contribution % 100% 75% 0% 25% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.35392016 0.35392016 0.277933502 0.277933502 0.277933502   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.3219678 0.3219678 0.252841313 0.252841313 0.252841313   
RISK LEVEL 0.966243219 0.639454163 0.639454163 0.535471593 0.535471593 0.535471593 0.535471593 
146 
Contribution % 0% 100% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.18724608 0.18724608 0.147044347 0.147044347 0.147044347   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.162107029 0.162107029 0.162107029   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.147471801 0.147471801 0.147471801   
RISK LEVEL 0.984428916 0.476141325 0.476141325 0.390710418 0.390710418 0.390710418 0.390710418 
147 
Contribution % 25% 100% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.16623707 0.16623707 0.130545971 0.130545971 0.130545971   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.162107029 0.162107029 0.162107029   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.147471801 0.147471801 0.147471801   
RISK LEVEL 0.979882492 0.462600016 0.462600016 0.378925177 0.378925177 0.378925177 0.378925177 
148 
Contribution % 50% 100% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.14522806 0.14522806 0.114047595 0.114047595 0.114047595   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.162107029 0.162107029 0.162107029   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.147471801 0.147471801 0.147471801   
RISK LEVEL 0.975336068 0.449058706 0.449058706 0.367139935 0.367139935 0.367139935 0.367139935 
149 
Contribution % 75% 100% 0% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.124219049 0.124219049 0.09754922 0.09754922 0.09754922   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.162107029 0.162107029 0.162107029   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.147471801 0.147471801 0.147471801   
RISK LEVEL 0.970789643 0.435517397 0.435517397 0.355354693 0.355354693 0.355354693 0.355354693 
150 
Contribution % 100% 100% 0% 25% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.20642688 0.20642688 0.162107029 0.162107029 0.162107029   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.1877904 0.1877904 0.147471801 0.147471801 0.147471801   
RISK LEVEL 0.966243219 0.421976088 0.421976088 0.343569452 0.343569452 0.343569452 0.343569452 
151 
Contribution % 0% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.7224 0.54626082 0.428978622 0.428978622 0.428978622   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.472921615 0.472921615 0.472921615   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.430225653 0.430225653 0.430225653   
RISK LEVEL 0.984428916 0.984428916 0.918391507 0.828513291 0.828513291 0.828513291 0.828513291 
152 
Contribution % 25% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.64134672 0.484970356 0.380847221 0.380847221 0.380847221   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.472921615 0.472921615 0.472921615   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.430225653 0.430225653 0.430225653   
RISK LEVEL 0.979882492 0.979882492 0.907367944 0.814058673 0.814058673 0.814058673 0.814058673 
153 
Contribution % 50% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.56029344 0.56029344 0.423679892 0.332715819 0.332715819 0.332715819   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.472921615 0.472921615 0.472921615   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.430225653 0.430225653 0.430225653   
RISK LEVEL 0.975336068 0.975336068 0.896344381 0.799604056 0.799604056 0.799604056 0.799604056 
154 
Contribution % 75% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.47924016 0.47924016 0.362389428 0.284584418 0.284584418 0.284584418   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.472921615 0.472921615 0.472921615   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.430225653 0.430225653 0.430225653   
RISK LEVEL 0.970789643 0.970789643 0.885320818 0.785149438 0.785149438 0.785149438 0.785149438 
155 
Contribution % 100% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0%   





Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.7964 0.60221777 0.472921615 0.472921615 0.472921615   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.7245 0.547848788 0.430225653 0.430225653 0.430225653   
RISK LEVEL 0.966243219 0.966243219 0.874297255 0.77069482 0.77069482 0.77069482 0.77069482 
156 
Contribution % 0% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.7224 0.58861152 0.445093316 0.349531781 0.349531781 0.349531781   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.385336532 0.385336532 0.385336532   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.350547862 0.350547862 0.350547862   
RISK LEVEL 0.984428916 0.940827945 0.843537303 0.740336662 0.740336662 0.740336662 0.740336662 
157 
Contribution % 25% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0%   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 0.64134672 0.522569307 0.395153846 0.310314315 0.310314315 0.310314315   
  
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Heating 
0.7964 0.64890672 0.490687039 0.385336532 0.385336532 0.385336532   
Failure rate (f/yr.) 
Cooling 
0.7245 0.5903226 0.446387192 0.350547862 0.350547862 0.350547862   






Appendix III Data Validation 
The Environment pollution parameters shown in Table 7-2 and  
Table 7-3 were calculated using the following steps: 
The total energy demand for one week in summer is 8,341.43 MWh 
1- The total CO2 pollution in case of the source of energy is the utility 8,341.43*865= 
7,215.34 Ton CO2  
2- The RES energy production is 283.5231 MWh with zero emission of CO2 
subsequently the total CO2 pollution will be reduced to 8,057.91*865+283.5231*0= 
6,970.1 Ton CO2 
3- The GT Co-gen. energy production is (5,819.0026 + 1,010.762) MWh and the CO2 
emission is 570 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen. emission = 1,228.15*865+283.5231*0+6,829.76*570= 
4,955.3 Ton CO2 
4- The GT Co-gen. energy production is (5,819.0026 + 310.762) MWh and the CO2 
emission is 570 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen. emission = 1,228.15*865+283.5231*0+6,129.76*570= 
4,556.3 Ton CO2 
5- The GT Co-gen. energy production reduced to 5,819.0026 MWh and the CO2 
emission is 570 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 5.99*865+283.5231*0+5,819.0026*570= 
3,322.0 Ton CO2 
6- The FC Co-gen. energy production is (5,819.0026 + 1,010.762) MWh and the CO2 
emission is 513 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 1,228.15*865+283.5231*0+6,829.76*513= 
4,566.0 Ton CO2 
7- The FC Co-gen. energy production reduced to 5,819.0026 MWh and the CO2 
emission is 513 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 5.99*865+283.5231*0+5,819.0026*513= 




8- Operation price for GT: 5,819.0026 MWh *10+x=132,710 CAD$, the operation cost 
is 10CAD/MWh, x=74,520 
Operation price for FC: 5,819.0026 MWh *10*(0.03/0.0275) +74,520= 183,000 
CAD$ 
Operation price for MT: 5,819.0026 MWh *10*(0.016/0.0275) +74,520= 108,380 
CAD$ 
Operation price for DE: 5,819.0026 MWh *10*(0.055/0.0275) +74,520= 190,900 
CAD$ 
9- The MT Co-gen. energy production is (5,819.0026 + 1,010.762) MWh and the CO2 
emission is 700 kg/MWh. Therefore the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 1,228.15*865+283.5231*0+6,829.76*700= 
5,843.2 Ton CO2 
10- The MT Co-gen. energy production reduced to 5,819.0026 MWh and the CO2 
emission is 700 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 5.99*865+283.5231*0+5,819.0026*700= 
4,078.5 Ton CO2 
11- The DE Co-gen. energy production increased to (5,819.0026 + 1,010.762) MWh and 
the CO2 emission is 657 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility 
emission (for heat and electricity generation) + RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 
1,228.15*865+283.5231*0+6,829.76*657= 5,549.5 Ton CO2 
12- The DE Co-gen. energy production reduced to 5,819.0026 MWh and the CO2 
emission is 657 kg/MWh. Therefore, the total CO2 emission is: Utility emission + 
RES emission + Co-gen, emission = 5.99*865+283.5231*0+5,819.0026*657= 
3,828.3 Ton CO2 
 
